LIBRARY OF PRINCETON
JUN 21 1919
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

Division DK46
Section .B98

THE NEW EASTERN EUROPE

THE NEW EASTERN EUROPE

LIBRARY OF PRINCETON
JUN 21 1919
THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

BY
RALPH BUTLER

LONGMANS, GREEN, AND CO.
39 PATERNOSTER ROW, LONDON
FOURTH AVENUE AND 30TH STREET, NEW YORK
BOMBAY, CALCUTTA AND MADRAS

1919

All rights reserved

PREFACE

THE chapters on Poland and Lithuania originally appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, the chapter on Finland in the *Fortnightly Review*, and the chapter on the Ukraine in the *Edinburgh Review* : the writer gratefully acknowledges in all these cases permission to reprint. The three chapters on Poland were written, the first just before the Russian Revolution, the second just before the negotiations at Brest, the third just after the Armistice at the end of 1918. It was originally intended to re-write them from the standpoint of the date of publication. On consideration, however, they have been left as they were written, in the belief that it is no bad way of treating the difficult and complicated Polish question to record its development as it presented itself at three critical stages.

The matter of orthography in the case of a book on Eastern Europe is troublesome. In the case of Russian names the writer has generally followed the practice of Dr. Dillon, whose authority is quite unequalled in England, based as it is not only on an exceptionally intimate experience of Russian politics but on an expert knowledge of Slavonic philology. Little Russian personal names, however (but not place-names), are written in this book in the Ukranian form : for example, Hrushevsky, not Grushevsky. The case of Polish is more difficult. To transliterate a language using the Latin alphabet, to write, for example, ' Wuj ' or ' Woodge ' for ' Łódź,' seems in the nature of a linguistic impertinence. On the other hand, it is useless to expect English and American readers to acquire a knowledge of the forty-six Polish letters and double-letters. The average reader ignores all strange-looking diacritical marks,

and pronounces Łódź as 'Lods,' indifferently whether the word is written 'Łódź' or 'Lodz.' The compromise adopted in this book is to omit all diacritical marks in the case of personal and place-names, but to include them in the case of any other Polish words. It is not a very satisfactory compromise. If Poland is once again to play a prominent part in Europe, some orthographic *modus vivendi* will have to be evolved for purposes of West European intercourse. *The New Europe*, whose services to the student of foreign politics during the War it would be difficult to overrate, has made an interesting attempt to solve the problem by writing all Slavonic names in Croat. It is, however, a solution which the other Slavonic nations can hardly be expected to appreciate. To some it will seem almost to savour of monomania.

Bibliographical references are apt to be tiresome in a book of essays of this kind: but a certain number of references to French and German books published since the War, and to one or two notable books of earlier date, have been included. It is hoped these will be of service to some students.

CONTENTS

Chapter		
	Introduction	1
I.	The Fourth Scandinavian State	7
II.	The New Balticum	21
III.	The New Lithuania	56
IV.	Poland 1917	68
V.	Poland 1918	103
VI.	Poland 1919	119
VII.	The Ukranian Movement	131
	Index	165

THE NEW EASTERN EUROPE

INTRODUCTION

THE new borderland of nations, which has come into existence between Russia and Central Europe, constitutes a political group for which it is convenient to use the collective expression 'Eastern Europe.' It is with this group of nations that the present volume is concerned. Russia forms the background to them all. But Russia is not here treated separately; for on Russia there is available in English an extensive and excellent literature, and the events of the War period in Russia, at any rate since the Revolution, have been fully reported in the Press. On the East European nations, on the other hand, very little has been reported in the Press, and the literature available in English is peculiarly scant. Before the War there was perhaps no region in Europe of which so little was known in England. The Balkans, the Islamic lands, the Far East, were all better known. There was a certain interest in Finland; for the constitutional dispute between Finland and Russia had attracted attention. There were some works on Polish history and politics; but the best of them, an Essay by the late Lord Salisbury, was half a century old.[1] On the Ukranian Question a

[1] By far the best introduction in English to contemporary Polish questions is Mr. Geoffrey Drage's *Pre-War Statistics of Poland and Lithuania* in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, vol. lxxxi. pt. ii. (March 1918). An English translation of *Petite Encyclopédie Polonaise* (Lausanne, 1916), one of the principal authorities used by Mr. Drage for the above paper, appeared at the beginning of 1919 (*Poland, Her People, History, Industries, &c.*, London, 1919—the date on the title-page is wrongly printed 1909).

Prof. Alison Phillips in his volume on Poland (London, 1915) has an interesting chapter on the Ukranian Movement, written from a different point of view from that taken up in this volume.

couple of pamphlets had appeared before the War. On Lithuania and the three races of the Baltic Provinces there were no sources of information in English at all. That the Foreign Office possessed a store of esoteric intelligence on all these countries does not appear probable from a consideration of the policy which it has pursued. Ministers have had to pioneer *in terra incognita*, without any of that preliminary clearing of the ground which is afforded by public discussion in books and newspapers.

The object of this book, appearing at an hour when the diplomats of all the belligerents are assembling to redraw the map of Europe, is not to discuss policy, still less to attack or defend the policy of this or that Government, but to give a conspectus of the material on which any discussion of policy must be based. It takes in turn each of the five regions, Finland, the Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, Poland, and the Ukraine, and endeavours to bring into relief the factors which in each compose the situation. Two main factors dominate the situation in all these countries. The first is Nationalism, a political movement drawing its inspiration from ideas, which were more current in the last century than this, but are by no means yet exhausted. The second is Socialism, an economic movement, in its East European development a movement of the twentieth century, first awakening to consciousness in the Russian Revolution of 1905. The interaction of these two movements during the twelve years between the first Russian Revolution in 1905 and the second in 1917 constitutes the principal theme of this book. Sometimes, as in Finland, the two are in open conflict. Sometimes, as in Poland, the political dominates the economic movement. Sometimes, as in the Ukraine, the economic movement dominates the political. But more often the two are found working in combination under the influence of a common hostility to Russia. After the second revolution the tendency is to conflict; and in this conflict Socialism labours under one great disadvantage. Its literature and tradition are industrial; and the conditions, to which it has to

be applied in Eastern Europe, are agricultural. In most of the East European countries—Finland is an exception—the Socialists have no thought-out agrarian policy. When the question of the land is raised, they either take refuge in rhetoric, or they adopt *en plein* the agrarian programme of the Russian Revolutionaries. But the conditions in Russia and in Eastern Europe are not identical. The Agrarian Revolution in Russia has been based on the principle of communal ownership, which is in harmony with the profoundly Socialistic Russian temperament, and in the working of which the Russian peasants have had long experience in the village communes. But the Russian commune is not an East European institution. To the Finnish, or Lettish, or Polish peasant, even to the Ukranian peasant, it makes scant appeal. The attempt to apply it to East European social conditions at once rallies to the side of Reaction every class or individual which owns any property at all. This development has been most conspicuous in the case of the Ukraine, and is discussed at length in the chapter devoted to the Ukranian Movement. The influence of the mighty Agrarian Revolution in Russia is already felt in a hundred ways, and will in future, no doubt, be felt increasingly. But for the present property in Eastern Europe seems still too fundamental an institution easily to be disturbed.

A new Balkans has been created in Eastern Europe; and no diplomatic reversal of the Treaty of Brest can reverse the facts of the situation. The Ukraine may join with Russia again, for Little Russia is one of All the Russias after all. But the non-Russian, non-Orthodox races of the Borderland, Finns, Balts, Letts, Esths, Lithuanians, Poles, are now launched for good or bad on an independent career. Hitherto they have been held in artificial equilibrium by the presence of the German armies. Now these are being withdrawn, and there is beginning to ensue, as in the Balkans when the Turkish power was removed, a jostling of infant nationalities struggling to find their feet. The young Balkan States could look to powerful neighbours,

Austria on the one hand and Russia on the other, for support; and the rest of Europe could preserve the peace of the Balkans, *tant bien que mal,* by balancing the rival influences of these two Powers. But the two great neighbours of the new Eastern Europe are both in collapse: and the friction between the several States has a free field. Force, in the shape of international Armies of Occupation, can no doubt hold it in suspense, as the Austro-German Occupation held it in suspense. But a mistake will be made if it is supposed that it can be dissipated by force—still less by diplomatic machinery. Friction in the case of young Nationalisms in conflict is a process of biological growth.

Much will depend on the stability which the new States are able to develop for themselves in the first decade of their existence. Political stability in Eastern Europe is mainly dependent on agrarian conditions. The analogy with the Balkans is again illuminating. It will be long before unhappy Roumania recovers from her present disasters, because her internal weakness arises out of the concentration of the land in the hands of her governing oligarchy. Bulgaria survived the scarcely less crushing disasters of 1913 with an elasticity which surprised the world, because the Bulgarian State has the stability of its land-owning peasantry. Even in Western Europe not a few historians have ascribed the recovery of France after 1870 to the stabilising influence of the French peasantry. For the economic structure of an agricultural country no better base has yet been discovered than a peasantry in possession of the land. The attempt is made in this book to show in some relief the elements in each country, out of which such a peasantry can be formed. It must be admitted on a general conspectus that they do not at present bulk largely in the view. The initial conditions in the new Eastern Europe are less favourable in this respect than they were in the Balkan States after the abolition of Turkish rule. There is less to build on, and more to be done.

The most uncertain factor of the future is Poland. Ten years of anarchy at the outset in Poland would lead, not only to a Fourth Partition, or some similar measure such as International Control, in Poland itself, but in all probability to the collapse of the other States as well. The Poles are a baffling race. In all Europe there is no people, with the possible exception of the French, which is naturally so gifted. No one can study Eastern Europe without feeling that they are infinitely the most attractive of the peoples with which he has to do. They are the only one in whose composition there is included that subtle *differentia* which marks off the 'big' nation from the 'small.' Their culture is not borrowed: it is original and creative, the true expression of their national genius and their historic tradition. Yet in the political sphere their genius is strangely unfruitful. They are of those artists who produce nothing. Their conceptions are brilliant, but they have no technique, and do not see the need of it: and they never finish their work. Their political capacity is, as it were, negative. Their resistance to outside pressure is amazing; but they seem unable to develop their own strength. Lack of positive qualities, of discipline on the one hand and of moderation on the other, brought them to their fate in the eighteenth century. In the nineteenth century their negative qualities found their scope: and they may fairly claim that by a hundred years of successful resistance alike to Russian and to Teuton penetration they have proved to the world that they can be neither absorbed nor crushed. To-day their captivity is over, and they are free to rebuild their fallen State. Yet they are rent by internecine quarrels: all their old imperialism has revived: and instead of betaking themselves to trowel and mortar, and with prayer and fasting each man labouring night and day at the foundations, they sit disputing amid the ruins whether they shall ally themselves with Babylon or the Mede, while their trumpeters and shawm-players march in procession to all the cities of Philistia to

proclaim, when their greatness is re-established, how great that greatness will be. Here, for example, is the matured utterance in the summer of 1918 of a Society founded by, and in close touch with, the then Polish Prime Minister[1] :—

> The Allies, when they declare that a Poland united, strong and independent, both politically and economically (with access to the sea), is an indispensable requisite for a stable peace, admit what appears to be a self-evident truth. That truth is simply this, that Russia has for many years ceased to exist as a real power, and in order to secure the European equilibrium it is necessary to replace her by a new factor, that is, by Poland. Poland appears perfectly designed to group around her all the Slavonic peoples, united amongst themselves by bonds of amity and by more or less close alliance. Here we are face to face with a really sound idea which, as we are glad to see, has entered into the War calculations of the Entente as a positive value.

Megalomania so childish, so pitifully out of all relation to the world of actualities, induces a sinking in the breast of every friend of Poland. And yet, when the student is tempted to think all Poles are like this, he must never lose sight of what the Poles have accomplished in Poznania by slow methodic toil, with iron discipline, and with a self-abnegation which makes the heart ache to see it. The prospect in Poland looks brightest when seen from this quarter, and the writer has endeavoured to give it full prominence in the following pages. It would be absurd to say that all the problems of Warsaw find their solution in Posen. Nevertheless, in the writer's opinion, the future in Poland in the next ten years depends very largely on whether Warsaw is prepared to seek in Posen its inspiration.

[1] The Society is La Pologne et la Guerre of Lausanne; and the Manifesto, from which this passage is quoted, was published in *The New Europe*, August 15, 1918. *The New Europe* in publishing it expressed the opinion that 'it may be accepted as embodying the views of the great majority of Poles in their own country, though for very obvious reasons it could not be publicly endorsed by the Government of Warsaw under military occupation.'

CHAPTER I

THE FOURTH SCANDINAVIAN STATE

'Caesar knew Gaul better than the Western nations know Eastern Europe.'—ALEXANDER HERZEN.

OF the various alien races, which before the War Russia held in subjection within her Western border three —the Poles, the Lithuanians, and the Finns—at some previous period of their history enjoyed an independent existence. The memory of that independence was kept green in the days of their captivity. By the waters of Babylon they sang the songs of Sion; and when the day came that Babylon the Great was fallen, they set out with rejoicing to rebuild the Temple in Salem by the favour, and at the direction, of Cyrus the Mede. Of these three races more was known in Western Europe of the Finns than of either of the other two. There was—before the War—no oppressed people which had so successfully exploited its grievances in Western ears. They had known how to mobilise half the Universities of Europe to plead their cause. At one time they had Protests from half a dozen European Parliaments lying on the table of the Russian Duma. Their story, as they told it, was the story of a wicked Government and an oppressed people, a villain nation and a hero nation, Reaction panoplied against Liberty, just as in Naples or Austria in the 'fifties, or any of the other classics of British Liberalism, with the Middle Class well in the foreground of the picture taking 'their natural place' as leaders and no troublesome social problems to complicate the issue. The War has revealed the gaps in this account, and the falseness which is inherent in all propaganda is painfully in evidence. It is clear now to all the world, writ large in the atrocious reprisals of the

Whites and in the despairing resistance of the Reds, that the real issue in Finland is not between Russian tyrant and Finnish victim, but between one-half of Finland brigaded against the other, with Russia helping the one and Germany supporting the other. On this issue the Finnish propagandists before the War had little to say. One may read books and brochures mountains high from the pens of these writers, and find no mention of such a thing as a Red Guard or a White Guard. And yet Red Guards and White Guards were not making their first appearance in Finland in the winter of 1917.

When Finland passed from Swedish into Russian hands in 1809, the Tsar Alexander was under the impression that he had annexed a Swedish province. The culture was Swedish; the religion was Swedish; when he visited the country the language in which the Diet greeted him was Swedish. The peasants, he was told, spoke a barbarous tongue of their own; but for all Alexander knew that might well be a dialect of Swedish, as Little Russian was of Russian. He was not interested in the matter. Very few persons at this time were. There was, however, in Helsingfors a small group of Swedish academics, who had been awakened to the life, and above all to the language, of the peasants. Rousseau's conception of the Noble Savage, then universally acclaimed in polite circles in Scandinavia, had invested with a novel glamour the ugly-looking Mongols, with whom most of the Helsingfors intellectuals had grown up. Wolf's 'Prolegomena to Homer,' a book whose repercussions outside the philological field are curiously extensive in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, had directed attention to the possibility of the preservation of a national literature over long periods by oral tradition without the use of writing. The bearing of Wolf's thesis on the ancient Finnish folk-songs seized the imagination of the Helsingfors savant Lönnrot. For many years he collected them, taking them down in writing from the mouths of village singers. When he had collected 12,000 lines he arranged them in Runes,

or Books, as Peisistratus is said to have arranged the Homeric poems, and in 1835 produced them as the Finnish national epic with the title 'Kalewala.'[1] *Si parva licet componere magnis*, Lönnrot's publication of the 'Kalewala' was to the Finnish tongue and people what the *Divine Comedy* was to the Italian tongue and Italy. It is the date with which the history of modern Finland begins.

But the national epic was no more than the foundation on which the fabric of the national language had to be built up. The vocabulary of Wainamoinen and the beauteous Aino, as may be imagined, contained no ready equivalents for 'proportional representation,' 'intensive agriculture,' and other conceptions, in which the modern Finn is largely interested. The expansion of the vocabulary took time; and the Finnish revivalists found that it was not possible to hasten the process, as the Czechs at the same period were finding in Bohemia, and the Gaelic League is finding in Ireland to-day. But numbers told. Of the 3,000,000 inhabitants of Finland over 2,500,000 are Finns and under 500,000 are Swedes. Once the majority became 'tongue-conscious,' it was bound to prevail over the minority. The language early obtained political recognition; in 1863, twenty-eight years after the publication of the 'Kalewala,' it was permitted as an alternative to Swedish in the Courts of Law and in the Diet; in 1886 it was allowed for official correspondence; and in 1894 it was admitted to the Senate. In the year 1915 there were 274 newspapers in Finnish, 103 in Swedish, and seven with Finnish and Swedish in parallel columns. The street-names in the towns are placarded in two languages, as in Dublin. The University of Helsingfors has three academic languages—Finnish, Swedish, and Latin—and there are, or used to be, one or two Professors who lectured alternately in Finnish and Swedish, to the intense discomfiture of the foreign student. The Finns

[1] Kalewala (pronounced Kálĕwălă not Kălĕwálă) is the country (Finland) from which the heroes go out for adventures into Pohjola (Lapland), the mysterious Land of the North.

have captured the two National Societies of Science and Literature; and the Swedes have founded two rival Societies in self-defence. The strongholds of Swedish are the houses of the landed gentry, in which remnants of old-fashioned Swedish culture still linger. The numbers of the landed gentry are dwindling, and the day of their political and social influence is over; but in the past they formed the nucleus of a movement which has preserved a compact island of Swedish culture amid the rising flood of Finnish nationalism, and they still leaven the middle-class *intelligentsia*, in which they are being merged. The language issue may indeed be said to be *chose jugée*. Undermost is now uppermost, as a Czech patriot once observed of Bohemia. But, like the German tradition in Bohemia, the tradition of a superior Swedish culture still lingers in Finland, sometimes in unexpected places: there are few beggars in Finland, but if the traveller meets with one he may be sure that the language in which he will be asked an alms will be Swedish. As to what the Swedes themselves think of the position, the writer takes leave to quote the following story from the delightful pages of a clever English traveller,[1] who visited Finland only two or three years before the War. It is the traveller's first visit to a Finnish country house:—

Celia and I . . . found ourselves talking to an agreeable, elderly man, a senator of some kind, who spoke fluent but Teutonic English. It was quite soon after our arrival [in Finland], when she had yet learnt little of Swede-Finn controversy, so Celia chanced to say, in all innocence:

'Of course, you write and speak Finnish?'

He went a bright salmon-pink, and replied:

'Got-d forpit-d!'

The Fennoman movement—such is the name given to the Finnish Renascence[2]—would perhaps not have

[1] R. Travers (Mrs. H. M. Hyndman), *Letters from Finland*, London, 1911.

[2] The Latin words 'Fennoman' and 'Svecoman' are generally used both by Finns and Swedes to describe respectively the Finnish and the Swedish elements in Finland.

gone so far, had it been purely linguistic. But it had almost from the first a political—and it now has in addition an economic—aspect, in which the linguistic side of the movement has been wellnigh lost. In its early days the movement was welcomed by the Russians as a check to the Swedophil sentiments which had lasted in some circles, principally amongst the Svecoman aristocracy, for long after the Russian annexation. The political party, which is now known as the Old Finns, had its origin in the early Fennomans, who, in order to secure the tolerance of the Russian Government for their nationalist propaganda, pursued a strong Russophil policy. In later years, and especially during the period of Russification before the War, the Old Finns were opportunist, and are now paying the penalty which in the end political opportunism always pays. Their record somewhat resembles that of the Polish National Democrats; before the War, though widely distrusted, they served for many years as the focus of an otherwise unorganised body of Finnish opinion, which, if not exactly Russophil, was disposed to compromise and anxious to avoid conflict. But their strength in the Diet has for some years been declining.[1]

The one other party in Finland, which could be said to have Russian sympathies, was the Socialists; but, as may be imagined, it was not towards official Russia that their sympathies were directed. The doctrines of Social Democracy came late in the day to Finland;

[1] The fluctuations of the parties in the Diet during the last ten years are worth tabulating:

Elections of	1907	1908	1909	1910	1911	1916	1917
Socialists . .	80	83	83	86	87	103	92
Old Finns . .	58	53	48	42	42	33	61
Young Finns . .	25	26	28	28	28	22	
Agrarians . .	7	7	15	12	11	19	26
Svecomans . .	24	25	25	26	26	21	21
Christian Workers .	2	2	1	1	1	1	—

The Agrarians (Conservative *intelligentsia*) and Young Finns (Liberal *intelligentsia*) represent the Centre: the Svecomans the Right. The Agrarians poll what there is of a clerical vote in Finland. The Christian Worker is a crank.

it was not until 1903 that the political party was organised. Like the British Labour Party, it grew up out of a Federation of Trade Unions. It maintained close relations with the Russian and Jewish revolutionaries. In Finland its activities were at first concentrated on agitation for the reform of the Diet. The Diet, for the maintenance of which the Svecomans and their friends in Europe were shedding at this period many tears, was a thoroughly reactionary body, the last survival of a Parliamentary type once common in Northern Europe. It consisted of four Estates—Nobles, Clerics, Burghers, and Peasants—with a very limited franchise for the last. The second constitutional factor was the Senate, which by a curious arrangement combined the functions of an Upper House to the Diet with those of an irresponsible Executive on the German or American model. The theory of the Constitution gave to the Tsar Grand Duke concurrent legislative and administrative powers, the extent and limitations of which were the subject of hot dispute between Russian and Finnish lawyers.

When the Revolution broke out in Russia in 1905, the Socialists in Finland, as elsewhere, leapt to seize the helm. Finland was seething with discontent. The country had just been subjected under the well-known Governor-General Bobrikov to six years of resolute 'Russification.' The Constitution had been cut and pared and the powers of the Russian Governor-General increased. The Russian language had been introduced in the Administration, the University, and the schools. Worst of all, the Finlanders for the first time had been made liable to the Russian Conscription. Since Finland became a part of Russia no Finlander had ever served, save as a Volunteer, in the Russian Army. Conscription was no more popular than it is in Ireland ; and in Finland, as in Ireland, all, or almost all, parties were united in the feeling that, if it was to be introduced, it must be by legislation of the Diet and not of the Imperial Government. On this question something like a 'Sacred Union' had been achieved when the Revolution broke out at Petrograd,

and the Tsar's Government reeled under the shock, and all the Provincial Administrations were paralysed. It was the hour of the subject nations. Poles, Letts, Jews, and Armenians were in open revolt. In Finland the revolt took the form of an extremely complete General Strike, which the Socialists organised, opposing without bloodshed a blank wall of passive resistance to every operation of government. After six days the Government capitulated unconditionally. A ukase was hurriedly drawn up and signed by the Tsar, and brought to Helsingfors by one of de Witte's private secretaries—not without difficulty, for the train service had joined the Strike. It repealed unconditionally the most obnoxious part of the Russifying measures of the previous six years On the military question a compromise had already been arranged: Finland was once again exempted from the Russian Conscription, but in return the Finnish Legislature undertook to pay an annual contribution to the Imperial Treasury.

The role played by the Socialists in this successful Revolution surprised everyone. Nobody up to now in Finland had taken the Socialists very seriously. Socialism in Finland was so new a growth that the Russian authorities had not realised its significance. The Finnish bourgeoisie was equally amazed at its meteoric emergence, though in the first stage of the Revolution they followed its lead implicitly, as men will follow a leader in a crisis. The extent to which Fennoman Socialist and Svecoman bourgeois have combined against the Russian has always been exaggerated in Western Europe, because Western Europe has taken its information from Svecoman sources. On this occasion the 'Sacred Union' did not survive the turn of the year. After the capitulation of the Petrograd Government and the repeal of the Russifying legislation the bourgeois parties at once began to take alarm at the Socialist programme; and as it became apparent that the Russian Government was likely to regain control in Russia, the consequences of the Socialist alliance with

the Russian revolutionaries began to loom large to many prudent souls. The antipathy of bourgeois and Socialist came to a head at Sveaborg in the summer of 1906. The Russian garrison at Sveaborg having turned against its officers, the local Finnish Red Guard—the Socialists had organised a Red Guard at the outset of the Revolution—joined the Russian mutineers. There was a certain amount of disorder, and the bourgeoisie organised 'White Guards,' and—not without the help of the Russian Government—suppressed the Red Guard, and threw its leader into a Russian prison.

Having successfully carried through the General Strike and secured the capitulation of the Russian Government, the Socialists took no further part in the constitutional negotiations with Russia. The Russian Governor-General, Prince Obolensky, relied largely on the counsel of the Svecoman leader Dr. Mechelin, who had been brought back from the exile into which just before the Revolution he had been sent. The Socialists, without criticising, stood aloof from this arrangement, and devoted their energies entirely to agitation for reform of the Diet. Under their steady pressure the Diet was induced to pass a Bill (which was immediately confirmed by Petrograd) substituting for the four Estates a single Chamber of the most advanced type, with equal, adult, secret, proportional voting, for both sexes. Having thus secured a working instrument, the Socialists proceeded to draw up a programme which consisted entirely of social and economic reforms. Nothing is more striking in the welter of Russian revolutionary politics during the years 1905-1908 than the moderate policy of the Finnish Socialists. They offer an impressive contrast to the Polish Socialists during the same period. The Finns have that feeling for the essential and the unessential which is at the root of political aptitude, and which seems by nature to be lacking in the more talented Pole. While the Pole is formulating his rights, the Finn is discounting his claims. To the Pole politics is an end, to the Finn it is a means. The acute sense of political

values of the Finnish Socialists was twice shown in these years—first when, after the General Strike, they subordinated national policy to constitutional reform; secondly when, the Reform Bill once carried, they abandoned political for economic measures. In neither case had they secured more than an initial success; the abrogation of the Russifying laws left the powers of the Tsar to initiate new ones undiminished; and the reform of the Diet left the position of the Senate untouched. But the Socialists had the instinct, rare indeed in a Revolutionary Party, not to press their victory. They knew, what scarcely any Pole ever learns, that half a loaf is better than the noblest vindication of the right to unlimited bread.

In this spirit they proceeded to carry through the reformed Diet, not without the co-operation of one or other of the bourgeois parties—for the Socialists had not as yet a majority in the Diet—a Land Bill, a Temperance (Total Abolition) Bill, a (Compulsory) Education Bill, a Bill for removing Jewish disabilities (which under the old Finnish Constitution were fully as severe in Finland as in Russia), and some elementary measures of factory legislation. But the establishment of the Constitution in Russia had introduced a new factor into the Finnish situation. Up till this time there had been in Finland a dual authority, on the one hand the Finnish Diet, on the other hand the Russian Autocrat. The Russian Autocrat had now handed over his powers to Constitutional Ministers and a Parliament. Had he handed over his powers in Finland to the new Constitutional Government in Russia? The Finns maintained that he had not. The Russian Ministers maintained that he had; and the Third and Fourth Dumas agreed with them. With the suppression of the Revolution the Russian bureaucracy had resolved to reintroduce the Russifying policy in Finland. Constitutionalism was now the order of the day; and, indeed, the methods of the Bobrikov regime stood condemned by their results. *Soit!* The new Russification should proceed on Constitutional

lines. With this end in view the Russian Government prepared and passed through the Duma during the years 1909–1914 a quantity of legislation relating to Russo-Finnish, and sometimes to purely Finnish, questions. To all this legislation the Finnish Diet at the instance of the bourgeois parties, with the occasional exception of the Old Finns, opposed a passive resistance. When the laws were referred to the Diet for its opinion the Diet refused to consider them. Certain Finnish judges declared them illegal. To this policy of passive resistance the Socialists gave a general adhesion, but were at pains on more than one occasion to proclaim solidarity with the Russian proletariate. In 1910, when one of the Russian Bills came before the Diet, one of the Socialist leaders, speaking for the Party, uttered the following words, striking enough in the light of subsequent events:

> This Bill is a crime against our small nation, which might well destroy all sense of moral obligation on our part towards Russia. . . . Yet for all this one fact remains. Our wrath and bitterness are not directed against the Russian people, for they have made cruel sacrifices for freedom, and their blood was shed to pay for rights that Finland won. We have learnt to distinguish between the Russian Government and the Russian people, and we know that the latter one day will make reparation for the former's crimes.[1]

This second period of conflict between Finland and Russia was a time of industrial expansion and commercial prosperity in Finland. The prosperity reached its climax in the first two years of the War. Finland, exempt from all forms of military service, was free to devote herself to meeting the practically unlimited demand of Russia for manufactured articles of almost every kind. With the Baltic and the Black Sea closed by the Central Powers, Russia was ready to take all the timber that Finland could send her. In the dearth of imported coal the railways and factories were almost from the first reduced to using wood fuel. The demand

[1] Quoted from Mrs. Hyndman, *op. cit.*

for wood pulp and paper was also unlimited; and the timber industry in Finland had never known such expansion. Besides her timber industry, Finland has in recent years developed flourishing metal and textile industries, the raw materials for which she has to import; these, too, were set to work for the Russian armies, and as long as the supply of raw materials lasted profits were enormous. Prices—quoted in Finnish marks, which had to some extent escaped the depreciation of the Russian rouble—soared upwards unchecked by any Russian legislation. Dividends of 30 per cent.—an unheard-of figure in these infant industries—intoxicated the Finnish shareholder, and fortunes were lost and won on the Helsingfors Bourse. There was at first little shortage of foodstuffs; and when in 1916 the stiffening of the British blockade began to check the flow of food imports from the Scandinavian countries, the Finnish Senate sought relief by prohibiting the export of Finnish farm produce to Russia. The increase in the profits of the capitalist was followed by a demand for corresponding increase of wages; and, as in every belligerent country, the readjustment of the national wage-bill was not unattended by friction. The growth of the proletariate in the towns as a consequence of the industrial expansion brought new voting strength to the Socialist Party, and incidentally added to the unruly elements of the population. At the elections of 1916 the Socialists obtained an absolute majority in the Diet, returning 103 out of 200 members. When a few months later the Revolution broke out in Russia, it found the Finnish bourgeoisie in an alarmed and suspicious frame of mind. The disorders which accompanied the Revolution in Helsingfors, and particularly in Viborg, where a detachment of Russian soldiers put some twenty officers to death at the instigation of Finnish agitators from Helsingfors, recalled unpleasant memories of the Sveaborg affair in 1906; and it was largely by way of counter-propaganda to the Socialists, and as a means of cutting the connection between the latter and the revolutionaries

in Petrograd, that the bourgeois parties began soon after the establishment of Kerensky's Government to press for the complete independence of Finland. The Socialists were not disinclined for independence. 'Twenty years of resolute Government' had shorn the Russian connection of the last of its charms for almost every Finn. But the Socialists were on terms of 'fraternal' co-operation with the Russian revolutionaries, the Parliamentary Party for the most part supporting Kerensky, while outside elements, including the powerful Red Guard, which had been re-established towards the end of 1917, were for the Bolshevists. Neither section was anxious to offend Russian susceptibilities, and both distrusted profoundly the motives of the bourgeoisie and the influence which in an independent Finland they would inevitably exercise on foreign policy. In regard to Independence, therefore, the Party, as in 1906, left the initiative to the bourgeois parties, and in the voting in the Diet threw their influence on the side of moderation. In July 1917 the Diet by 136 votes to 55 passed a new Constitution for Finland, by which the Diet assumed supreme legislative authority on home affairs, taxation and customs, but recognised the existing Russian control in foreign affairs and in military legislation and administration. The Diet further assumed the powers previously resting with the Tsar Grand Duke; in future it was not to be dissolved without its own consent. At the same time the Senate was transformed into a responsible Ministry. The question of complete independence was raised by the Svecomans in an amendment, but the amendment was thrown out by the Socialist votes. On the other hand it was decided by 104 votes to 86—a fairly narrow margin—not to submit the Constitution for the approval of the Russian Provisional Government. The mouths of the minority were silenced by the sequel; for Petrograd had not yet unlearnt its traditional attitude towards Finland, and the immediate reply of the Russian Liberal Government to the new Constitution was to dissolve the Diet. It was the sixth time in ten years. The Hall of the Diet

was closed, but the Deputies continued to meet under an adjoining roof. It was the *jeu de paume* of the Finnish Revolution. The (Kerenskist) Governor-General endeavoured to form a Socialist Ministry. Strikes and riots took place throughout the country. In September the President of the Diet, without reference to the Governor-General, ordered new Elections; and the Senate drafted a Bill establishing complete independence. For one moment peace was patched up between Petrograd and Helsingfors; but at the same moment the Kerensky Administration collapsed. The Bolshevists then announced the summoning of the Constituent Assembly in Russia, and the parties in Finland were induced to await its decision. When the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, the Finnish bourgeois parties addressed an application to the Bolshevists, inquiring whether they were prepared to extend the right of self-determination to Finland and recognise Finnish independence. The Bolshevists replied in the affirmative, but at the same time they were sending Red Guards and machine-guns across the border to support the Finnish Red Guard in the struggle, which all now saw was impending. The Finnish bourgeoisie had already begun the formation of White Guards on the model of 1906; they were resolved to make an end of disorder, and the Red Guards, or a section of them, were equally determined to bring about a Bolshevist revolution. The stages by which street-fighting became merged in civil war were imperceptible. The White Guards had not the best of the struggle; they were pushed out of Helsingfors and the best part of Southern Finland, and several of their leaders were captured. But neither side possessed the weapons with which to wage serious war; and matters were approaching a deadlock when the White Guard Headquarters, having first for form's sake approached the Swedish Government, turned to that Power, to which the bourgeoisie of Eastern Europe were at this time generally directing their gaze, and German troops appeared off Abo in the familiar role of saviours of society.

It is impossible to read the story of the past twenty

years in Finland without being struck by the ineptitude displayed by the Russians for the task of governing the country. There were large sections of the population which, if not Russophil, were averse to Russophobe agitation. The Russians made no attempt to co-operate with them. On the military question the Russians had a very fair case, and, in fact, their claims were tacitly admitted by the Finns on more than one occasion. Yet the Russians could never approach the subject without raising a hornets' nest of opposition. Again and again the record of these twenty years in Finland reads like a chapter of Irish history. The truth is that the cleavage between the two nations is fundamental, extending far below the political irritation of the surface. Russia is a great nation, with a great culture of her own, which the Finns are temperamentally unfitted to share. Russia has a mission to fulfil to the world, a mission which she will yet fulfil, for the wounds from which she is now bleeding, terrible as they may seem, have with one exception none of them struck near the heart. Finland is a small nation. She has no mission to the world; the only mission of which she is conscious is to herself. She has no ' will to power,' no sense of the ' White Man's burden.' She abhors militarism and war, as only the small nations abhor it. She distrusts political idealism. Though not in blood Scandinavian, politically and geographically she is a part of Scandinavia. Her culture, like that of the Scandinavian nations, is a borrowed one, deriving in the past from Latin Europe and in the present mainly from Germany. She has the Scandinavian aptitude for self-government, and the Scandinavian *flair* for what the big nations pronounce ' advanced ' —that unmistakable parochial touch, which is to the elemental imaginings of the Slavonic genius as a matchlight is to the sun. The two cannot live together. Russia will be the healthier for the excision of this non-Slavonic element. Finland will be the happier for standing alone. Scandinavia as a whole will gain in interest from the addition of a new half-brother of non-Teutonic race.

CHAPTER II

THE NEW BALTICUM

[*Ethnological Note.*—The three Baltic Provinces are Courland, Livonia, and Esthonia. Of the original inhabitants, the Cours, Livs, and Esths, all of Ugro-Finnic (Mongolian) stock, speaking languages akin to modern Finnish, the Esths still inhabit Esthonia and the Northern part of Livonia; the Cours and Livs were displaced by the Letts, a tribe of Lithuanian (Indo-European, but not Slavonic) race, in the early Middle Ages, and have disappeared, though the Liv language is said to linger, much corrupted by Lettic, in one or two villages in Livonia.

The German Schwertbrüder (*Brothers of the Sword*), later absorbed in the Teutonic Order, conquered the Letts and Esths in the early thirteenth century, took their land, and converted them to Christianity. From these Teutonic knights are descended the present German element in the three provinces. The word 'Balt,' which might be expected to apply to all the races in the provinces, is commonly confined to the German element.

Russia acquired the three provinces at different times in the eighteenth century, and held them till the Peace of Brest, 1918.

The present racial distribution is, (1) Balt in all three provinces: (2) Letts in Courland and South Livonia: (3) Esths in North Livonia and Esthonia. The Russian element before the War consisted almost entirely of officials. The Jews in the three provinces speak German, not Yiddish (as the Russian and Polish Jews do), and are in general supporters of the Balts.]

OVER the history of the past half-century in all the subject territories of European Russia the shadow of Pan-Slavism hangs like a cloud. In its essence indeed Pan-Slavism is no growth of the past half-century: it represents the perennial reaction of the Russian in

contact with West European culture, and as a conscious political movement may easily be traced (and has been traced by Mackenzie Wallace and others) back to the opposition to Peter the Great. In the last half-century it took the form of a policy, carried out by the bureaucracy but conceived and supported by almost every section of Russian public opinion, of Russifying the non-Russian subject nations, which in a long chain from Finland to Galicia constituted the Western Marches of the Russian Empire. The history of all these nations in this period is the history of the Russification, and of the reactions to which it gave birth, culminating after an abortive eruption in 1905 in the overwhelming upheaval which attended the Revolution of 1917.

Half a century ago, before the Russification began, the Baltic Provinces represented an enclave of Germanism within the borders of the Russian Empire. All told the German element (Balts) constituted less than one-fifteenth of the entire population [1]: but they held under the Russian Governor-General almost the whole of the administration of the country in their hands. The Provinces were mainly agricultural; in the towns a few decaying handicrafts survived; there were as yet no modern industries. The conditions were mediaeval and the administration was mediaeval. The Diets representing exclusively the *Ritterschaften*, or Corporations of German Barons, whose ancestors took the land in the thirteenth century, ruled the land,[2] and the Town

[1] The proportions of the three nationalities were much the same fifty years later. The percentage figures in the Russian census of 1897 are:

	Courland	Livonia	Esthonia
Balts . . .	8·25	5·4	3·8
Letts . . .	79	39·3	—
Esths . . .	—	39·9	88·6

At the present moment the proportion of Balts has been very largely increased in Courland owing to the evacuation of the country by large numbers of the Letts before the German Occupation.

[2] In the 'sixties, before the Russification began, the Diets adopted new Constitutions, by which the franchise went not with the title of Baron (*Ritterstand*) but with the property (*Rittergut*), so that non-noble land-owners were entitled to elect for the Diets. The change made

Councils, representing equally exclusively the German element, ruled the towns.[1] Neither had jurisdiction in the sphere of the other. Each appointed a catena of officials, in the higher ranks mostly unpaid, judges who administered German mediaeval law, teachers in the schools, and pastors in the Lutheran Church. Nowhere, unless it was in Mecklenburg, had the life and social structure of mediaeval Germany—without, it is true, the mediaeval Church—survived in greater completeness than in the three Provinces before the Russification. The anomaly of their existence was all the greater in Pan-Slavist eyes.

Russian was nominally substituted for German as the official language in 1867; but the officials, being all Balts, made no attempt to introduce it in practice, and for many years its use was confined to communications between the provincial authorities and the capital. In the 'seventies the Russian Government laid their hands on the Town Councils. The Russian Municipal Constitution, which is on modern lines—indeed, as the Russian authorities did not fail to point out, on modern German lines—was introduced throughout the Provinces; and in the freely elected Municipal Assemblies the proud and wealthy Balt *Stadtväter* found themselves forced for the first time to admit the despised Letts to their councils. In the large towns they have been able, though not without difficulty, to maintain their ascendancy; for their prestige is still great. In the smaller towns they have for the most part been swamped, or, as the expression runs in Balticum, *verlettet*. The judicial functions of the towns were abolished. It was intended to abolish the more or less obsolete Baltic Law, and the Russian Criminal

little practical difference. There has, however, been in quite recent years a slight infusion of a non-German element into the land-owning class in Courland. Some 20 per cent. of the large estates in Courland before the War were held in other than Balt hands; a few of them were in the hands of rich Letts.

[1] But this was not so unfair as it would be now, for the towns were then predominantly German. In Courland in 1863 the Lett element in the towns was only 17·3 per cent.

Code was introduced in the 'eighties ; but it was found impossible to replace the Baltic Civil Law without an interim period, owing to the complexities of Baltic shipping transactions. The Russian Government accordingly—this was the true Pan-Slav touch—withdrew all facilities for its study at the University of Dorpat, and it was hoped that in time the supply of lawyers acquainted with its intricacies would die out !

At the end of the 'eighties the whole hierarchy of the Russian bureaucracy was introduced in town and country alike. It was the first crushing blow to the Balt domination. For centuries the Balts had held the government of the country in their hands and administered it, in their own interests indeed, but not without a certain rough-and-ready efficiency, and at an extremely low cost to the tax-payers. Their system was in this respect not unlike the rule of the landed gentry which prevailed down to about thé same period in England : but whereas the English squirearchy was replaced by a system of elected county and district councils, in the Baltic Provinces it was replaced by the Russian—which is in the main the German—bureaucratic system. There is a certain atmosphere of freedom about a squirearchy, though it may not percolate much below the social stratum of the squires. There was something of this atmosphere in Old Balticum, though the Letts did not get much of the benefit of it. Its loss certainly was not compensated by an increase of efficiency ; for in a comparison of efficiency as between Balt *Junker* and Russian *tchinovniki* the advantage is not commonly on the side of the latter. The tax-payer lamented the increase in expenditure.

To the Letts under the heel of the Balt Barons the Russification appeared at first as a movement of emancipation ; but it soon became evident that, if the Russians were striking at Balt dominance, it was not to put Lett Nationalism in its place. The Russian language was rigorously enforced in the administration : many of the new officials knew no other. Few Letts spoke Russian

at that time, and in the country districts many regretted the old days. The Barons had never been intolerant in the matter of language ; they understood Lettic well, and used no other language with their labourers ; it no more occurred to them to Germanise the Letts than it occurred to them to ask them to dine. In the communal schools and in the so-called district schools [1] no other language but Lettic had ever been used. Now the children had to begin, as soon as they had passed the first Standard (there are three Standards in the Baltic primary schools), to learn their lessons in Russian. Russian inspectors immediately took the place of the once all-powerful pastors and *Ritter* ; and Russian teachers, who spoke only a few words of German and no Lettic, were gradually introduced. In the towns the German secondary schools were confronted with the alternative of substituting Russian for German throughout as the language of instruction, or of ceasing to qualify as a grade in the State educational system, through which all candidates for the public services must pass. Where they were unwilling to be Russified, new State schools were rapidly built to replace them. Some endeavoured to carry on as private schools, supplementing the Russian schools ; but the task was hopeless. The *Landesgymnasia* in Courland and Esthonia collapsed ; and a very famous school in Reval, the *Ritter- und Domschule*, which had been in existence for 700 years—longer than Winchester—closed its doors and has never been re-opened. Finally in the 'nineties, when the Russification of the schools was complete, the Balts learnt with a feeling akin to consternation that the Government had decided to close the historic and

[1] Communal Schools (*Landvolksschulen*) existed in every village commune, and were maintained out of the funds controlled by the Diets. Education in these was free and compulsory. District Schools (*Parochialschulen*) were maintained in each *Kirchspiel* (group of communes for purposes of the Lutheran Church administration) : education in these was voluntary, but they were well attended by the Lett peasants. The District Schools were in the nature of continuation schools to the Communal Schools. For secondary education it was necessary to go to the towns.

essentially Balt University of Dorpat. Efforts were made to induce the new Tsar Nicholas to intervene in its favour, but without avail. In 1895 it was emptied of students and Professors, and reopened as a colourless Russian High School. The very name was changed. There is a homely German proverb, ' When a man steals a shirt he hastens to cut the name-mark out.' [1]

It is possible that like a forest fire, which causes havoc at the time, but ultimately is found to have enriched the soil, so the Russification will in time be recognised by the peoples of the Baltic Provinces, and even by the Balts, to have been a blessing in disguise. It put an end to a system of government which had become an anachronism and which was unlikely to reform itself from within. It precipitated social and national movements, that were being artificially held in solution. But at the time it was welcomed by none of the Baltic peoples ; and to the Balts it appeared as unrelieved disaster. In the sphere of education its effect seemed particularly calamitous. In the village schools the influence of the pastors, though reactionary in the political sphere, provided certain moral and social restraints, which subsequent events (notably those of the year of Revolution 1905) have shown that the Lett population was not in a position to forego. In the towns the *Ministerschulen*, as the new Russian schools were called, were housed in imposing buildings and lavishly equipped ; but the qualifications of the new Russian teachers were altogether inferior to those of the displaced German

[1] The citation is not the writer's, but comes from an article written by the well-known Berlin theologian Prof. Harnack (himself a *Dorpatenser* and the son of a Dorpat Professor) in a volume recently edited by Paul Rohrbach (*Das Baltenbuch*, Berlin, n.d. [1916]).

The new name for Dorpat was Juriev. The policy of renaming places with unaccommodating associations was a common feature of the Russification, and is characteristic of the strange mixture of practical thoroughness and unpractical idealism of which Pan-Slavism is composed. Poland was officially renamed ' The Vistula Provinces ' after 1863 ; and the Baltic Provinces themselves were renamed ' The North-West Provinces.' As might have been expected, the old names persisted generally in practice, and even in official documents.

teachers. The best Russian education at that time was inferior to the Balt education: and the Russian educational service had naturally not given of its best elements to pioneer in a remote and alien province. The percentage of illiterates in the three Provinces rose appreciably from under two per cent. of the population in the early 'eighties, when the Russification of the schools began, to nearly five per cent. at the close of the century. At Dorpat there were 1054 students in 1890. In the new Russian University in 1900 there were 268, mainly sons of Russian officials with a sprinkling of Poles: and during the Revolutionary disturbances of 1905 the Balts had the malicious satisfaction of observing that they took sides against the Government almost to a man.

Long before then the Balts had lost all the love they ever had for Mother Russia. In the days when their dominance was privileged and unassailed they were amongst the most loyal subjects of the Tsar. Their noble families, Lievens, Pahlens, Keyserlings, Manteuffels, were welcomed at the Imperial Court. In many Balt families it was the custom for all the boys to begin their careers in the Corps des Pages. Many rose to high rank in the army: it was a Balt General who defended Sebastopol in the Crimean War, and another who overran East Prussia in August 1914. In the public services they provided an element out of all proportion to their numbers; and though the 'true Russian' element disliked them and the Revolutionaries considered them pillars of reaction, when placed in positions of responsibility they had a name with the public alike for honesty and competence, to a degree not enjoyed by the average Russian official. Though attached to their German language and their German ways in their own homes, they were proud of their record as 'German-Russians' (*Deutschrussen*): Pan-German ideas were quite unknown amongst them: and they generally had a sincere devotion to the person of the Tsar. The Russification came as a profound shock to them; and it was long before they could understand that it was not merely 'a dirty trick

of the *tchinovniks.*' At first they thought they could counteract it through the Court: their grandfathers had given the country to the Tsar, and the Tsar in return had confirmed them in their privileges: they would appeal to the Tsar. But new Pharaohs ruled, who had not known Joseph. Gradually it was borne in upon them that they were threatened, not by the waywardness of an autocrat or the jealousy of a bureaucracy, but by the weight of Russian public opinion. Their whole orientation was uprooted. They were feeling for the first time, what it is so difficult for a West European to realise, the pressure of the Slav. They felt themselves, as never before, an alien element in a hostile body politic: and like all the races of the borderland between Teutonic and Slavonic Europe, they began to bethink them to which element they rightly belonged. The *geistige Heimat* of the Balts could hardly be in doubt: but it was the first time their spiritual affinities had assumed political shape. Henceforward they stood on the defensive. In the country where for seven hundred years they had borne rule absolute and unquestioned, they were now ranked with the nationalities over whom their sway had been exercised, in common subjection to an *Oberschicht* of Russian officials of inferior culture and competence—of this they had no manner of doubt—to themselves. Worse than this, even the maintenance of their own nationality was threatened by the closing of Dorpat and the Russifying of the schools. It was really difficult for them to conceive such a situation. A German Balticum had seemed to them like the passions of man or the seasons of the year, in the nature of things. The danger bound all sections of them together closer than ever before. Parties in the Diets ceased to exist, that a united front might be opposed to the enemy; and mutual criticism in the newspapers, a marked feature of Old Balticum, was hushed lest the Russian should blaspheme. The old tolerance of manners and opinions, a happy characteristic which an earlier generation had grafted from the Slav, gave way to a rigid insistence on

German morals and customs. The language was purified of Russicisms; and very particular Balts will now call a *droschke* a *Fahrwagen*, and a *samovar* a *Teemaschine*.

Socially, however, a good deal of the old Russian ease of manner lingers about them. There is a very distinct Balt type. The Balt has never looked to *Reichsdeutschland* either for his views or his manners, as the Walloons in Belgium look to Paris. German Radical writers before the War used to call the Balt Barons 'Super-Junkers' (*Ueberostelbier*) and the like. But the Balt has none of that stiff pride of birth which characterises the Prussian Junker. Titles are not used in conversation with the irritating meticulosity which prevails in Prussian Junker circles: and within Society differences of rank count for nothing at all. The Balt has something of what has been described as the characteristic of the good Etonian, a sense of the perfect rightness of one's surroundings and of oneself as the embodiment of them, or as one of the Balts themselves, who does not lack humour, has described it, an 'unassuming self-satisfaction' (*anspruchslose Selbstzufriedenheit*).[1] Englishmen of a corresponding class generally get on well with them, or at the worst regard them as the least disagreeable Germans they ever met. Money, as is the case in Prussian Junker circles, is not a social passport. Social status depends principally on the ownership of land, and the great majority of the land-owners are noble: but there are many more ties between the nobility and the middle class than exist in Prussia, and inter-marriage is commoner. The so-called 'Literaten,' a class peculiar to Balticum, form a bridge between the two. The Literaten are the intellectuals, authors, artists, academics, and the like. For the most part they are the sons of lawyers, doctors, pastors, and what in England are called professional men. They enjoy an intercourse with the landed class, which improves their manners, while it broadens the horizon of the land-lords. They

[1] *Die deutsch-lettischen Beziehungen in den baltischen Provinzen, ein Wort der Aufklärung von einem Balten*, Leipzig, 1916.

go near to forming what in Germany proper does not exist, an Upper Middle Class in the true English sense of the expression. The homogeneity of the social structure is completed and enhanced by the absence of a Balt working-class. With the development of modern industries in Riga and Libau, and the decay of the mediaeval system of apprenticeship, the Balt craftsmen in the towns were long ago swamped by the Lett proletariate. There has been no immigration of workers from Germany for several decades: and the sons of the former craftsmen are now small shopkeepers, and form with the class of minor officials displaced by the Russian *tchinovniks* a lower middle class, which is separated by no such barriers from the Literaten and Adel as a genuine proletariate would inevitably be. Of this curious society, to which it would be difficult to find a parallel, though the Magyars in Hungary and the English in India each offer certain analogies, the heart, the core, and the quintessence was until the closing years of the last century the University of Dorpat.

To look at, Dorpat is hardly what enthusiastic Balts have called it, 'the Heidelberg of the North.' It is a plain, clean little town without notable buildings or beauties of site. But before its suppression it was a Holy Place of Baltentum, in association and tradition incomparably rich. In many respects it resembled Trinity College, Dublin. Like Trinity it was confined —not in theory but in practice—to the ruling race. The sprinkling of Letts and Esths was, like the Catholics at Trinity, without significance. It was a true German University with an atmosphere of *Burschen* and *Wilden*, *Philister*, *Manichäer*, and the rest of it. There were Corps, *Curonia*, *Estonia*, *Livonia*, and a *Fraternitas Rigensis*; and it had its own variety of *Mensur*, in which the duellists struck their blows not on the head but on the upper part of the body, so that the faces of the *Dorpatenser* in after-life were agreeably free from the scars which distinguished their German *Corpsverbandsbrüder*. All classes mixed in the Corps. An attempt which was

at one time made to found an exclusively aristocratic Corps was put down by public opinion. In the small arena of the Baltic Provinces the former Corps students naturally hung together in after-life, and the unifying effect on Balt society as a whole was potent and conspicuous. The teaching at Dorpat in the two favourite faculties of Law and History was on less specialised lines than are now usual in German Universities. The tradition attached great importance to the personal influence of the teacher, and amongst the Dorpat Professors personalities were apt to be strongly marked. There was a larger sprinkling of aristocrats amongst them than is common in most German Universities. The professorial atmosphere was one of vigorous, not to say pugnacious, disputation, with the whole world as the field of discussion. Professors imported from Germany often found it difficult to acclimatise themselves to the argumentative atmosphere, for the modern German Professor is neither so catholic nor so combative as was an earlier generation: '*die baltischen Kollegen*,' one such importation once wrote, '*sind alle noch die alten Schwertbrüder*.' The University was indeed the University of a ruling race, with all the faults of the race but also with all its virtues. With a great arrogance it combined a great candour.[1] The road on which its feet were set was narrow, but it journeyed far and eagerly, and knew the rapture of great heights and depths. It may be that it had to perish in order to be born again, like the political order of which it was the expression. It is earnestly to be hoped that at its refounding it will be based on broader lines: for alike its geographic situation and its history mark it out as the natural meeting-place of the three races, Esths, Letts and Balts. But, such as it was, it was a true laboratory of culture, a sanctuary of the things of the spirit: and its suppression must be regarded, on any hypothesis of political ethics or theory of history, as one of the gravest crimes that lie

[1] The writer is again quoting from Harnack, *op. cit.* The words contrasted in the German are *Freimut* and *Uebermut*.

at the door of the Pan-Slav Movement and the Government of the Tsar.

For some years after the suppression of Dorpat the Balts were without a cultural rallying-point. They retired to their country-houses, and watched in silence the gathering of the Revolutionary storm. It might have been thought that in the Diets, which alone had survived the Russification, they would have found a refuge behind which to shelter their battered domination. But though the constitution of the Diets remained untouched, they wielded but a shadow of their former power, hampered in every direction by the veto of the bureaucracy and paralysed by the fear of suppression. The *Ritterschaften* dared not attempt reform from within: for in any attempt at reform the Russians would assuredly take a hand, and whoever might benefit by the change, it would certainly not be the Balts. In truth they suited the Russians best as they were. It was easier to let them decay from their own weakness than to substitute for them genuine popular assemblies, in which the majorities on any sort of franchise would be composed of Letts and Esths, most of them belonging to the extreme wing of Revolutionary Social Democracy. So the Diets survived until the War, and finally expired painlessly at the hands of the German invader.[1]

[1] The sequence of events in the three provinces between the Russian Revolution and the Peace of Brest is very confused. The following account will, the writer believes, be found accurate. The particulars given for Esthonia are partly based on a letter to the *Spectator* (July 13, 1918) from Dr. Antonius Piip, a member of the Maanõukogu (see below), and its Informal Diplomatic Representative in London.

In September 1917 the Courland Diet at the instigation of the Occupying authorities called a National Assembly at Mitau. The Assembly appointed a National Council of twenty members to represent the Province until its future constitution should be settled, and dissolved. Similar Councils were appointed by National Assemblies called by the other three Diets of Livonia, Esthonia, and the Isle of Oesel, and by the City of Riga, after the German Occupation of Livonia and Esthonia in April 1918. With these five National Councils the German Government conducted all subsequent negotiations in the three provinces, treating generally with the Courland Council separately and with the other four Councils sitting together as a 'United National Council.'

Before that time the Balts had found the rallying-point which they needed. In the Revolutionary storms of 1905, when the Government lay paralysed and every nationality began to fend for itself, the Balts in Esthonia met together, opened a subscription list, and founded a Union for the defence of German culture. Their example was rapidly followed in Courland and Livonia ; and the three Unions concerted operations.[1] Their object was the re-establishment of the German schools, which the inauguration of the Constitutional regime in Russia seemed likely to render again possible. In effect con

The Courland National Assembly was constituted as follows. Of 80 representatives, 31 represented the large land-owners (80 per cent. Balt), 27 the rural communes (almost exclusively Lett), 17 the towns, 4 the Lutheran Church, 1 the Catholic Church. The other National Assemblies seem to have been similarly constituted.

In July 1917, before the Courland National Assembly met, a Conference of Letts was held in Courland with the consent of the German authorities. It protested against any union of the three provinces, and proposed to carve out a Lett State from what may be called Lettland (South Livonia, Courland, and Latgalia, in which the Letts constitute 75 per cent. of the population) ; the new State was to be accorded ' self-determination ' at the expiry of one year ; and it was to be declared neutral under an international guarantee.

In Esthonia at the same time (July 1917), that is before the German Occupation, an Assembly, called in Esth Maanôukogu, was elected by universal suffrage of the Esth population and met at Reval, the Russian Liberal Government having conceded self-government to the Esths by a Law of April 12, 1917. The Maanôukogu, like the Lett Conference, protested against union of the three provinces ; and declared for the creation of an autonomous State within the borders of Russia, to include what may be called Esthland (Esthonia and the Esth parts of North Livonia, in which the Esths constitute 90 per cent. of the population). The Maanôukogu was overturned by Esth Soviets after the Bolshevist Revolution of November 1917, and finally withdrew to Stockholm before the German Occupation, where it formed a Provisional Government, which was subsequently recognised by the British and French Governments as a ' *de facto* independent body ' with ' Informal Diplomatic Representatives.'

Finally in the closing weeks of 1918, after the German collapse, a group of bourgeois Letts was recognised by the Allies as a Provisional Government on the same terms as the Esth Maanôukogu.

[1] The original Esthonian Society was called the ' Esthonian German Educational Union ' (*Estländischer deutscher Bildungsverein*). The other two omitted the limiting word ' Educational,' and called themselves simply the ' German Union in Courland ' and ' German Union in Livonia.' To correspond, the name of the Esthonian Union was later altered to ' German Union in Esthonia.'

siderable concessions were made to the nationalities after 1906 in the question of the schools. In the Baltic Provinces the authorities agreed to recognise the German secondary schools if re-established, and to permit German as the language of instruction. It was stipulated however that all examinations, to the passing of which civil rights were attached, should continue to be in Russian. The *Landesgymnasia* in Courland and Esthonia were immediately reopened amid great Balt rejoicings. The difficulty of the examinations was met by Recapitulatory Courses in Russian in the different subjects—no bad thing perhaps from the educational point of view: for duplication of languages of instruction, a dead-weight in the elementary school, is under certain circumstances in the secondary school not a handicap but a benefit to the student: certainly for the young Balts, who all possessed at the start a certain amount of conversational Russian, it was an admirable means of acquiring the literary language without giving up to it precious hours of the curriculum as a separate subject. The three Provinces are now covered with a network of German schools, housed in new buildings, and a good deal more lavishly equipped than were the old historic schools before the Russification. In particular there are now provided beside the *Gymnasia*, which in the old days stood alone, *Realschulen* and *Realgymnasia*, in which facilities are available for technical and industrial education. In addition to the schools, the Unions have built libraries, theatres, *Kindergarten*, and *Ferienheime*. They have organised Lectures, Women's Leagues—these were particularly active before the War—Country Holiday Funds, Free Meals for School Children, and the like. More or less at their instigation, or with their financial support, there have sprung up Land Banks, Agricultural Leagues, *Gewerbevereinen*, and social and literary societies. At the outset of the War, when by one of the last administrative acts of the Russian Government the schools were again closed and the Unions dissolved, the Balts could feel that they had a foothold once more: they

had 'created an Ersatz for Dorpat'; and with new-found strength and a unity and cohesion never known in the days of unquestioned hegemony, they were addressing themselves to the internal problems, at once national and social, which the Russification had set for solution.

The Russification had in fact torn up by the roots the settlement arrived at by the Teutonic Knights seven hundred years before; and the Balts, or the younger generation of them, knew that it could never be restored. There were other nationalities beside the Balts, in which the Russification had set in motion new currents; and if they had not the cohesion or the energy of the Young Balt Movement, they had behind them the weight of crushingly superior numbers. The settlement of the Teutonic Knights had the direct simplicity of the Middle Age. The German *conquistadores* took the land, and compelled the previous inhabitants in return for German protection and the blessings of Christianity to till the soil for them. The Catholic Clergy, as elsewhere in Mediaeval Europe, stood up in general for the peasants against the nobles; and the principal factor in the introduction of the Reformation was a combination of the towns with the nobles to break the power of the Catholic Bishops. Since the Reformation all power in matters ecclesiastical has rested with the nobles, who have strenuously resisted any attempt to introduce beside the Lutheran Church any more independent form of Protestantism. The pastors were almost all German.[1] Many of them were admirable men. They did much to preserve and systematise the Lett and Esth languages. But they lived in fine parsonages, in comfort inferior only to the castles of the Barons: they held rich glebelands, on which the peasantry were compelled to work without remuneration, because the pastor's income was dependent on the glebe; before the abolition of serfage they owned serfs. As a class they were more conservative than the Barons, and have been slower

[1] They still are. Of some 120 pastors in Courland in the year before the War, barely twenty were Letts.

to realise the passing of the patriarchal age. On the Lett proletariate in the towns and on the younger generation in the villages they have now scarcely any influence at all. It may indeed be said that there are no ecclesiastical considerations, such as powerfully affect the position in Lithuania and Poland, to cross and complicate the National Movements of the Esths and Letts. Protestantism as a social and political factor in North-East Europe has practically ceased to exist.

The view, which is now to be advanced as to the Lett and Esth Movements, is briefly that they are in essence not political, that is to say Nationalist, but agrarian : and that their development in the future, despite some indications to the contrary, depends not on the towns but on the land. The observations which follow will be concerned principally with the Lett Movement, with which the writer is better acquainted. The Esth Movement has proceeded on parallel lines. Conflict between the two is a possibility of the future, if the industrialisation of the three Provinces proceeds much further ; but it is hardly at present a factor in the political situation.

The hatred which the Letts have for the Balts was never probably more bitter than now, when such support as the Letts could sometimes in the past draw from the Russians is withdrawn, and the *intelligentsia* feels that there is nothing left for it but ' to drown in clear German water or sink in the Russian morass.' [1] To judge by the utterances of the articulate portions of the Lett nation, whether of the bourgeois or the Socialist sections, eternal conflict between the former masters and the former serfs is the only conceivable vista in the future. A recent writer, who has nobly championed the Lett claims, M. Doumergue,[2] has been at pains to illustrate

[1] This was said by one of them soon after the German Occupation to the correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*.

[2] E. Doumergue, *Une petite nationalité en souffrance, Les Lettons*, published by ' Foi et Vie,' 48 Rue de Lille, Paris, n.d. [1917]. Apart from its own interest, this brochure is valuable to the student for the very impartially selected bibliography which it contains.

from the Lett folk-songs the bitterness which prevails. It is no difficult task. One song—it may be cited here as it is not amongst those given by Doumergue—runs :

Oh poor German guest !
What wouldst thou in our wretched hut ?
Thou canst not stay in the yard,
For in the yard is wind or rain.
Thou canst not stay within,
For within is smoke.[1]
Listen ! I will advise thee !
Go to the bottom-most place of Hell,
Where the Devil makes his fire.
No rain there, German ! No smoke there !

It would be difficult to conceive a more vivid expression of race-hatred : and what truer expression than folk-song of the soul of a race ? But there is a good deal more to be said. The Letts ceased to make folk-song at least seventy or eighty years ago. Since that time new elements have come into being in Balticum, the existence of which cannot be ignored in any estimate of the present political situation.

In an agricultural country with alien land-owners and a landless peasantry there is only one political magic. Englishmen do not need to look as far as the shores of the Baltic to know that it is Land Purchase. In 1863, some forty years before the Wyndham Act came into operation in Ireland, the *Ritterschaften* in the Baltic Diets established land-purchase facilities for tenants in the three Provinces. The object was not to eliminate the land-lord class, but to supplement it by a land-owning peasantry side by side with the landless labourer class, with whose labour the land-lords could not afford to dispense. The reforms in short were limited in intention, and—though there has been no curtailment or reversal of the purchase facilities—they have proved limited in the execution. They have created no such economic revolution as the Wyndham Act before its curtailment set on foot in Ireland : but they have gone far enough

[1] A hundred years ago Lett cottages had no chimneys.

to call into existence a new class of Lett and Esth peasantry, which represents an entirely new economic factor in the three Provinces, a factor which has already shifted the centre of gravity of the social structure, and may under certain conditions, now to be discussed, entirely alter the social balance.

The land-owning peasants, or as they would be called in England small farmers, or as they are commonly called in Balticum 'Wirte,' own on an average 120 to 150 acres of land. They cultivate it with the help of 'peasants' labourers' (*Wirtsknechte*) living in the house; and in addition they often let portions of their land to one or two outside married labourers. The *Ritter* in Courland and Livonia (but not in Esthonia) retain sporting and fishing rights, which like similar rights in England are much resented, over the peasant properties: fishing rights on the large lakes are sometimes very valuable. The *Ritter* further have the exclusive right (outside the towns) to build mills and distilleries, and to sell to the peasants *schnaps*[1] (potato spirit), beer, mugs and other tavern furniture; they commonly keep an Estate Shop, which they let to a *Hofjude* or 'Manorial Jew.' The land was held before the War in the following proportions:

	Courland.	Livonia.	Esthonia.
Large landed properties (of which 80 per cent. in Courland, 91·5 per cent. in Livonia, and about 90 per cent. in Esthonia were held by Balt *Ritter*)	41·6	50·3	59·8[2]
Small landed properties (almost all Lett or Esth *Wirtsgüter*) . .	38·1	38·9	40·2[2]
Town-land, crown-land, and glebe .	20·3	10·8	—

[1] The disgraceful monopoly of the trade in *schnaps*, which has done infinite harm in Eastern Europe, has in recent years been restricted; not, however, on the initiative of the *Ritter* but by the Russian Duma. The *schnaps* trade was not affected by the Russian State Alcohol Monopoly, which extended only to *vodka*.

[2] The figures given for Esthonia unfortunately do not correspond with those given for Courland and Livonia, as they represent, not the percentages of the total soil of Esthonia held by *Ritter* and *Wirte* respectively, but the relative proportions of the *Ritter*-held land and the *Wirte*-held land to one another.

There have been no arrears of purchase-money in the fifty years during which the land-purchase facilities have been in operation. It is the same story in Balticum, in Ireland, in Poznania. Agricultural Man, if reasonably treated, seems in every part of the world to be honest. The *Wirte* constitute an element which everybody, and not least the *Ritter*, values in the country-side. On the whole, despite the Lett National agitation with which in its more subdued forms the *Wirte* are heartily in sympathy, social relations between *Wirte* and *Ritter* are not bad. The *Wirte* are keenly alive to the value of scientific agriculture; and the *Ritter* are the admitted sponsors of agricultural progress. The *Wirte* are prepared to learn from them; and individual *Ritter*, who have deserved it, still command a position in their own district not inferior to that which their fathers held in the patriarchal days. *Wirte* and *Ritter* together have slowly increased the productiveness of the soil in the three Provinces to a point not far short even of East Prussian standards.[1] Good work done in common and crowned with success is after all a powerful bond.

But the majority of the agricultural population are not *Wirte*. Sixty to seventy per cent. in Courland and Livonia, and about 75 per cent. in Esthonia, are landless labourers or 'Knechte,' who are in the same position as the English agricultural labourer or worse. The *Knechte* say to the *Wirte*: 'You *Wirte* have nothing more to ask. You live like the Barons. You have silver spoons for your soup. Your daughters have gold watches to wear.' The Socialist Letts in 1905—and in 1905 the Socialists had more than a little say in rural politics—nicknamed the *Wirte* 'Grey Barons,' because, they said,

[1] Before the War the yield of wheat, rye, and barley taken together was in kilos per hectare:

in Courland . . .	1150
in East Prussia . .	1500
in Russian Poland . .	1010

If the other two Baltic Provinces are included, the figure given for Courland must be considerably reduced. Courland is in agriculture, as in most other respects, ahead of the other two provinces.

they were nearly as bad as the ' Black Barons,' the *Ritter*. The social cleft between the ' haves ' and the ' have-nots ' inside the Lett community often looks almost as wide as the national cleft between Lett and Balt. The *Knechte* are generally engaged, as throughout Eastern Europe, by a written contract covering a year from winter to winter. Many varieties of contract of course prevail: they are long documents, drawn up with considerable detail. The following is a summary of a typical specimen, made on an Estate near Libau in the second year of the War between a Balt *Ritter* and a Lett *Knecht* on what is known as a wage and allowance (*Deputat*) basis: —

The labourer is to receive £6 wages: free lodging: free doctor and chemist: free stabling for a horse and cart: and allowances of 1800 lbs. rye, 1100 lbs. barley, 400 lbs. small rye [used as pig-food], 80 lbs. oats and groats (peeled barley or oats), 120 lbs. beans: with free milling.

The labourer is to have in manured and prepared land, ½ *Lofstelle* [rather over ½ acre] potato land: ¼–⅛ acre garden-land: tools and cartage for the labourer's land to be provided by the Estate.

The labourer is allowed to keep [his own] sheep and cows to the number of 3 sheep and 2 cows: and receives as allowances of fodder for them, 2–3 cartloads of hay, for each beast: summer and winter straw: one large basket of chaff.

The labourer also receives ½ Faden [about 4 cubic feet] of wood: 2–3 Faden brushwood.

In return the labourer has to give daily work from breakfast till dark for the whole of the year: and his wife for 70 days in the year. The cattle fodder allowance is treated as wage for the wife: for any days above 70 worked by her she is to receive 1*s*. 1½*d*. a day. In the work-day the following rests are allowed, 1 hour breakfast, 1 hour in the afternoon [' tea-time '], 1, or in high summer 2, hours midday.

The *Wirte* pay higher wages than the *Ritter*; instead of the £6 paid in the above case, a *Wirtsknecht* might get anything from £8 to £12, and a woman labourer £4 to £6. On the other hand the *Wirte* do not give free drugs and doctoring; and they make deductions for absence owing to accidents or illness—a practice which

is greatly disliked. It is common experience that the *Ritter* get their labourers more readily than the *Wirte*.

It is surprising that with this primitive wage-system, in which the best part of the wage is paid in kind, the Lett labourers are able to save as much as they do. The Lett Peasant Banks do, however, draw from the *Knechte* quite considerable deposits, which they lend out again to the *Wirte*. The Balt Banks, which have been longer in the field than the Lett Banks, also receive a good share of the Lett savings. The Kurländischer Kreditverein in the year before the War had 6000 Lett peasants (both *Wirte* and *Knechte*) on its books as depositors, in spite of the fact that it was paying 4 per cent. for deposits while the Lett Banks were paying 6 per cent. The Balt Banks are not boycotted by the Letts, as the German Banks are by the Poles in Poznania.

But the Letts are no longer overwhelmingly an agricultural people. In the past quarter of a century there has been a steady stream of Letts from the country into the towns. The towns are still German in appearance, and it may be said in atmosphere. The Russian language has never got a foothold in the everyday life of the Provinces, and German is the *lingua franca* from Riga to Reval. But the Balt element in the towns is no longer numerically preponderant. It is estimated that on an average of all the towns in the three Provinces the Letts and Esths on the one hand and the Balts and all the other nationalities on the other hand are numerically about equally balanced. In the Courland towns alone the Letts represent 42 per cent. of the total population ; and their numbers are steadily growing. When the flow to the towns began, one class of the immigrants opened small shops or found work in the shipping offices. Out of these has grown up the Lett bourgeoisie. Others, a larger class, found work as dock labourers or in big works like the Phœnix in Riga. Out of these was formed the Lett proletariate. The *intelligentsia* was drawn from both classes. The first generation both of the bourgeoisie and of the proletariate were still very close to the

peasants in their thought, their life, and their aspirations. But there is a Lett proverb, 'Cut bread does not rejoin the loaf': and to-day in the second generation there is markedly less sympathy between town and country. The events of 1905 represent the transition between the two periods. Throughout the decade of discontent, which preceded the 1905 Revolution, the Lett bourgeoisie and proletariate were becoming more and more sharply differentiated. The bourgeoisie were keen Nationalists, and had no objection to a little violence of language. But they had grown rich quickly, having lower standards of living than their Balt and Jew competitors; and they disliked intensely the growing tendency which was making itself manifest amongst the proletariate to divide the world into good and bad, not according to nationality but according to class. The pure word of Marxism in fact had begun to reach the Lett worker. Social Demoratic Circles were already being organised towards the end of the 'nineties. The tendency in all of these was extremist: the stalwarts put the National Movement in the background, attacked the Nationalist bourgeoisie as reactionary, and even refused to allow 'God Save Lettland' to be sung at the meetings which they controlled. The Russian Government with characteristic blindness completely failed to distinguish the two currents.

When the Revolution at length burst upon the Baltic Provinces in the early summer of 1905, the Socialists, as elsewhere among the subject nations, assumed to themselves control. They established a Federated Committee in Riga, which purported to combine Lett, Jew, Esth, Lithuanian, and even German Revolutionaries on true Marxian principles; but in fact it was controlled by the Letts. The Lett Socialist leaders were from the first sceptical as to the success of the Revolution; and they were strongly opposed to any Rising, unless it could be made general throughout Russia. To let off steam, they proceeded to hold a series of Congresses in Riga, in the management of which they at first displayed considerable skill, bridging internal differences and,

when passions became too elated, diverting them into the safe channel in which all could join of attacks on the Lutheran Church. A Party Congress of the Socialists declared for a Representative Assembly for all Russia and representation for the Letts in it. It was followed by a Congress of Lett School Teachers, which declared solidarity with the Socialists, demanded education in the mother-tongue, and 'taking into consideration that the religion and science of to-day contradict each other, and that religion is a matter of conscience which cannot be imparted by teaching,' declared for the separation of Church and State, and Church and School. The School Teachers were followed by a Congress of 1000 delegates from 600 Curonian and Livonian communes; it declared for the establishment of Peasants' Councils in the villages in place of the existing Russian functionaries, and in a number of districts these were at once set up. The Federated Committee had 'comrades' in the Post Office and even in one of the Governors'[1] Chancelleries, and they had obtained a copy of a Decypher employed by the authorities in communication with Petrograd. From the telegrams which passed they were aware that no troops were available, and that the Government feared the worst. But they always believed that the Revolution was premature and would ultimately collapse, and the Government recover control. They accordingly continued to discourage violence in the towns, and were at some pains to repudiate separatist national tendencies amongst themselves.

But meanwhile in the country the Movement passed rapidly out of their control. The landless labourers, excited by the atmosphere of the Peasants' Congress and

[1] The Governor-Generalship of the three provinces was abolished in the early days of the Russification, and each of the provinces now had its own Governor. It was the Governor of Livonia whose cypher the Socialists tapped. (See Ames, *The Revolution in the Baltic Provinces of Russia*, London, n.d. [1907], for an interesting account from Lett Socialist sources of the year of Revolution. This is, so far as the writer knows, the only book in English dealing with the Lett question.)

the sight of *Ritterschaft* and Russian alike paralysed, under the leadership of Revolutionary students and other independents, took matters into their own hands. The first symptom of what was to come occurred in the village of Durben in Courland one Sunday towards the close of 1905. The service was proceeding in the church, and the pastor had reached the Prayer for the Tsar, when a masked man with a revolver in his hand sprang to the pulpit, and threw the pastor out of it. The peasant-women, horrified at the sight, surrounded the intruder and prevented him from speaking. The men did nothing, and afterwards listened to his harangues outside the church. Similar scenes took place in other churches, and the pastors became more than nervous as they approached the Prayer for the Tsar, which was throughout the signal for interruption. Twenty-three churches were closed altogether, the pastors retiring till better times. In others the *Ritter* took to attending in force to guard the church-doors during service, and keep watch for strange faces among the congregation. In one village Baron Hahn von Lub-Essern and his nephew Baron von Bistramb were thus engaged, when Bistramb fell shot through the heart, and a second bullet whistled past Lub-Essern. This seems to have been the first personal attack. After it the *Knechte* took to attacking the houses and castles of the *Ritter*; and in the three Provinces in the years 1905–1906 no less than 200 country-houses were sacked and burnt. The Government at an early stage of the Revolution had ordered all foresters in the Crown Forests to bring in their sporting arms to the Chief Foresters. These collections were broken into by the Revolutionaries, and the guns and ammunition distributed to the *Knechte*. For some months the Government was paralysed, and Balts and Letts were left to fight out the issues between them. Martial Law was proclaimed in December 1905; but no troops were available before the spring of the following year. Penal expeditions were then organised; and a number of Balts, who shortly before the Revolution (in March

1905) had been enrolled by the Government as Special Constables, accompanied the expeditions, interpreted at the Courts Martial, and denounced the insurgents on the basis of their local knowledge. There is something revolting about this part of the story.

The *Wirte* under the terrorism established by the Revolutionaries had passively acquiesced in the attacks on the Barons ; and with a few exceptions had preserved their own property from attack. They now came out on the side of law and order : and, the leaders of the Revolution having fled from Russia at the outset of the Reaction,[1] there was a marked disillusionment on the part of the younger Socialists ; and in the country the influence of the Party was gone. The *Wirte* have since dominated the rural politics of the Lett Provinces. So far as their influence in politics goes—and, like all peasants, they are shy of politics—it is thrown on the same side as that of the bourgeoisie in the towns. Both elements are determined to prevent a repetition of the occurrences of 1905, and a considerable section of the *intelligentsia* has inclined since 1905 to their side. Political activities have found a vent in a great development of Lett Societies on the model of the Balt Unions. These Societies have given birth, like the Unions, to a rich crop of schools, credit banks, and—a peculiar feature, to the outsider perhaps the most attractive feature, of the Lett culture—a network of Musical Societies. The Musical Societies are essentially popular, and in no sense imitated from the

[1] Some of them came to England. There was a small settlement of Lett Revolutionaries at Tottenham, two of whom were responsible for the 'Tottenham Outrage,' which filled columns of the London newspapers in 1909. The two men 'expropriated' money which was coming from the Bank to pay the weekly wages at the factory in which they worked (it bore a German name, which lent to the proceedings an additional touch of home !). They were detected and pursued by the (unarmed) English police. Before they were finally captured, they terrorised a tram-car and killed and wounded nearly a dozen people. When the odium which their act excited in England became known, the Lett Socialist Party disowned them. It was, however, established that, though they had never held any important position in the Party, they had been used by it as agents for smuggling Revolutionary literature into Russia.

Balt. The musical genius of the people, which impresses every traveller—it has particularly impressed the German invaders—is in a stage of incubation after the passing of the unconscious period of folk-song. When the conscious period begins, the Letts, it is thought by those who are capable of judging, may give great compositions to the world.

Between 1905 and the War the Russians made some attempt to play off the Letts against the Balts. It is astonishing how rarely in the history of conflicting nationalities the *Divide et impera* policy really succeeds. With the exception perhaps of the Austrians, few ruling races have the instinct for it. To the Russians it is eminently unsympathetic, and they have never had much success with it. There was always a pro-Russian element among the Letts, as among the Finns : but, as in Finland, the pro-Russian element was the Revolutionary element, and it was not with the official Russia that its sympathies lay. Of the bourgeois Lett the most that could be said was that he disliked the Russian rather less than the Esth did, and was prepared to support the Russian Government if it would help him to attack the Balts. The approach of the German invader in 1915 naturally strengthened the pro-Russian feeling ; for German conquest meant a restitution, so all thought, of the worst days of Balt supremacy. The retreating Russian Armies laid waste the land in Courland, and the Government ordered the peasants to evacuate the country. Over half a million refugees passed through the hands of Committees organised for the purpose in Petrograd and Moscow. The refugees were distributed on a prepared plan amongst the villages in certain districts of Russia. Unfortunately the Russian villagers, being ill acquainted with Baltic ethnology and perceiving that the newcomers were neither Jews nor Orthodox nor Poles, took them for Germans. The funds at the disposal of the Committees were quite inadequate to maintain such large numbers. The Committees sought to ease the problem by raising Lett Battalions for the Russian Army. The project was at first vetoed by the Russian authorities,

but the sympathies of the Army Higher Command appear to have been enlisted, and the project was finally sanctioned in the summer of 1915. The Army authorities drafted out the Lett conscripts to form the nucleus, as the Austrians had done in the case of the Polish Legions in Galicia a year before : and a number of Lett Battalions were soon in being. They were terribly reduced by the end of the following year : and the gaps had had to be filled with Siberians. But the Battalions had established a tradition of hard fighting and Revolutionary thinking. When the Revolution broke out again in the spring of 1917, they were among the first troops to side with the Bolshevists ; and they have remained faithful to the Bolshevists ever since.

There was a further exodus of refugees, by order of the Russian Government, from parts of Livonia in 1916 and 1917. The (Balt) Mayor of Riga endeavoured to keep the peasants on the land, but was arrested by the Russian authorities for his interference, and sent into exile. When the Germans entered Windau, only 3000 out of 35,000 inhabitants were left. The last Russian census gave Courland a population of 674,000. A German census taken in September 1915 gave only 230,000. So greatly was the population reduced. The Lett Socialist and other political leaders were mostly gone. The road was open to the German invasion, and to whatever consequences the invasion might bring in its train for the Lettish race.

On the whole the Letts who remained behind, having expected the worst, appear to have been agreeably surprised. The German rule did not consist in giving a free hand to the Balts. It seems that the Occupying authorities, coming as strangers to the country, were somewhat appalled at the hatred with which the Balts are regarded ; and the Chief of the German Administration in Mitau took an early opportunity of proclaiming his anxiety to avoid ' the reproduction of Irish conditions ' in Courland. The local administration was carried on by German, not Balt, *Kreishauptmänner* (heads of districts about the size of a small English

county). Each *Kreishauptmann* was assisted by a (German) Economic Officer and a (German) Legal Officer. These three officials were provided with six local assessors, who were required to be conversant with Lettic. To these last posts Balts were largely appointed, but also a fair number of Letts. In the towns the balance of parties on the Municipal Councils was maintained; no elections were held, but as vacancies occurred Balts were replaced by Balts, and Letts by Letts. The pastors' and land-lords' wives were turned on to teach in the rural schools, and the Lett *intelligentsia* in the towns. Lettic was retained as the language of instruction in the elementary schools; but every child was compelled to learn German. Russian was for some reason left as the language of instruction in the higher schools in Libau, Mitau, and Goldingen. The German Civil and Criminal Codes were introduced in place of the Russian Criminal Code and the Baltic Civil Law. But the most striking act of the new Government, in the peasants' eyes, seems to have been the extension of the road corvee, for which hitherto only the peasants had been liable, to all classes of the population. This measure was probably adopted purely because of the shortage of labour caused by the Evacuations, and without a thought of any but military exigencies. As propaganda, however, for the claim of the Occupation to be impartial it could hardly have been bettered. It appealed to the Lett sense of humour to see the Balts compelled to take a hand.

On the conditions under the Occupation, and the relations between German and Balt, instructive side-lights are thrown by an amusing article from the pen of a German correspondent, which recently appeared in a well-known German paper.[1]

[1] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, April 18, 1918. The translation is taken from the invaluable 'Weekly Survey of the Foreign Press' in the *Cambridge Magazine*, May 25, 1918. The article is probably from the pen of Fritz Wertheimer, the extremely able and generally objective correspondent of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* in the Baltic region. Wertheimer has collected some of his earlier contributions to his paper in a volume called *Kurland und die Dunafront*, Stuttgart and Berlin, 1916.

'You smile, Frau Baronin?'

'Yes, a little, you know: your eagerness to tidy up, to organise, is not likely to please the people of Riga. We too have had to get accustomed to it. And now after the first exultations we find that the *Reichsdeutsche* and the *Deutschbalten* are very different people.'

'Of course we grew apart: there are centuries of separation between us. It is marvellous that the German language has persisted. . . .'

'Well, that may be because we were so determined to remain German in our customs and our language. . . . It was the only way to resist the Russian influence. Apart from this we were very happy under the Russian flag, we lived in great style, we were perfectly free, we were the masters.'

'You are approaching a dangerous point, Frau Baronin: let me finish your sentence. "We were perfectly free, we were the lords of the country, more so than we shall ever be under German domination." Quite right. The nobility of Courland will have to learn a good many things. . . .'

'Certainly, I believe it. And I repeat, we are happy in spite of everything. But it seems to me you overrate the Russian Radicalism. It is true it has lately enjoyed some orgies: but you do not do justice to the "broadness" of the Russian nature. It is such a comfortable feature of the Russian character that every Russian wants to live freely and amply, and allows the same to others. It is this latitude of Russian life which we like so much. . . .'

'I understand, Frau Baronin! And the German is so small, so economical, so narrow, so niggardly, is he not? I feel that I and my people are sitting on the penitents' form. For you are right, quite right. We are too much attuned to the ideas of economic gain, profit . . . economy. While the Russians are so full of a grand *insouciance*, lovable spendthrifts. . . . But it is our necessity makes us . . . calculating competitors in the fight for life. . . . At the same time we have a great deal of the sense of the community, and of the State.'

'Dear me, the State! What is the State to us? We love Courland, and we love the German language and German ways; but love the State! Is that possible? We never loved the Russian State. Shall we ever love the German? . . . We did not mind, with regard to taxes now, or customs duties—well, cheating just a little.'

The basic weakness of the Balts' position in the future is the absence of a Balt peasantry. Once the patriarchal period came to an end, the position of an element consisting for all practical purposes solely of land-lords and Literaten was fundamentally artificial and unsound. It is of course a tenable view that the entire Balt element ought to be eliminated from the population, as the Anglo-Irish landlords are being eliminated from Ireland. Those who believe that everything German was created bad, and—what to the writer never seems a logical corollary—that anything anti-German was created good, will naturally incline to this view. Nor is the argument, which German writers commonly put forward, that the culture of the Letts is inseparable from the Balt culture and unfit to stand alone, though not without weight, conclusive. It is true that the Lett culture has been modelled on Balt culture, but it is as yet largely undeveloped, and may evolve in the future values and institutions of its own. It is to run counter to the teachings of History, and perhaps of something more than History, to say that any nation is unfit to evolve a culture of its own. A more cogent line of reasoning is the argument from the political value of *Baltentum*. The Balts are the one element that holds the three Provinces together, the one cement which can be used if a single large State is to be built up. The question must be decided according to the view which is taken as to the comparative advantages of a single large State or two small ones in Balticum. The latter is the programme of the *Emigré* element of the Letts and Esths, and would probably be endorsed by a majority of the Letts and Esths on the spot. The former programme, which the Germans tried to realise at Brest, is that of the Balts. If it is accepted, and the desirability of a single strong Baltic State is admitted, it appears to follow that the Balt element requires to be strengthened rather than weakened. It is not unnaturally the deduction which the Balts themselves, or the younger generation of them, have drawn. Since the Revolution of 1905 very remarkable efforts have been made to introduce

for the first time a German peasant element into the country. The new movement, the Colonisation Movement as it is called by the Balts, first took shape in the hands of a Balt land-owner named Silvio Brödrich, who is perhaps the most interesting personality in modern Balticum. Silvio with his brother Robert owns a small *Rittergut* in the district of Goldingen in Courland. They have been land-owners for two generations, but are not of the nobility by birth. Silvio was a Special Constable in the time of the Reprisals after 1905, and for his services was made by the Russians a *Kreispolizeichef*, one of the principal functionaries in a rural district. The Russians had cause later to regret the appointment, for Silvio used his position to launch his Colonisation Movement. When the German Army entered Courland, Silvio joined it; and he was organising annexationist propaganda in Germany, when the Russian Revolution broke out in 1917. He helped to organise the Appeal of the Russian Subject Nations to President Wilson, and was one of the Balt signatories. As a form of propaganda he gave the first account of the Colonisation Movement to the world in a volume published at Berlin.[1] The book gives a fair picture of the man's personality. Balt cynicism and the enthusiasm of the social reformer are curiously combined in him. It is a formidable combination in a leader.

The idea of the Colonisation Movement was not to draw Germans from the Empire but to tap the large numbers of German settlers in Russia. When the Movement was first launched, the numbers of the latter were estimated as follows:

in Poland . . .	500,000
in Volhynia . . .	250,000
in the Black Earth region .	750,000
on the Volga . . .	500,000
	2,000,000

As was to be expected, the most successful of these settlers were not prepared to leave flourishing farms on

[1] *Das neue Ostland*, Berlin, 1915.

a forlorn hope of colonising strange and unfriendly regions in the North. The most they were inclined to do was to weed out the unsuccessful elements in their midst, and supply them with a little capital for a 'new start.' With these elements Silvio made a beginning. There was a certain amount of initial sifting; but better elements were soon attracted by the very favourable reports which the colonists sent back. Between the years 1908 and 1912 thirty *Rittergüter*, mostly in the neighbourhood of Silvio's own property, were acquired for settlement; the total acreage was about 160,000 acres. The effect of the purchases, as in the case of the German Land Settlement in Prussian Poland, was a rise in land values, which was further enhanced by competition from the Russian State Land Bank, which was endeavouring at the same time to buy land for Russian colonists. The position in fact presented a curiously exact parallel to the competition of the Germans and the Poles in Poznania, but with the Germans in this case in the place of the Poles. The Russian colonisation was even less successful than the efforts of the German Land Settlement in Poznania, because the Russian Bank was not armed with powers of expropriation; but, while the competition lasted, it was a curious experience to pass from Poznania to Courland, and observe the inversion of the German role. A part of the land acquired by the Balts for settlement is forest-land; and interesting experiments have been made, which seem to show conclusively that the forests can be economically settled, if the initial cost of clearance is once met. Most of the colonisation has been financed by the Kurländischer Kreditverein. The settler is required to make an initial deposit of £10 to £30, according to the size of his holding; he then receives credits, on which for the first five years he pays no interest; after five years he is required to pay the bank's current rate—before the War generally 5 per cent. At the beginning of the War, 13,000 to 14,000 Germans had been settled in Courland, and 7,000 in Livonia. The movement has not yet extended its

operations to the Esth districts. The colonists under Silvio's inspiration have developed ultra-Balt views, and are now the principal agents in the attraction of further settlers. At the outset of the War the Russian authorities brought the German colonisation to an abrupt end; but since the Occupation it has taken on new life, and is beginning to attract attention in Germany itself. The supply of German colonists from Russia, however, has not fallen off. On the contrary, it has been largely increased by the Russian legislation passed in the first year of the War, with a view to terminating German ownership of land in Russia. This legislation, though apparently it has not been carried out in its entirety, has left large numbers—including the women and children, they are estimated by German writers at as many as 1,500,000—without homes or money. With such a reservoir to draw on, Silvio has developed an extensive programme for the future. His enthusiasm has undoubtedly caught the imagination of the Balt landowners. They told Paul Rohrbach, when he visited Courland in 1915, that estimates had been prepared showing that about one-third of the total *Ritter*-held land could be made available almost immediately for German settlers. The chief difficulty in the way appears to be the question of entail; but it is proposed either to alter the existing law of entail, or (as Silvio himself formerly proposed) to exchange the entailed lands for forest-land, which, being better suited to large-scale management, is well adapted for entail; the difficulty is in any case obviously a minor one. A more recent scheme, communicated from private sources in Courland for Otto Kessler's book,[1] works out the following interesting estimate of land available for colonisation:

	Acres
From Crown-land, excluding forests . . .	166,000
From large landed properties	600,000
From glebe-land	24,000
From small landed properties (i.e. *Wirtsgüter*) .	600,000
	1,390,000

[1] *Die Baltenländer und Litauen*, Berlin, 1916.

As regards the last item, it should be explained that Kessler reckons that, owing to the damage caused by the War, a number of the *Wirte* will be obliged to sell a part of their land.

If this scheme were carried through, the land tenure of Courland would be redistributed as follows:

	Acres
Large landed properties. [This is the pre-war figure (2,671,000) less 600,000 (see previous table)]	2,071,000
New German peasant settlements	1,390,000
Crown forests	1,056,000
Town and glebe land	60,000
Small landed properties. [This is the pre-war figure (2,440,000) less 600,000 (see previous table)]	1,840,000
	6,417,000

which clearly would constitute a very much more favourable percentage for the Germans.

Calculations of this sort rarely work out in practice as they are planned. It is the principle underlying them which is their most interesting feature. Kessler's calculation, that the Balts will be able to buy out Lett *Wirte* after the War, is quite certainly fallacious: the Lett Credit Banks can be relied upon to prevent it. Nor is it probable that the Balts themselves—Kessler is not a Balt, but a German—would welcome any reduction in the number and power of the *Wirte*. The more Lett peasants can be settled on the land, the better. Far-sighted Balts welcome it. But far-sighted Letts ought also to welcome German colonisation; for, unless the extreme view is taken that the Balts should be eliminated altogether, any process that equalises the conditions on which the two races are to live side by side should be welcomed. At the present day, when the continuance of the Balt nationality is threatened, it is folly to expect the Balts to promote a Lett colonisation policy in addition to their own. It is for the Letts to settle their own people. There is nothing to prevent them doing so. The purchase facilities are there, and it is purely a ques-

tion of credit. The Lett organisations are quite strong enough to undertake such a policy. The instruments are ready to their hand in the Lettish Banks. But the truth is, the Lett *intelligentsia* is not prepared for a dull agrarian policy, which 'compromises' with the blood-sucking Barons. The *intelligentsia* is ready enough to denounce the conditions of agricultural labour on the estates of the *Ritter*, and to attribute to these conditions the drain of young Letts from the country to the towns. The logic is unanswerable; but the drain does not cease, while the *Ritter* are denounced. Agrarian evils can be cured by agrarian policy alone: and in the circumstances of the Baltic Provinces the only agrarian policy for the Letts is one based on the increase of the numbers of the *Wirte* and the strengthening of their economic power of resistance. The evacuation of the country in 1915–1916—in every other respect a disaster to the Lett cause—may prove a blessing in disguise for Lettland, if for the next few years it lessens the influence of the Socialists in the towns, and strengthens the influence of the *Wirte*. At bottom the malady from which the Letts are suffering is a disproportionate growth of *intelligentsia*. It is a malady not rare in the case of nations that have been through great oppression and are struggling to be free. The case of Armenia is not dissimilar. It is a malady which can always be righted, so long as the natural land-hunger of the race is not dead. There are pessimists who say that the land-hunger of the Letts is becoming exhausted, that the race has made up its mind to industrialisation, and no longer craves for the land. If this were so, the future of the Letts would be dark indeed. In the writer's judgment such a view is a travesty of the position, a misinterpretation and exaggeration of transient and incidental phenomena. But this is certain, that in the crucial years of their national development, which will begin when the German Armies withdraw, they must cease to build their house from the top downwards, and make haste to lay the foundations secure. And the foundation is the land: for the Land is the People.

CHAPTER III

THE NEW LITHUANIA

Woher du kommst und seist, O Fremdling, sprich!
Mir scheint es dass ich eher einem Griechen
Als einem Skythen dich vergleichen soll.

THE subject nations of Russia, a German writer has recently observed,[1] with the exception of the Balts, Poles, and Finns, began their political life in the year of the First Russian Revolution, 1905. The uncaged fledglings spread their wings and fluttered helplessly to the ground, and were without much difficulty replaced in the cage. When the Second Revolution broke out in 1917, they were still but imperfectly fledged, conscious of nationhood, but ill equipped for the arduous course of independent national life. Some made a bold attempt to stand alone, but after a while were driven by their own weakness to lean on the strength of their full-grown Western neighbour. Others, less courageous, turned to him from the first. Of these last was Lithuania.

The case of Lithuania was in some respects peculiar. Like the other non-Slavonic nations, she had been subjected for some half a century to the influence of Russian Pan-Slavism, and had had her full share of Russification. What was peculiar in Lithuania's case was the vicarious character of her sufferings. The Russifying policy of the Russian Government in Lithuania was not so much directed against the Lithuanians as against the Poles. To the Pan-Slavists, Lithuania was not an independent entity, but a part of Poland, which they proposed to Russify as a bulwark against the rest. Few persons, fifty years ago, distinguished Lithuania from Poland. For purposes of government, Lithuania was Polish.

[1] Paul Rohrbach, *Russisches Denkschrift*, 1915.

The nobles were Polish; and it was with the nobles that the Russian Government was at this moment principally concerned. The Polish Insurrection of 1863 had just been crushed in blood, and for the Insurrection the nobles alone were responsible. The peasants—barely a twelvemonth before they had been serfs—had no part or interest in such high politics: their nationality was a factor, which it probably never occurred either to nobility or Government to consider There was no Lithuanian *intelligentsia.* No educated man in Kovno, in Vilna, in Suvalki spoke the Lithuanian language. The newspapers were Polish. The higher schools—till they were Russified—were Polish. The University of Vilna, while it existed—it was suppressed by the Russian Government some years after the First Polish Rising of 1830—had been Polish. If it had not been for the Clergy, the memory of a written Lithuanian language would have been lost.

The Lithuanian language is said by philologists to be the oldest Indo-European tongue. It is as distinct from the Slavonic family as are the Teutonic or the Latin language-groups. Yet half a century ago it was still possible to find philologists, especially Polish philologists, who were prepared to say that Lithuanian was a Slav or Slavicised language. Basing themselves on the reports of two such experts, the Russian bureaucrats set themselves to Russify it. For forty years, from 1864 to 1905, the use of the Latin script was forbidden in Lithuania; and Cyrillicised schoolbooks and prayer-books were issued by the Government presses for the Lithuanian churches and village schools. But the people would not use the 'schismatic' dictionaries and grammars [1]; and in spite of the perquisitions of Russian

[1] A French scholar, M. Gauthiot, in a bibliographical study carried out for the French Government in 1902 ('*Rapport sur une mission scientifique en lituanie russe,*' in *Nouvelles Archives des Missions scientifiques et littéraires, tome X*, Paris, 1902), gives some interesting statistics of the Lithuanian books thus published in Cyrillic script. In 1865 there were published at Vilna five such books; in 1866, six; in 1867, five; in 1868, three; in 1869, three; in 1870, two; in 1871,

policemen, leading to scandalous and sometimes ridiculous scenes, Lithuania was flooded with books in the traditional Latin script, printed in Prussia,[1] and smuggled across the frontier ; and in more recent years with books from the Lithuanian presses in the United States. But Lithuanian books, printed before 1864, are now quite rare ; and the bibliophile can be safely advised to purchase them at sight.

Until 1906, there were no schools above the village schools in Lithuania, where the national language was either used as the language of instruction or could even be studied. A few of the richer Lithuanians at one time used to send their children to the Lett schools in Courland, but in the early 'nineties this was stopped. And yet the Lithuanian peasant is by no means without enthusiasm for education. Like the Irish small farmer, he likes to send at least one son to a secondary school—under the circumstances it had to be a Russian one—to make a priest of him. In quite recent years this class has shown a tendency to place their sons, after leaving the secondary schools, in banks and insurance companies in Vilna and Kovno: a development which, if it goes further, may ultimately shake the at present almost complete economic domination of the Jews. But so long as the only road by which the peasant could enter such professions was the Russian school, it was almost impossible for a distinctively Lithuanian *intelligentsia* to be formed. The example of Poland shows that it

one ; and since then only two or three altogether. In Kovno, Russian was the language of instruction in all the schools ; so no Lithuanian books were published there at all. In Suvalki, which as part of the Congress Kingdom of Poland was under the provincial authorities at Warsaw, '*où l'on nie moins facilement la présence de populations étrangères parce que l'on n'y rencontre presque pas de Russes . . . tandis que les Lituaniens des Gouvernements de Kovno, de Vilna, et aussi de Grodno sont supposés en quelque sorte ne pas exister*,' rather more was done. But by 1870, or thereabouts, it had become clear to everyone that the language neither was Slav, nor could be Slavicised.

[1] Some 100,000 Lithuanians live on the extreme eastern border of East Prussia. They have two flourishing presses at Tilsit and Memel, at each of which towns Lithuanian is taught in the gymnasia—and not even in Gothic characters!

is not impossible to maintain an already existing *intelligentsia* without facilities for education in the national language ; but it can hardly be possible under such conditions to build one up. The Lithuanian *intelligentsia* is, accordingly, a plant of very recent growth, and is largely recruited from the emigrants in the United States. The real leaders of the national movement have been, and are still, not the *intelligentsia*, but the Clergy.

The record of the Catholic Clergy in Lithuania, in the past fifty years, is an honourable one. In some, though not in all, respects it recalls the record of the Clergy in Ireland. The first beginnings of the national revival may be traced back to the labours of a certain Bishop in Samogitia, Msgr. Wolonczewski (as the name is written in Polish) or Valanczevskis (as it is written in Lithuanian), in the 'forties and 'fifties of the last century. The work of this devoted prelate, part national, part social, part religious, has much in common with the work of the better known Archbishop Count Szeptycki, the present Metropolitan of the Ruthenes (Ukranians) in Galicia. Polish born, like Szeptycki, and Polish educated—a Pole indeed of the straitest sect—Wolonczewski renounced his birthright, as Szeptycki has done, and turned him to the Gentiles. For the first time for perhaps two hundred years a high Church dignitary in Lithuania addressed his ministrations not to the landowners and the wealthy, but to the peasants and the poor. Who can doubt, who has studied the early history of national movements, that such examples are like the mustard-seed of the Parable, out of which great Churches, and nations, are built up ? Wolonczewski was especially interested in the multiplying of Lithuanian books ; and under his vigorous impulse a quantity of volumes, mostly religious, were printed and distributed amongst the villages ; and they continued to circulate until the restrictions of the Russian Government were imposed in 1864. Since that time the Clergy in Lithuania has been more and more Lithuanised, and has preserved under the Russification the tradition of interest in education

and in the potentialities of Lithuanian as a literary language. It was at the seminaries alone, until 1905, that the language could be seriously studied. Here, in recent years, the Russian Government made no attempt to interfere, though (as was so often the case in Old Russia) a little camouflage was expected and observed. The Professor of 'Homiletic' would arrange a course of Lithuanian philology under cover of a syllabus on 'Pastoralis cura'; and half a score of young enthusiasts might then be seen attending the lectures (after a full day's work at the Russian High School), who were never intending to proceed to presbytery and pulpit. There is, to the writer, something singularly pathetic in such scenes.

Social Democracy made its first appearance after the close of the century, and was confined almost exclusively to the towns, where it was coloured and dominated by the White Russian and Jewish revolutionaries. In the period of suppressed discontent, which preceded the Revolution of 1905, an attempt was made to assassinate the Governor of Vilna in common with other Provincial Governors and Ministers of State. The assassin, however, was not a Lithuanian, but a Jew. The Lithuanian Social Democrats do not in any respect resemble the violent and extremist Lettish revolutionaries. It is, indeed, a mistake to couple the two races together in any connection; for, though of kindred ethnic stock, they have in matters of politics as little affection for one another as have the Spaniards and the French.

When the Revolution broke out in 1905, the Clergy kept their hold on the reins. They threw their weight strongly against the forces of disorder, kept the peasantry for the most part out of the movement, and in the towns diverted the surge of the revolutionary wave into what in any country but Russia would have been constitutional channels. At the end of 1905 a 'National Assembly' was held at Vilna, on which the Clergy, and peasant representatives nominated under their influence, were strongly represented. The Assembly pronounced for

autonomy for Lithuania within the Russian Empire, and put forward the Nationalist educational demands. The latter were at once conceded by the paralysed Government. The Latin script was again authorised : Lithuanian was allowed as the language of instruction in the two first classes in the State schools ; certain restrictions on private schools were withdrawn ; and limited facilities for the study of Lithuanian (in Russian) were provided at the State secondary schools. From this time forward the Russian authorities renounced the credo of Russification, and embraced a policy—which fifty years before might have been wise and fruitful—of playing off the Lithuanian Nationalists against the Poles. But the change of policy was now too late. The injuries which men, and nations, do to one another are quick and easy in the doing, but slow and arduous to undo, as other countries than Russia have learnt to their cost in this War. The Lithuanians were ready enough to be ' pro-Russian,' so long as Russia was prepared to protect them from the Poles. When Russia collapsed, they transferred their affections to the only other Power who could further the realisation of their national aims. That Power was Germany.

There were not many connecting links between the Lithuanians and the Germans when the War broke out. Very few Lithuanians had gone to Germany for their education : the Lithuanian element in East Prussia was less of a link than might have been expected, by reason of the difference of religion (the East Prussian Lithuanians are Lutheran) : and there were fewer Germans settled in Lithuania than in any other Russian province. To the Lithuanian peasant the German troops, when they entered the country, must have been as complete strangers as were the French under Napoleon 103 years before.[1] The stories of German atrocities, though widely reproduced

[1] Napoleon's headquarters were at Vilna at the end of June 1812. It is curious to note how his arrangements for the occupation of the country resemble, even to points of detail, those made by the Germans in 1915.

in the 'bourgeois' Lithuanian papers in the United States—the Socialist papers would not print them—had not figured largely in the Lithuanian papers in Lithuania itself. There was little panic, therefore, when the German advance began. As in Poland and Courland, the Russian Government ordered evacuation of the country; and the retreating Russian armies laid waste the country, as far as time allowed, causing great distress in the following year. But the peasants, preparing to comply with the evacuation order, were met on the high roads and induced to remain by emissaries of a secret committee, which had been hurriedly organised in Vilna by the *intelligentsia*. When the first German columns entered Vilna, they received much to their surprise—for they were as ignorant of the Lithuanians as the Lithuanians were of them—a warm welcome from the crowds in the street. A similar curious scene, it will be remembered, was enacted a year later in Bucharest. The German General commanding seems to have been quite alarmed at these unusual demonstrations, and *more teutonico* arrested the Mayor! The Bishop intervening explained the position and secured the Mayor's release. It seems probable that the higher Clergy, acting through Bishop Karevicz of Kovno, early established with the Occupying authorities an understanding as to the future. At any rate the latter almost at once recognised, though not at first openly, a National Council or Taryba which was formed in the summer of 1916 by representatives of the various Lithuanian parties, including the Lithuanians in the United States. The Lithuanian National Council was not, like the Councils in the Baltic Provinces, of more or less German manufacture. Nor were the elements, of which it was composed, at first by any means all pro-German. There were still many who believed in an eventual Russian recovery, and were reluctant to commit themselves for fear of future reprisals. The Clergy made no overt pronouncement. A 'Committee of Lithuanians in Berlin' signed the Petition of the Russian Subject Nations to President Wilson in May 1916. Others,

on the other hand, made their way to Switzerland, and were said in the Lithuanian Press to have approached the Western Powers and to have received discouraging replies. The Russian Government too endeavoured to get into touch with the Taryba, appealing to the memory of common efforts in the past against the Poles. But the German bidder had more to offer. *Beati possidentes!* As soon as the Russian Revolution broke out, Herr Zimmermann announced publicly to a Lithuanian deputation that the German Government would support the Lithuanian claim to self-government after the War. The Taryba wished the Germans to go further and proclaim Lithuanian independence. From the autumn of 1917 they continued to press for a Proclamation in this sense. They even proclaimed it themselves; but Berlin induced them to wait, and the Occupying authorities forbade publication of the Proclamation. It is said the military authorities were opposed to an independent State, and in favour of a personal union with the German Empire. One thing at any rate was clear, that, if complete independence were granted, there would be a most embarrassing diversity of claimants—Wettin, Wittelsbach, Urach, even (it is said) Wied—for the vacant throne! But there were weightier considerations than this to incline the Chancellor to delay. One of these, and not the least weighty, was the attitude of the Poles.

The Polish policy under the German Occupation has been not to oppose the establishment of a separate Lithuanian Kingdom, but to help set it up and then 'capture' it by the superior weight of their culture, by infiltration of the public services, and by the influence which in the absence of a Lithuanian aristocracy their nobility would inevitably exercise at any future Lithuanian Court. Their influence is strongest in the towns, where a powerful section of the Clergy is Polonophil, and many of the officials are Polish. The Lithuanians are weakest in the towns. Their young *intelligentsia*, though now fully 'awake,' is no match as yet for the Polish *intelligentsia*. It would, for instance, probably

not be possible at the present moment to find sufficient educated Lithuanians to Lithuanise the public services. In Vilna, which has already been chosen as the capital of the new State, the majority of the population is not Lithuanian but White Russian. On grounds of sentiment and tradition Vilna is regarded by the Lithuanians as the Italians regard Triest; but Vilna is no more Lithuanian than Triest is Italian, if the statistics of the population are to be the deciding factor. In the country districts, where the Lithuanians are strongest and where the Clergy is predominantly Nationalist, the Polish influence is confined to the land-lords and their dependents. But, though the peasantry is strongly anti-Polish, the feeling is as much social as national: 'Pole' to the Lithuanian peasant means 'land-lord': race-consciousness is a new thing with him and (apart from a general feeling of attachment to the national language) still largely undeveloped. The influence of the land-lords has been somewhat strengthened since 1915 by an influx of Polish peasants, who migrated with the retreating Russian armies from Poland and have settled in the Lithuanian provinces. On the whole, however, it may be said that the Poles now realise that the Lithuanian peasant has escaped them, as the Norwegians have escaped the Swedes, and that the day when he could be Polonised has gone by. They have recently turned their attention to a more promising field. In the three former Russian provinces, Vilna, Kovno, Suvalki, out of which the Lithuanian State must be cut, the Lithuanians have a majority in Kovno and Suvalki alone. In the province of Vilna the large majority are White Russians. The last available official figures—they are taken from the Russian census of 1897, the only census on modern lines which has ever been taken in Russia—are, in thousands, as follows:—

	Lithuanians	White Russians
Province of Vilna . .	280	892
„ Kovno . .	1018	38
„ Suvalki . .	3105	27

The White Russian Question is a complicated one. The feature of it which interests the Poles is the prospect of including all the Catholic White Russians (some 175,000 out of a total of 5,000,000; all the rest are Orthodox), and as many of the others as possible, in the New Poland. Fifty years ago the Catholic White Russians were not Latins but Uniates; that is to say, in communion with Rome but having the Greek Rite. In the 'sixties of the last century the Russian Church conducted religious propagada amongst these Uniates, and converted something between 50,000 and 100,000 of them to Orthodoxy. According to the Russian law, as it existed down to 1905, no one once converted to Orthodoxy might change his religion. But in 1905 Nicholas II issued his Edict of Toleration; and something between 150,000 and 200,000 White Russians reverted to Catholicism. But by this time, under the Russian Concordat with the Vatican, no Uniate Church in Russia any longer existed, and an Orthodox becoming a Catholic was obliged to join the Latin Rite. The Poles, who always endeavour to treat 'Pole,' 'Latin,' and 'Catholic' as three identical terms, are endeavouring to bring these strayed sheep into the fold of the Metropolitan at Warsaw, although the Vatican years before expressly provided for this contingency by establishing a second (Latin) Metropolitan at Mohilev in White Russia. At times of census the Polish Clergy instruct their White Russian parishioners to reply 'Polak,' when questioned as to their religion; and many do so, for religion and nationality are readily confused in Eastern Europe. Since the German Occupation this Polish propaganda has been particularly vigorous. The former Russian schools, deserted by the Russian teachers and officials, have been taken over and reopened by the Poles; in Vilna the City crèches and kindergarten are being used by them as elementary schools. The Poles themselves in Vilna hardly amount to 9 per cent. of the population; and this fostering care is not designed for the benefit of the young Polish eaglets alone. The fact is the White

Eagle has extensive projects of adoption in these parts. The Germans, though they recognised Lithuanian independence, never delimited the frontiers of the new State, or committed themselves to any solution of the White Russian Question. The Poles have no difficulty in finding a solution for any such question. Their ancient motto, *Cuius religio eius regio,* can be as well applied in White Russia as it was three hundred years ago in Lithuania. Polish Imperialism, in short, is blossoming again like the aloe after a hundred barren years ; not all the disasters of Poland have availed to kill that irrepressible growth ; its tentacles reach out like the ivy wherever a foothold is to be found. The Poles now mean to press for the inclusion in the New Poland of just so much of the White Russian provinces as circumstances at the Peace Conference will allow. To this end their feverish anxiety to Polonise, while the final settlement is still in the furnace. The Polish papers have lately taken to calling the White Russians 'White Ruthenes,' which, by those acquainted with the nuances of East European nomenclature, will be readily perceived to be intended to help the White Russians to forget that they ever were Russians at all.

In the writer's opinion the Lithuanians are not yet in a position to dispense with the influence of the Poles, and cannot hope, at least for some years, to compete with Polish culture on its own ground. They must look elsewhere than to their *intelligentsia* for the basis of their new State, if it is to preserve its national lines ; and, if not to the *intelligentsia,* no other class remains but the peasantry to which they can turn. It is no misfortune for Lithuanian Nationalism, but an advantage that it should be so. The land is the broadest of all bases for state-building, and in Eastern Europe at any rate the best. The broader the base of the building, the less the cause for alarm when the upper storeys rock. A system of peasant land-ownership has still to be created in Lithuania ; but the land and the men are there, and the land-hunger. Three generations ago the Russians might

have built up a new Lithuania on these lines. The land of the insurrectionary proprietors had been confiscated after the Polish Risings of 1830 and 1863, and the Lithuanian Movement was still unborn. But the Russians were blinded with Pan-Slavism, and they let the chance go by. The confiscated properties were turned into Crown-land; and the forests—the confiscated properties were largely forest land—were never settled or cleared. Yet it is good land for settlement and cultivation, geomorphically similar to the land in Courland which the Baltic Barons have cleared, and settled to a great extent with peasant proprietors. The Russian State Land Bank has been in existence for a long time in Lithuania; and it has initiated local policies of colonisation from time to time; but its efforts taken as a whole have been insignificant; and they have frequently been limited by national or ecclesiastical restrictions. The promising Russian Co-operative Movement is weaker in the Lithuanian and White Russian provinces than in any other part of Russia. The Lithuanian agriculturalist has been driven by economic pressure into emigration, to such an extent that to-day almost one-third of the race is living in the United States; and the strength of the people, every unit of which will be needed for the Titanic task which awaits them, is, like the strength of the Irish, divided by half the world. The quality of the agriculture in Lithuania is very poor; and the land offers an astonishing contrast in appearance to that which is under the cultivation of the Letts in the neighbouring provinces of Courland and Livonia. The Polish land-lords give no such agricultural lead as the Balt Barons offer in Courland. All the large estates are more or less wastefully cultivated, and most of them cry aloud for the expenditure of capital—sure sign of bad agriculture. The Crown-land forests are probably the worst managed forest land in Europe. Yet they are so extensive that it has been estimated that it would be possible to settle a land-owning Lithuanian peasantry on these alone without any expropriation of the lands

of the Poles. *Hora poscit Herculem*; and the stage is already set for the first and greatest of labours. For this is certain, that, to bring back to life and nationhood a people which has lain exanimate so long, there is needed a man bold enough to descend into depths and grapple with Powers of Darkness.

CHAPTER IV

POLAND 1917

[*This survey of the position in Poland was written one month before the Russian Revolution of March* 1917.]

If Old Moore, in compiling his celebrated *Almanac* a month before the War, had foretold that in the month of November 1916 the Poles would once more have a kingdom of their own, who would not have laughed in his face? Any political surprise would have seemed more probable—a Japanese-American War, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the restoration of the Temporal Power of the Pope; but a revival of the Polish question—impossible! There was no Polish question in the international sense. The world knew that Prussia was endeavouring to Germanise her Polish provinces; the Poles could count on the platonic sympathy of most foreigners in their resistance. There had been disturbances at Warsaw in 1905; but they were only one out of many symptoms of disaffection in Russia at that time. In any case, these were matters which concerned nobody but the Poles themselves and the governments under which they lived. Europe would not disturb the *status quo* on their account. The Poles themselves, or the great majority of them, accepted the situation in much the same spirit. Since 1863 political independence had been, at the most, an academic aspiration. Five years before the War a party leader of the Russian Poles could write as follows[1]:

The period of insurrections, the period of armed struggles for independence, is henceforward closed. The Polish Question, considered as an international question, having for its

[1] Roman Dmowski, *La Question Polonaise*, Paris, 1909.

immediate object the reconstitution of the Polish State, does not present itself to-day to Polish public men themselves. . . . There is taking shape a quite different conception of the Polish cause. It is to be henceforward the struggle for existence, the struggle for justice, for the maintenance of the national individuality, for the affirmation of the personality of the Polish nation in each of the three Partitioning States.

But from the first moment of the invasion of East Prussia by the Russians every Pole knew that the situation had suddenly and dramatically changed. When August set in the cultivator was thinking of his crops. July had been a sultry, scorching month in the Polish Plain ; and the farmers feared a drought. The politicians in Poznania were busy denouncing the Expropriation Law ; Warsaw was still dominated by the reaction after the Revolution of 1905 ; no one paid much attention to either Duma or Diet. And then suddenly, spontaneously as it seemed, like thunder out of a clear sky, the whole of the national aspirations were once more on the *tapis* ; and, before August was out, Eastern Europe, from the Carpathians to the Baltic, was a battlefield on which the fate of Poland was being decided. It was a *coup de théâtre* such as the Poles love—unexpected, catastrophic, transforming the whole plot. Nor since that moment has the emotional tension relaxed. Hope, fear, elation, disappointment, have followed one upon the other. On the same battlefield of Tannenberg, on which five hundred years before a Polish king annihilated the German Order of Knights, they now saw 90,000 Russians lay down their arms to a Prussian general. They saw first Lemberg and then Przemysl fall to the Russians, and Cossack cavalry pushing up to the Carpathian passes. The 'Austrian Solution' was at a discount in those days. A few weeks later and the same Russians were in full retreat—first from Przemysl, then from Lemberg, and at last from Warsaw itself. Within twelve months of the outbreak of war there was not a Russian soldier left on the soil of the Polish Kingdom. Many of the timid and hesitant then made up their

minds and went over into the camp of the conqueror. Not a few of them regretted their decision, when a year later Brusilov struck on the Stochod, and the entire Bukovina once more passed into Russian hands. Finally, on November 5, 1916, amid indescribable rejoicings, the German Governor-General of Warsaw proclaimed in the Palace where once the Polish Diet met that the Kingdom of Poland was once more an independent State. What a rich assortment of experiences! What a moving climax to the drama! No wonder the crowd sang 'Boże coś Polskę,' and the altars of Our Lady of Poland in the churches were laden with golden and jewelled thank-offerings.

It is folly to minimise the significance of this *dénouement*; and in Russia it has not been minimised. Though the new Poland is to contain neither Poznania [1] nor Galicia,[2] though its existence is precarious, and the motives which brought it into being are suspect, yet that has been done which it will be very hard to undo. The forbidden word 'independence' has been spoken. The plant, which had withered, has taken new root. Any promises which the other side could make afterwards were almost bound to fall flat. The comment was too obvious. Every country has a proverb about birds in the hand and birds in the bush. The truth is, it is a mistake to set about the business of state-making in a spirit of romanticism. There are certain hard, cold facts on which every Pole, and every friend of the Poles, must base their arguments; for they are the essential factors in the continuance of Poland as a State. One is the geographic situation of Poland. The other is the historic character of the Pole. The diplomats, who, when the time comes, are to negotiate peace terms, can do no more than study these essential factors without prejudice and without passion. If their studies lead to the conclusion that the elements for an independent national existence are not there, they can only be silent

[1] Prussian Poland. [2] Austrian Poland.

when the Poles come to plead their cause. The writer has endeavoured, for some years past, to carry out such an investigation, and his studies have not led him to this negative result. He believes that the conditions for an independent national existence, lacking in 1863, lacking in 1830, lacking, above all, at the time of the Partitions, and at the Congress of Vienna, are now present, if only in embryonic form. The aspect of the Polish question has been changed fundamentally by a remarkable economic development of the last quarter of a century, the facts of which are little known in England, and are not adequately realised by many of the Poles themselves. *Via prima salutis, quod minime reris, Graia pandetur ab urbe.* It is in Prussian Poland that the kernel of the new Polish State must be sought; and under no conceivable concatenation of circumstances can Prussian Poland be included in the new kingdom, except in the event of an Allied victory. Herein lies the decisive argument for the Allied bird in the bush.

The geographic situation of Poland carries with it inevitable political corollaries. Eight million Poles in Galicia, two millions in Poznania, and about ten millions in Russian Poland, make up a total of 20,000,000. A State, then, of twenty millions, if the Allied solution prevails, of ten millions if the Austro-German solution prevails, is wedged in Eastern Europe between the Russian Empire of 170,000,000 and the Central European Empire of 116,000,000. Whether it receives an outlet on the Baltic, as both belligerents are said to have promised (each at the other's expense), or remains a coastless State, like Switzerland, makes a good deal of difference to its future economic development, but little or nothing to the problem of defence. A small state with two powerful neighbours has only one possible foreign policy. It must conclude a drastic alliance with one or other of the two neighbours. If Russia is the enemy, then Poland must be sure of German support in arms in the event of a war with Russia; and *vice versa*. But neither Germany nor Russia would pledge their armed support

without exacting a heavy price. The first condition of such an alliance would be an offensive and defensive clause ; in other words, Poland would have to place her two million rifles at the disposal of her ally. Her friends must be her ally's friends, her enemies his enemies. In a word, she must surrender all freedom in her foreign policy. That might be a price worth paying in return for freedom in her home policy. But the leaders must reckon, at the same time that they surrender their foreign policy, to hand over a great part of their economic policy as well. Russia is not going to open her tariff frontiers to a Poland in vassalage to the Germans ; and Polish industry will have to look for an outlet for its products in combination, and probably in syndication, with German industry. Such considerations sometimes look more formidable in prospect than they prove to be in practice. But they must not be left out of consideration.

Facts of geography cry aloud to heaven. The romanticist can hardly overlook them. But to the facts of history it is the easiest thing in the world to shut one's eyes. In England, during a great part of the last century, the Poles commanded a sympathy which was largely based on ignorance of the Polish past. In the early 'sixties the wave of Liberal enthusiasm, which a few years before had gone out to Kossuth (who Messrs. Steed and Seton-Watson would now have the world believe was a tyrant of the deepest dye), was in full flood for the handful of aristocrats stirring up a brave but hopeless rebellion on the Vistula. Agents of the so-called ' Emigration,' the group of Polish nobles whose headquarters were in Paris, were appealing to crowded meetings in England for sympathy and diplomatic support. At Manchester a member of a great Polish family, Count Ladislas Zamoiski, amid cheers, referred to the Partitions as the ' greatest crime of the age.' The young Lord Robert Cecil (whose son bearing the same name may not impossibly have a voice in the disposal of Polish destinies at the peace) seized on the

phrase, and, in a long article in the *Quarterly Review*, subjected it to a historical examination, with results which, in this country at any rate, were new and startling. The view which he then developed as to the causes and circumstances of the Partitions has since prevailed with most Englishmen who have turned their attention to the subject. Lord Salisbury thus concluded the historical part of the essay :—

With the year 1815 the strength of the Polish cause begins. As a nation they had fallen by the justest retribution that was ever meted out to a foreign policy of incessant aggression, and an oppressive and barbarous domestic rule. But they had not lost their rights as men. They had a right to good government, and at least to some portion of the freedom they had lost. . . . An absolutely independent Poland is a mere chimera. There is no power that can set it up ; and if set up—assuming that the Russian Empire remains otherwise unbroken—there is no power that can maintain it. Recent events have shown that the Polish character still makes united effort as impossible as it was in the days of the Confederations of Bar and Radom. An independent Polish Kingdom, even if it could be established, would never be more than the nursling of domineering Embassies. The individual ambition which, even at this supreme crisis, could not be restrained from dividing the Polish arms, would give abundant facility to each Ambassador to construct for himself a party in the interests of his own Court. A country governed upon such a system is in no true sense a nation. It is a mere battlefield for foreign intrigue. An independent Poland will become a possibility when individual Polish leaders shall have shown that they have acquired the moral capacity for self-renunciation. But a nation which even in its deepest woe is still torn by factions is not likely to make head against the forces of the largest Empire in the world.

The ' recent events,' to which Lord Salisbury alluded in the above passage, were the tendency of the Central Revolutionary Committee to split into parties, and the dispute even in the heart of the crisis between two rival leaders, each of whom issued proclamations denouncing

the other. Faction ruined Poland. Faction was the cause of the Partitions. Faction made a failure of each of the two insurrections of the nineteenth century. How is it with the Poles to-day? The great hour of their deliverance has struck. Does it find them still torn by faction? Or have they acquired 'the moral capacity for self-renunciation,' which Lord Salisbury esteemed the precedent condition of political reconstruction?

Before that question is answered, here is a list of political parties in the Poland of 1917: Nationalists, Realists, National Democrats, National Radicals, National Workers' Union, Party of National Work, League for the Reconstitution of the Polish State, Progressive Party, Progressive Union, Party of Economic Independence, Club des Etatistes, National Peasants' Union, Peasants' Party, Socialists, Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, Patriots' Union, and, finally, Confederation of Independent Parties. These groups are divided according as they are Activists or Passivists. Some follow a Supreme National Committee, others a Central National Committee; and the two Committees are at daggers drawn, to the extent of abusing one another openly in their respective newspapers. At first sight, therefore, it might appear as if the Poles had not acquired 'the moral capacity for self-renunciation.'

The student of Polish affairs, who plunges suddenly into this welter of names and parties without previous acquaintance with the subject, is not to be envied. The key to a Polish situation is generally a personal factor, of which the outsider is not likely to be aware. Poland is like Anglo-India in one respect: everybody in Poland seems to know everybody else, what they are doing, who they are making friends with, what their income is, and how they are spending it. Actions which to an outsider appear inexplicable do not seem to a Pole to need explanation at all, because they arise naturally out of the personality of the actor. If Major 'Willie' Redmond, at a critical moment in the Battle of the Somme, had suddenly withdrawn his battalion from the

firing-line in order to further the prospects of immediate Home Rule, the surprise and embarrassment of the Nationalist Party at Westminster may be imagined.[1] Yet this is precisely what the Socialist leader Pilsudski, who by one of the strange peripeties of the present War is now an Austrian brigadier-general, did with a brigade of the Polish Legions in the spring of 1916; and nobody —except his German Army Commander—appeared to think it odd. The Socialist leader is the most arresting personality at present in the limelight on the Polish political stage. It will be a convenient way of getting a conspectus of the political situation to trace his fortunes up to the present time.

Twelve years ago, when the Russian Revolution broke out, Pilsudski was leader of the Socialists in Russian Poland, more Socialist than National, as bitter an enemy of the Polish capitalist as of the Russian bureaucrat, and with no love lost for the Church. The strength of the Party was in the workmen of the towns, but there was a large sprinkling of *intelligentsia*; the peasants had little to do with it. When the Revolution began the Polish Socialists threw in their lot with the Russian and Jewish Revolutionaries; and they took an early opportunity of declaring a private and domestic war against a rival Polish party, the National Democrats. The National Democrats, with another group called Realists, represented the great land-owners, the capitalists, and the bulk of the bourgeoisie in the towns; they had a following among the peasants, and in a certain section of the *intelligentsia*. Their programme was strongly National; they accepted Russian rule, but demanded complete internal autonomy; on the economic problem a marked anti-Semitism was their chief contribution

[1] The liberty taken with the name of a gallant and patriotic officer will, perhaps, be excused in an illustration directed to showing how in the Ireland of Eastern Europe the impossible happens. [Such an illustration could never have been employed, had the writer been able to foresee, when this passage was written, that within a few months this gallant officer would have laid down his life on a Western battlefield.]

to thought. Richer and better organised than the Socialists, the National Democrats had considerably the better of the struggle. At the elections to the First Duma they won all the seats ; and have since constituted the Polish Party in the Russian Parliament. The Revolution in Poland was not completely suppressed before 1907, by which time the country had become too hot to hold Pilsudski, and he withdrew across the Austrian border into Galicia. During the Revolution there had grown up under his inspiration a semi-military organisation of armed riflemen ; and in the years which followed he maintained and extended this organisation on either side of the border, so that at the outbreak of the war it was ready to form the nucleus of the Polish Legions. Pilsudski's idea during these years was to provoke another armed insurrection in Russia, but before the war he could find no support for such a project with any of the parties in Galicia.

The war gave him his chance. Hastily gathering together some four hundred Galician riflemen he ' invaded Russia,' with the national demands inscribed on a banner. The military effect was presumably not large, but it soon became clear that his bold decisive action had powerfully impressed the national mind. Not only the Radicals and Socialists on both sides of the border now rallied to his leadership, but a number of National Democrats from Russia went over to his camp. Even to the Galician bourgeois parties he began to be a hero. At a Conference of Poles, both from Galicia and from Russia, which was held at Vienna in the first month of the war, a Supreme National Committee was constituted, to which all parties—for the moment—subscribed. The enrolment of the Legions was taken in hand, the lists in possession of Pilsudski's organisation, now called the Central National Committee, being used as a basis. The Austrian Government seems to have facilitated the transfer to the Legions of all the Galician Poles who had been called up in the mobilisation. All Russophil voices were, for the moment, silenced. They

revived with the defeat of the Austrians and the advance of the Russians in Galicia; and at one moment there were some hurried departures from the railway station at Cracow. But the forcing of the Dunajec, and the subsequent Russian retreat all along the line, more than restored the credit of the Supreme National Committee. Since then the Russophils, not wishing to be pro-Russian in the hour of Russian adversity, nor to have been anti-Russian should the Russian triumphs recommence, have had a difficult part to play, to which perhaps sufficient justice has not been done in Russia. It was too much to expect them to stand altogether aside from the national movement in so critical a time. Though they have maintained a liaison with the Supreme National Committee, a large and influential section, including most of the Duma Deputies, has remained faithful to the 'Russian orientation' without much encouragement and at a time when faith was distinctly the evidence of things not seen. As a party they refused the seats which were offered them in the Provisional Government. By the other parties they are described as Passivists or Neutralists, by which is meant that while accepting *de facto* the constitution of independent Poland they wish it to remain neutral in the present war.

The Activists are the rest; on the one hand, Pilsudski, with his Socialists and Radicals, represented in the Central National Committee; on the other hand, the numerous groups of Austrian Poles, accustomed at ordinary times to fight one another like cat and dog, but at the present moment, with a few exceptions, united under the Supreme National Committee. The Austrians would almost all prefer the 'Austrian solution'—that is to say, the union of Austrian and Russian Poland under the Emperor of Austria, who would be elected Hereditary King of Poland by the first Polish Diet. The exclusion of Austrian Poland from the new Kingdom, under the Proclamation of November last, does not seriously disturb them, as they already possess self-government, and the union of the two elements appears to them only a question of

time. Their political speculations at the present time, moreover, are coloured, as are those of all peoples within the orbit of the Central Powers, with Naumannic ideas of *Mitteleuropa*. It may be added that they have at all times a child-like faith in the benevolence of the Austrian Government; and that they are known to their enemies by the disarming nick-name of 'the Good Boys' (*die Musterknaben*).

Pilsudski and his followers have no enthusiasm for the 'Austrian solution,' though they might accept it as a *pis aller*. Their chief concern until lately was to keep the Legions in being as the nucleus of a standing army, with which to be ready to uphold the existence of the new Polish state. In this design, which was obviously sound policy, they were at one with the Austrian Poles, and for that matter with the Austrian and German Governments, who have every reason to be thankful to the Polish Legions for services rendered, while they at the same time cherish a lively anticipation of favours to come. The Socialist leader was fully aware of the importance which the Legions, his own creation, had acquired, and he appears to have conceived the idea of using them as a lever to exert political pressure. Throughout 1915 he had been urging on the Central Powers an immediate declaration of their attitude with regard to the future of Poland. In January 1916 a Conference was held at Cracow, at which delegates from all three Polands attended, including, according to the Russian Ministry of the Interior,[1] two Deputies of the Duma, Parczewski and Lempicki. Austrian Poles in the confidence of the Austrian and German Governments announced to the delegates that the Central Powers were in agreement upon the 'Austrian solution,' but nothing happened. Pilsudski was more and more restive.

[1] In the much-discussed 'Memorandum to Heads of Departments' (English text in the *Times'* Russian Supplement, September 30, 1916). The Polish Club in the Duma issued a reply, in which they dispute the accuracy of the Memorandum, but do not contest this particular statement.

Then Brusilov's offensive began in Volhynia, and relations between the Supreme National Committee and the Central National Committee became very strained. Pilsudski wished to resign his command in the Legions; but the Austrian military authorities refused to accept his resignation. Shortly afterwards, while the Austrians were still fighting for their lives on the Stochod Pilsudski suddenly and without warning withdrew his brigade from the front. The Austrians are inured to Polish political demonstrations; and if Pilsudski's Army Commander had been an Austrian, the military authorities would very likely have shrugged their shoulders, and the incident would have been hushed up. Unfortunately he was a German, and he insisted on Pilsudski's resignation being accepted and officially gazetted '*wegen Verweigerung der militärischen Disciplin vor dem Feinde.*' A number of Russian-Pole officers in the Legions wished to follow Pilsudski in resigning their commissions; he himself was threatening to oppose recruiting for the Legions. Had both carried out their threats, an awkward situation would undoubtedly have arisen for the Austro-Germans. It may be therefore, as his followers claim, that Pilsudski's action hastened the Proclamation of November 5; but, however that may be, there seems no doubt that it has appreciably damaged his prestige, both in the Legions and with the rank and file of his party. A curious illustration of the impression created came to light a few weeks ago in the shape of a letter sent by the American Poles to their representative on the Central National Committee in November last. The 'Good Boys' intercepted the letter by means best known to themselves and the Austrian Post Office, and published it in one of their newspapers.[1] It appears from the letter that the representative of the American Poles in Warsaw omitted to mention in his reports the trifling circumstance that the Central National Committee, to which the American subscriptions were being paid, had broken

[1] *Dziennik Narodowy* of Piotrkow (Russian Poland), January 12, 1917. The letter has since been published in America.

with the Supreme National Committee, to which the subscribers believed they were contributing. The letter is as follows :

DEAR COMRADE,—We have listened with much regret in the Confidential Committee to the Report from the old country. Our position as Socialists among citizens holding different views could have been maintained on a proper level only if our loyalty could not have been questioned.

Meantime, we have learnt that the Supreme National Committee maintained complete reserve with regard to the Central National Committee, because it knew that the work of the Central National Committee, which fights the Supreme National Committee, is conducted with our money. We are much obliged to the tact of M. Jaworski[1] for his not having come out against our organisation, because undoubtedly without any guilt on our part we have merited the accusation of double dealing. Only now have we learnt about the fatal mistake of the Central National Committee, which three weeks after the occupation of Warsaw had started opposition against recruiting for the Legions. You ought to have let us know about that. We would then have considered the matter in the Confidential Committee, and would have either taken your side or come out against you openly. Meantime, we were sending money to you in Warsaw at your request. This money was used for fighting the Supreme National Committee, whilst in our meetings and resolutions we were calling on the people here to obey absolutely the Supreme National Committee, and were attacking those who were fighting it.

You will admit that this looked like hypocrisy of a base kind. The resignation of Pilsudski and the cry raised against the Legions were an incredible mistake. If it were not for the German Proclamation, we should have had such a disruption among us, such a chaos, that even in the worst times of the Nobility rule there could have been nothing more disastrous. The Germans could have ruined us, if they had left us to our fate, and if instead of November the Fifth they had allowed Polish anarchy and provincially-minded politicians to kill our cause.

We resent most that our comrades, owing to this diplomacy

[1] Ex-President of the Supreme National Committee.

for the sake of diplomacy, diplomacy without diplomats, have ruined the prestige of the Socialists in the eyes of the masses, to the joy of the bourgeois, and undone much of our work for independence which we have been conducting for twenty years. Most of all, we fear that Ziuk[1] will no longer have the importance which he previously had.

We had to listen with much regret to very tactful but very serious charges against you because during all this time you have sent us no report and no explanation of the real conditions at home, and because you did not inform us of the use you made of our money. We have succeeded in weakening the bad impression by putting all the blame on the mails and on Great Britain. We must, however, admit that the whole affair of the Central National Committee of Sokolnicki,[2] and the impressionist, adventurous policy and the noble, but ill-considered, resignation of Ziuk were a great blow to us. In a great time our country lacks great men.— With fraternal greetings.

B. KULAKOWSKI,
J. BORKOWSKI,
For the Committee of National Defence in America.

The Provisional Government, which was set up by the Germans after the Proclamation of November 5, consisted of a Council of State of twenty-five members, all Poles, which proceeded to nominate an Executive Committee, the members of which act as Ministers of Politics (that is, relations with the Central Powers), Finance, Justice, the Interior, Commerce, Labour, and Education. Work was found for the rest of the politicians on the Army Committee (over which Pilsudski presides), the Committee for drafting the Constitution, and the like. The Germans wished all parties to be represented on the Council of State ; but they intended to secure a majority for the ' Good Boys ' in the allotment of seats. The party of Pilsudski with five seats was to form the Left. The ' Good Boys ' were to form the Centre. And it was hoped that the Passivists would form the Right. Pilsudski seems to have conducted the negotiations between

[1] *Petit nom* for Pilsudski.
[2] Partisan of Pilsudski.

the Passivists and the German Government—an odd agent for the latter to select. Probably he hoped to secure such an allotment of seats on the Council that his own party would be able to play a more decisive part than their numbers would give them. If, for example, the 'Good Boys' had ten seats, and the Passivists ten seats, Pilsudski's five votes would have the decision on every occasion. If such were his tactics, they were seen through by the German Government, which announced that it proposed to allot thirteen seats to the 'Good Boys' and seven seats to the Passivists. The negotiations for the entry of the Passivists thereupon broke down, and neither of the two Russian parties, National Democrats and Realists, is officially represented on the Council of State.[1] The seven seats intended for them were filled by independent Conservative landowners, of whom there is never any lack in Poland, all of an anti-Russian tinge. Such is the position as it stands in the spring of 1917.

The reader is now in a position to form his own opinion on the question, whether the politicians of Poland have acquired 'the moral capacity for self-renunciation,' or whether, in the words of the American Poles, 'in a great time our country lacks great men.' His attention is now invited to a very different field of Polish activities. It must have struck him that in all the *démarches*, conferences, and negotiations, which have just been described, the Poles of German Poland have scarcely figured at all. It would be the greatest possible mistake to conclude that the German Poles love the Germans better than their brothers in Russia love the Russians. The German Government has made it perfectly clear from the beginning that under no circumstances will it cede any portion of Poznania to the Kingdom. The Poles of Poznania know the Germans; they have full cause to know them; and they are under no illusions as to the

[1] Nevertheless, two former leaders of the National Democrats, one of them an ex-Deputy of the Duma, hold portfolios; and a former Chairman of the Realists is a member of the Committee for drafting the Constitution.

German Government keeping its word. It would be madness on their part to risk future reprisals from a victorious Prussia by dallying with a revolution, which Prussia may, for her own ends, encourage on her enemy's territory, but does not dream of allowing so much as to cast its spray across the frontier. The Poles of Prussia are not in the position of the Russian Poles who have gone over to the Austrian camp. They have more to lose. The reprisals, which the Russian Poles with guilty consciences have to fear, are political reprisals; and they count on a generous political amnesty on both sides after the war. It is not political reprisals which the Prussian Poles fear. During fifty years, by the sweat of their brow, under constant menace, and in the teeth of opposition, they have built up an elaborate and delicate economic organisation, in which the national life has its being, and on which depend all its hopes of survival and potentialities of development. When the Russian Poles were holding secret meetings in the villages, and in fiery speeches denouncing the Russian authorities, the Prussian Poles were founding land banks in the forms of German law. They have organised the economic life, first of the peasant, then of the tradesman, and, lastly, of the artisan, with an enterprise and a patience incredible to anyone who has studied the Polish character only in Galicia and the Kingdom. They have learnt from the Prussian oppressor the virtue of discipline, the commonest virtue in the Prussian and the rarest in the Pole. They have evolved a State within a State, a habitation for their Slavonic soul *in populo peregrino*, for the maintenance and continuance of which they must every hour tremble.

When the rising in Russia collapsed, in 1863, the leadership of the Nobility, in the form in which it had been maintained since the days when Poland was a State and their rule was exclusive and unquestioned, came to an end. From that time on the development of the three Polands proceeded on independent lines. In Poznania (Prussian Poland), two movements developed simul-

taneously. The one was a political ' Democratic ' movement, which bade fair to carry on the traditions of the Nobility under another set of labels. The leaders of this movement were the bourgeois *intelligentsia*. They, too, like the Nobles, looked to Paris for their inspiration ; but they sought it, not in the Court of the Tuileries, but in the Republican Opposition. Academic and cosmopolitan, they found their chief affinities and support in the similarly minded politicians of Austrian and Russian Poland. For social and economic problems at home they had little interest or inclination. From time to time they read papers to one another on ' The defective political sense of the masses.' The other movement also sprang from the middle class ; but, unlike the Democratic movement, it had its activities in the depths. At the time, and for many years afterwards, it was little heeded : and though for some time now its significance has been appreciated by the bulk of the Poles themselves and by the Prussian bureaucracy, it was not realised by the German public until quite a short time ago. In 1907 the German economist, Ludwig Bernhard, published the first edition of his Polish studies.[1] In writing this notable book, Prof. Bernhard had access both to official and to Polish sources, and by his personal relations with the capitalist world to a great deal of private information, which the Poles take care not to publish. The appearance of the book produced something like consternation in Polish circles. It is written from the Prussian point of view with a kind of half-amused, half-irritated admiration for the Poles, not unlike the feeling which many Englishmen have for the Irish. Its strength, however, lay less in its conclusions than in the facts which it disclosed. It must form the starting-point of any future investigations, whether by friend or foe. The alarm which it caused amongst the Poles was due to the fear that it would be used by the bureaucracy to stir up feeling in Prussia

[1] *Das polnische Gemeinwesen im preussischen Staat, Die Polenfrage*, by Ludwig Bernhard, Ord. Professor der Staatswissenschaften a.d. Universität Berlin, Second Edition, Leipzig, 1910.

for another anti-Polish crusade ; and, to some extent, it has been so used. Prince Bülow quoted from it extensively in introducing his anti-Polish legislation in 1908 But, on the whole, the book has probably made as many friends for the Poles as it has encouraged enemies. The Germanising policy of the Prussian Government has never been popular in Germany outside Prussia, and in Prussia itself it is regarded as a ' disagreeable necessity.'

Prof. Bernhard traces the origin of the economic movement, which is now to be described, to the Peasant Unions, which were founded in Poznania by the Insurrectionist, Maximilian Jackowski, on his release from prison after the suppression of the Insurrection of 1863. The peasant up to this time had kept out of politics. When Poland was a State, the peasant was a serf, a serf whose condition had been steadily worsened by the Nobility from the fifteenth century onwards. *Coelum nobilium, paradisus clericorum, aurifodina advenarum, infernum rusticorum,* says a traveller in Poland a few years befere the Partitions. About the same period Stanislas Leszczynski, who had himself twice been King of Poland, wrote :

> Such necessary persons [the serfs] should, without doubt, be esteemed ; but we make scarcely a difference between them and the beasts which plough our fields. We often spare them less than the beasts, and only too often sell them to equally cruel masters, who compel them by increase of work to pay the price of their new servitude. With horror I mention the law which lays upon every noble who kills a peasant—only a fine of fifteen francs.

For the peasant the substitution of Prussian for Polish rule meant primarily the abolition of serfage. The political changes passed unheeded over his head. From time to time during the years which followed, his landlord's agent would pack him into a potato waggon and send him into the town to vote for some candidate for the Prussian Diet. But he noticed that there were fewer landlords now than there used to be. The Prussian Government were splitting up estates to form peasant

holdings. In this and in other ways there was much profit to be had from the *Prusacy*. He had no feeling against them himself. They were the rulers, and what they said had to be done: that was natural: he ruled his own household in the same way. But they did not interfere with him. For his part he could not see why the priest attacked them, and the *szlachta* urged him to rise against them. This, or something like it, was the attitude of the peasant when in 1873 the Administration introduced an ordinance making German the language of instruction in the schools. The change was first felt more as an inconvenience by the peasant than as an attack on his nationality. But other regulations followed. Gradually he began to see that there was a policy behind them. The Germans were threatening the mother-tongue! In that hour the Polish peasant awoke for the first time to political consciousness.

It was at this stage that Jackowski with his Peasant Union projects offered himself to his notice. The unions promised him economic aid, of which he was badly in need. And they were pure Polish. They were not political—he would not have touched them had they been 'politics'—but in some sense he felt they were a protest against the Prussian authorities. This gentleman from Posen, who was so eager to form unions, was a good man. They said he had been imprisoned by the Prussians for helping their brothers in Russia during the late troubles. That could not be right, to imprison a good man for helping his brothers. The Priest said it was not pleasing to God. Jackowski's propaganda made rapid headway. In 1873 there were 7 Peasant Unions in Poznania; in 1875 there were 58; in 1876, 74; in 1877, 105; in 1880, 130. *And all were combined in one central organisation in Posen, of which Jackowski was the head.*

The conception of combined effort was Jackowski's great contribution to the economic movement. Peasant Unions already existed when he came upon the scene; but they were isolated one from the other, and, because

isolated, powerless. Jackowski's organisation to-day consists of over 388 unions. These are grouped in twenty-six districts, each district being under a Vice-Patron. Over the Vice-Patrons is the Patron—Jackowski himself was Patron until his death in 1905. The Patronate has an office in Posen, from which it publishes a weekly paper. The activities of the unions are as follows. Each union has a social gathering once a month, generally after Mass on Sundays, at which arrangements are made for insurance, hire of machinery, purchase of fertilisers, and the like, on co-operative lines. Once a year the district holds a meeting, which for most of the peasants is the principal event of the year. Some 300 to 400 persons may be present. The local newspapers report the proceedings at length. The Patron, or his representative from the Head Office, is invariably present; and great efforts are made to impress him with the success of the district. If he is not satisfied, he does not hesitate to say so in the annual report; and the Press and public opinion follow suit. Finally, there takes place every spring in Posen the General Meeting, to which each Union sends its Chairman and one delegate. The Polish Landlords' Union generally arranges to hold its General Meeting at the same time, so that the beginning of March sees in Posen a kind of Agricultural Week, not unlike the annual meeting of the British Association. The significance of such a gathering lies not in the papers which are read, which indeed are scarcely listened to, but in the intercourse and interchange of ideas between men engaged on similar pursuits from every part of the province. Though not a word of politics is spoken from beginning to end of the proceedings, attendance constitutes the most effective political education for the delegate from a small and remote village. *The political lesson, which he carries away with him, is simply this, that a State which has lost its independence need not lose its nationality, if it will organise its social and economic life.*

Some fifteen years before Jackowski began to found his Peasant Unions, efforts had been made, principally

in the towns, to organise co-operative societies or banks on the model of those which were being founded in Germany by the German social reformer, Schulze-Delitzsch. The first co-operative banks, however, were not inspired by the national idea, nor were they directed exclusively or principally by Polish leaders. They were founded to provide credit facilities [1] for the small craftsmen in the towns, shoemakers, tailors, masons, locksmiths, blacksmiths, and the like, amongst whom there were as many Germans as Poles. With the growth of racial hostility, however, after the introduction of the Germanising policy of the Government in the 'seventies, the Poles separated from the Germans, and proceeded to form separate co-operative banks, which, after the model of Jackowski's peasant unions, were federated in a Central Association with a patron at the head, the *Związek Spółek Zarobkowych Polskich* (in German, *Verband der polnischen Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften*). From this time on the co-operative banks went hand in hand with the Peasant Unions. New branches were formed in country districts. At the present time some 68 per cent. of the members are agriculturalists (nearly all peasants), 20 per cent. are craftsmen or artisans, and 12 per cent. are tradesmen or of other professions.[2]

The history of the co-operative movement in its early years is thoroughly Polish. When the Central Association was founded, the founders selected as patron a member of the Polish party in the Prussian Diet. At the end of a year he handed over the concern, 'owing to the burden of Parliamentary duties,' with the finances in confusion. The next patron, Msgr. Szamarzewski,

[1] The co-operative banks in Poznania were all copied from the German model; and the co-operative movement in Germany has proceeded on different lines from those which it has followed in England. Co-operative trading societies, of the kind with which English people are familiar, form a part, but an unimportant part, of the Polish movement. The fundamental idea of co-operation in England is the elimination of competition. The fundamental idea of co-operation in Germany or Poland is the organisation of credit—a work which in England is done by the joint-stock banks.

[2] For some further statistics, see Note at end of chapter.

was a cleric who, like Jackowski, had been implicated in the rising of 1863. Szamarzewski had the typical Polish temperament, Slav enthusiasm without Teutonic power of work. Under his energetic hand banks sprang up in every quarter of the province, many of them under very inefficient control. Institutions of this kind, which have their origin, not in financial, but in social or political aims, do not prove their economic soundness till the first ten years are past, and the initial enthusiasm has cooled. Towards the end of the 'seventies it became clear that the co-operative movement had come to a standstill. Szamarzewski was no disciplinarian. The vital importance in such a movement of stern central control by audit and otherwise had not been appreciated. Individual banks resisted interference by the Central Association in the name of 'Liberty,' the invocation of which is the preliminary to every Polish crime. The advantages of centralisation were lost. Some banks could not give credits, because they had no deposits: others would not accept deposits, because they had nowhere to place them. After 1879 no new bank was founded; and several of the existing ones were obliged to close their doors. The movement was discredited.

This state of affairs continued for some years. A change came just at the time that the Prussian Government inaugurated its Land Settlement policy in 1886. Land values were then low; many of the Polish landlords were heavily in debt; the Government proposed to step in, buy up the encumbered Polish estates, and settle German peasants on the land. 100,000,000 marks were voted for the purpose Twice in his life Bismarck met his match: the first time in his conflict with Rome; the second time in his conflict with the Poles. In the latter instance the journey to Canossa has still to come; but the resistance of the Poles has proved just as insuperable as was the resistance of the Catholics in the Kulturkampf. Bismarck's mistake in the Polish question was his belief that the Nobles were still the leaders of the community. Their measure he had taken sufficiently

well; and the readiness with which they surrendered their land during the first five years after the passing of the Settlement Law seemed to justify his opinion.[1] Resistance from any other class was hardly expected. The Polish troops had fought with traditional bravery for Prussia in the war of 1870, as they have in the present war: and in the absence of political agitation of the kind made familiar by the first half of the century, there had grown up the belief in Germany that conscription had 'educated the Pole': *der Pole der drei Jahre gedient hat ist loyal.* English readers have not far to look for a parallel to such a misapprehension.

While the Government was introducing the Settlement Bill, the co-operative organisation was being remodelled. The Central Association had been placed in new hands. The leaders had learnt in adversity the value of discipline. Above all, the movement had found at last its Jackowski. At the head, indeed, still stood the patron Szamarzewski, now old and feeble; but behind him were ranged a group of energetic men, the most notable of whom was a young parish priest, Father (later Msgr.) Peter Wawrzyniak of Schrimm, Vice-Patron from 1886 and Patron in succession to Szamarzewski from 1892 till his death in 1910. If Wawrzyniak was not the founder of the Polish co-operative movement, he was by far the first of its benefactors. He taught it discipline; and the lesson has been so well learned that it has become, as discipline does become, a second nature, with infinite advantage, moral and material, to the Prussian Pole. Wawrzyniak had the secret, which so few Poles have, of combining enterprise with caution. Again and again, when enthusiastic spirits urged the extension of the movement to new spheres, the patron delayed action till the new policies had been thought

[1] Between 1886 and 1890, the Settlement Commission acquired 133,824 acres of land, 90 per cent. of which came from Polish landlords, and settled 650 German families. The purchase money, or such part of it as the vendors could save from the Jews, filtered through to Paris, Nice, and Monte Carlo in the usual way.

out; above all, till the reaction which they were likely to provoke from the Prussian Government had been forecasted. When new policies were ultimately adopted, they almost always bore the trace of his own masterful shaping, and they were commonly successful. But, if there were few failures, there were few dazzling triumphs. Wawrzyniak had many of the characteristics of the late Lord Cromer. When Jackowski died the peasants revered him as a saint. There was no such feeling for Wawrzyniak. 'The Monsignore' was less a personality than an institution. While he lived, no political or financial project was begun without his sanction. Yet when he died, he left no irreparable gap, because his voice still speaks and his inspiration lingers in the organisation which he created.

The first step which the reformed Association took was to found an Association Bank (*Bank Związku Spółek Zarobkowych*, in German *Verbandsbank der Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften*). It began as a kind of clearing-house for the branch banks, to equalise the flow of capital between rich and poor branches. The power which it thus wielded enabled it to insist on regular audits and book-keeping after a prescribed pattern. As the central control became stricter, confidence revived, and deposits and membership began to increase. Wawrzyniak's next move was to draw the parochial clergy into the movement. His motives were probably more economic than clerical. The co-operative banks, originally intended to serve the small craftsmen of the towns, required much adaptation to meet the needs of the agriculturalist in the villages. For such adaptation, knowledge of local conditions was essential. In many Polish villages the priest is the only person who combines with local knowledge a certain amount of leisure. At the present day there are very few village banks of which the priest is not either the Chairman or one of the managers. When Prof. Bernhard made this assertion in the first edition of his book, it was contested by Polish critics. In the second edition, accordingly, the Professor published the names of

all the priests figuring on the management of the banks. From these lists it appears that in 1909, of 225 co-operative banks, 159 had priests as managers, while 217 priests in all held official positions in the movement. In bringing about this extraordinary development Wawrzyniak was at times supported and at times mildly opposed by the authorities at the Archbishopric. That the cure of souls should include a knowledge of book-keeping was a novel idea to some prelates ; but the encyclical *Rerum novarum* was a powerful ally on the Monsignore's side, and the success of the movement a still more powerful one. When a new branch is founded to-day in an agricultural district, it is almost invariably the work of the priest. He collects at the Presbytery or the Inn a score of peasants, the organist—the organist is to figure as cashier—and any small tradesmen there may be in the village—the saddler, for example, or the chemist. The meeting then decides to form a co-operative bank, and applies for affiliation to the Central Association. Three peasants are elected managers with the priest, and they meet once a week to receive savings and grant credits. Generally, the peasants want to keep the books 'in their heads,' as they do their own accounts : and great roughness on the part of the priest is needed before he can induce them to use a pen. When a peasant receives a credit, he signs a simple form of bill, to which two neighbours add their names as sureties. On this modest basis the great part of the Poznanian credit system has been built up. The organisation of the banks is similar to that of the Peasant Unions, which has been described. The control by the Central Association is very strict and somewhat autocratic. The Association has laid down the rule that a bank is unsound when the number of members is greater than the number of depositors : and that under normal circumstances the number of depositors should be twice the number of members. Banks which have let their ratio fall low are warned at the half-yearly audit by the Association, and, if necessary, refused credit by the Association Bank.

Banks which have maintained their ratio are rewarded by publicity in the Press and at the annual general meeting. There is accordingly keen competition to attract the savings of the smallest peasant or labourer in order to increase for the balance-sheet the *Liczba deponentów* (number of depositors). Any sum can be placed on deposit down to a mark (1s.). There is little or no competition from the Government Savings Banks, which as German are boycotted.

In the granting of credits the underlying principle is the vigorous enforcement of regular repayment. The banks will, and do, evict to enforce repayment. Renewal is hardly ever granted, except to peasants who have got into the hands of usurers, in which case the banks allow latitude till the debts to the usurer are paid off. The scrutiny, however, in such cases is very strict, as the Polish peasant (like the rest of mankind) is generally reluctant to make a clean breast of his debts. The priest's knowledge of his parish is generally a useful control in these cases. So strict are the banks with the peasants that German critics often call them 'usurious.' In reality, however, their principle is the opposite of the usurer's principle. The usurer is anxious to postpone payment. The banks are anxious to enforce it. The banks have proved, indeed, the worst enemy of the usurer, who, as everywhere in Eastern Europe, is the Jew. The writer has seen no statistics as to the decline of usury in Poznania; but from the statistics of the whole Jewish population it appears that whereas in 1871 Jews constituted 3·9 per cent. of the population, in 1900 the percentage had dropped to 1·9, and in 1905 still further to 1·4. These are very remarkable statistics for an East European country. The constant inflow of the peasants' repayments enables the Association Bank to do a great deal with a small capital: while, by accustoming the Polish borrower to short credits and frequent calling in, it provides a certain protection against economic crises, and against those political attacks on the part of the Prussian Government, for which the Association has to

be unceasingly on guard. The Government, indeed, is always on the watch to catch the banks in any illegality ; but the banks adhere rigidly to the forms and regulations of the German law. They are registered as co-operative societies (*Erwerbs- und Wirtschaftsgenossenschaften*), and the legislation for such societies is—fortunately for the banks—Imperial and not Prussian. Under the Imperial Law all co-operative societies must submit to Government audit, except those societies on which the State (that is, in this case, the Prussian) authorities confer the right to conduct their own audits. The Polish Co-operative Association secured this right during the so-called ' Flirtation Period ' (1890–1894), when the Polish Party in the Prussian Diet were granted various concessions in return for their support of Count Caprivi's Army Bills in the Reichstag. Before revoking this privilege the authorities are bound to show that illegalities have occurred in the conduct of the society ; for which purpose they may call on the society to produce its books. More than once the Prussian Government has made this call upon the Association ; but the inspections have proved satisfactory, and the privilege has not been withdrawn. On the whole, this constant menace has proved a useful discipline to the movement.

Sometimes the weapons which the Government have employed have recoiled on their own head, as the following story shows. The Polish banks pay slightly higher interest on deposits than the Government Savings Banks ; and they used, until recently, to attract the savings of a good many minor Government officials. In not a few villages the (Prussian) schoolmaster was elected on the management ; and it was even the case that a Government official (of Polish nationality) sat on the Board of the Central Association. In January 1904 the Prussian Minister of Finance suddenly issued an Order that all officials and their families should withdraw their savings from the Polish banks, and cease to participate in the management. The manner in which Wawrzyniak met this attack was characteristic. At first, when the officials

began to withdraw their deposits, there was an angry demand that all credits granted to German clients should be immediately called in, so as to drive as many as possible into bankruptcy and (with luck) the sale of their land. Polish sureties, who had stood as guarantors for German borrowers, withdrew their guarantees. It looked as if the Polish banks would be completely purged of what German elements they contained. That, however, was not at all what Wawrzyniak desired. The German element in the movement, while quite without influence, had been to a certain limited extent a protection against Government aggression. To remove it would in any case accentuate the national aspect of the movement, and render it more open to future attack. Accordingly, before retaliatory measures had gone far, each branch received from headquarters in German and Polish, as the law requires, the following circular :—

Mogilno, January 22nd, 1904.

To the Honoured Co-operative Societies affiliated to the Central Co-operative Association.

In accordance with an Ordinance issued by their superiors, all State officials have been compelled to resign from membership of our societies, and to withdraw their deposits in our banks.

In the name of all the societies, I declare that we have given no pretext for this regulation. Our societies have invariably been conducted in accordance with the prescriptions of the law, and have made no difference between clients in respect of religion, nationality, or political views.

We propose to continue this policy in the future.

I desire to caution societies, which have been injuriously affected by the withdrawal of officials, and which complain of lack of consideration on the part of the authorities (who but a short while ago urged us to place ourselves in a position to point to members of German nationality on our lists), not to allow themselves now to be induced to desert the only just principle, or to cease to deal with financial matters without regard to differences of nationality.

The withdrawal of capital, which the Ordinance in question will occasion, will not (I apprehend) cause our societies any

serious loss, or compel us to call in credits granted to our members, even in cases where the latter may be German.

I trust that we shall refrain from every thought of revenge or retaliation as heathenish.—With respect and greeting,

WAWRZYNIAK, Priest,
Patron of the Co-operative Societies.

The Polish Press protested against so lily-livered a reply. The German Press treated it as a sign of 'the essential weakness of the Polish co-operative movement.' But the Monsignore had never meant to rest content with branding retaliation as 'heathenish.' Though no Germans were driven out of Polish banks, almost every Pole in a German bank withdrew his savings. A lively agitation was initiated to 'meet the withdrawal of the Prussian monies by an increase in the savings of the Pole.' At the annual meeting in October of the following year, it was reported that the annual increase in deposits, which for years past had varied between 5,000,000 marks and 7,000,000 marks, had suddenly risen to 12,000,000 marks! There is something Irish about this story.

The truth is, the co-operative movement is now too strong for the Government to be able to shake it without producing an economic crisis in the province, and to no small extent outside, of the most formidable dimensions. The co-operative banks have gradually absorbed almost every form of financial activity in the province. There are hardly any Polish joint-stock banks, and there is not much company enterprise. The aristocracy is wealthy, but without inclination to employ its capital in business. Under these circumstances the savings of the peasant and the labourer represent the working capital of the country; and the Association Bank, which has organised it, usurps functions which in any other country would be performed by a variety of institutions. It lends the labourer with a two-acre allotment money to buy seed. It finances the great Cegielski engineering works. It has rebuilt Posen. It has played a prominent part in the resistance to the

Settlement Commission. It is a building society, a savings bank, a land speculator, a trust company, and a joint-stock bank in one. Its deposits in the year 1907 amounted to £6,150,000,[1] which is the equivalent of over £3 1*s.* 6*d.* per head, if the total Polish population in Germany is taken at 2,000,000. The credits granted in the same year ranged from £30,000 to—7*s.*! The business which it did with private customers outside the co-operative movement amounted to 33 per cent. of the whole.

In the struggle against the Prussian Land Settlement the Polish banks have played at once a negative and a positive part. On the one hand the network of branch banks has acted as a kind of police to prevent any Polish peasant land passing into German hands. On the other hand, the Association Bank has founded and financed institutions which buy up large estates (German, if possible, but, if not, Polish) and split them up into Polish peasant holdings. For many years after the passing of the Settlement Law, Wawrzyniak was unwilling to lock up the capital of the co-operative banks in such a risky operation as land speculation. The sales of Polish land to the Settlement Commission had been brought to a standstill by 1890. For the next ten years the Association Bank confined itself to financing certain individual land speculators. In 1900, however, with the experience of the 'nineties behind it, the bank began the founding of a number of 'parcelling banks' (banks for splitting up estates) in affiliation with the Co-operative Association. These activities were struck at by the Government, first, through the Amendment Act of 1904, which seemed to make it impossible for the Poles to found new peasant holdings; and, secondly, through Prince Bülow's law of 1908, giving the Settle-

[1] In judging such a figure as is given above for the *per caput* total of deposits, the extreme poverty of the Polish agriculturalist at the time when the co-operative movement started must be taken into consideration. Comparisons with prosperous agricultural countries like France and Denmark, or even with Ireland, are calculated to mislead.

ment Commission powers of compulsory expropriation.[1] The ingenuity with which the Poles circumvented these measures, and the unsuccess of the Settlement Commission, have often been described. The real factor in the Polish resistance, which alone has made its success possible, is the land-hunger of the Polish labourer; and this the co-operative banks have organised. There is no such distinction in Poznania as that to which English people are accustomed between the agricultural and the industrial labourer. The agricultural labourer sends his son to the factory in Silesia or Westphalia because of the high wages to be earned there. But the aspiration of both is to own a farm of their own and become peasants. The priests dislike this 'emigration'; and it was chiefly their desire to fight it that induced them to take up the parcelling enterprises of the past few years. When a parcelling bank has acquired a property, it advertises in the religious and other papers which circulate among the Polish workmen in Westphalia that it is prepared to advance the purchase price of a holding, which the purchaser is to pay off by the proceeds of his labour during the next six or more years. Like the credit banks, whose methods have been described, the parcelling

[1] The Prussian Conservatives in the Diet, who dislike the principle of compulsory powers, succeeded in limiting the expropriation to 192,500 acres; and the Law has been applied in one or two unimportant transactions only, and not at all since the War.

The effect of the 'Parcelling' Movement has been most marked in the five or six years before the War. Unfortunately, no statistics are available for this period. The following figures, however, taken from Th. von Jackowsky (*Der Bauernbesitz in der Provinz Posen im 19ten Jahrhundert*, Leipzig, 1914), show the changes effected in the Poznanian land-tenure between the years 1895 and 1907, that is in the initial stage of the Movement.

	Holdings of under 2½ Acres.	Holdings of 2½–25 Acres.	Holdings of 25–250 Acres.	Holdings of over 250 Acres.
Number of holdings in 1895	108,597	61,827	32,980	2,605
Representing a total acreage in thousands of acres of	*99*	*704*	*2,129*	*3,574*
Number of holdings in 1907	94,929	69,294	38,424	2,305
Representing a total acreage in thousands of acres of	*86*	*879*	*2,484*	*2,938*

banks are very severe in exacting repayment ; and there is no mercy for defaulters. The land-hunger is such that the banks have no difficulty in disposing of a defaulter's holding. It is a common thing for a man who has bought a holding to remain working in Westphalia for six or seven years to earn the instalments of the interest and repayment, while his wife and family manage the land. Sometimes the purchaser knows that he cannot free himself of the debt in his own time, but he works for the next generation. The contrast between this devotion and the selfishness of the German land-holder, for whose benefit the whole machinery of a powerful Government is constantly brought into play, has something in it of the revolting. The ideal, which the Government constantly proclaims, of Germanising the East Mark is not in itself a low ideal. It closely resembles, in fact, the ideal of the Pole.[1] The justification or condemnation of both lies in the extent to which each is prepared to sacrifice himself for his ideal. The German, in the East Mark, has shown no readiness to sacrifice himself. The German co-operative societies have neither the cohesion nor the discipline of the Polish Societies. The landlords will not split up their estates. Peasants and landlords alike are ready to take advantage of the inflated prices, which the purchases of the Settlement Commission have brought about. If a Polish bank is prepared to outbid the Commission, they sell to the Polish bank. Not only will the Germans not work with the Commission : they will not even work with one another. The German Peasants' Association and the German Landlords' Association fight openly, while the Pole mocks. Not many years ago all Posen was humming a tune which some humourist had written after one of these encounters :—

Michel sagt zu seinem Sohne :
'Hol' der Teufel die Barone !
Ob sie deutsch sind oder Polen,
Alle soll der Teufel holen !'

[1] The Pole, of course, wishes to Polonise it. At present the population is nearly equally divided between the two races (Poles 55 per cent., Germans 45 per cent.).

There are some Poles still in Poznania who ignore the economic movement: and there are not a few who will say that the political education of the people has been neglected for economic development. It is true that politics have been in the background during the past twenty years. The best brains of the country have gone into the economic movement, and the Parliamentarians in the Diet have lost weight. But that the economic movement is political in the deeper sense of the word has, it is hoped, been shown. It has raised a peasantry which was degraded to a degree unknown in Western Europe for many centuries. It has made an outlet for the energies of a gifted middle class, denied access save at the price of their nationality to the Army, the Navy, the Civil Service, and the teaching profession. And it has afforded to a people whose ineptitude for self-government was once one of the commonplaces of history an education in that hard school whose lessons are not written in books. It is not possible, when the future of Eastern Europe is once more on the *tapis*, to write down such a movement as a matter of German internal politics, and to say it has no international significance. The show which is now being enacted at Warsaw is a puppet-show. The High Well Born the Crown Marshal, the Exalted Council of State, and all the crowd of attendant politicians, have no vitality save such as is lent them by the man behind the stage. The Provisional Government will last precisely as long as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw lasted; and that was as long as Napoleon's bayonets were there to support it. The Poles now talk of raising an Army of 1,000,000 men; but the advocates of compulsory service have failed to carry their point on the Council of State [1]; the Legions

[1] This all-important decision was reached at a meeting of the Council of State held in February, 1917.

NOTE.—The statistics in Prof. Bernhard's book do not, for the most part, even in the Second Edition (1910), cover a period later than 1907. Slightly later figures are available in Dr. Th. von Jackowsky's *Der Bauernbesitz in der Provinz Posen im 19ten Jahrhundert* (Leipzig, 1914), which contains fifty-three Appendices of valuable statistics

are not believed to amount to more than 30,000 at present ; and it remains to be seen how much larger a force Poland is able to raise on a voluntary basis. Neither 30,000, nor 60,000, nor 90,000 men will decide the future of Poland, when once the Austrian and German bayonets are withdrawn. If by the fortune of war the Allies are called to re-draw the map of Eastern Europe, they will inevitably turn to a nucleus of Poles who not only have no love for the Central Empires, but have shown marked signs of capacity for the Herculean task of resuscitating a State.

and a useful bibliography. The following particulars with regard to the Co-operative Association (Związek) are taken from *Vie Economique de la Pologne prussienne* (forming Vol. I. Fasc. VI. of *Encyclopédie Polonaise*, Freiburg & Lausanne, 1917) :—

In 1914 there were affiliated to the Association 297 co-operative societies, of which—

208 were Loan Banks, such as are described above, catering mainly for the peasants, and registered mostly under the name *Bank Ludowy* (People's Bank).

61 were Agricultural Purchasing Societies, registered mostly under the name *Rolnik* ('The Agriculturalist').

18 were Parcelling Banks (*Spółka Parcelacyjna*).

4 were Trading Societies, mostly registered under the name *Kupiec* ('The Tradesman').

6 various.

297

CHAPTER V

POLAND 1918

[*This survey of the position in Poland was written at the moment when the Central Powers and Russia were meeting to negotiate at Brest.*]

NEARLY a year ago, the writer argued for a solution of the Polish Question in a sense favourable to the Allies.[1] While not minimising the significance of the historic Act of November the Fifth, the famous manifesto of the two Emperors (dated November 5th, 1916), by which an independent Polish State once more came into existence, the writer urged the advantages which the new Poland would derive if it should include the economically advanced and politically experienced Prussian province of Poznania (Posen); and argued that, since Poznania would not be included in the new kingdom under any imaginable circumstances other than an Allied victory, it was in the interests of the Poles to prefer the Allied bird-in-the-bush to the Austro-German bird-in-the-hand. That argument can no longer be urged. Recent events in Russia render in some sort definitive the Austro-German settlement of the Polish Question. Much as the Western nations and America desire a solution of the Polish Question in the full and generous form which they approve, Poland is a vital interest of Russia alone among the nations which have contended against the Central Powers. Whatever view is held as to the nature and prospects of an Allied victory, it is inconceivable that either France or England or America would attempt at the Peace Conference to overturn a settlement in which Russia—and Poland herself—had acquiesced.

Irritation is a poor guide in politics; and nothing is gained by finding fault with the Poles because they

[1] See Chapter IV.

have accepted the German settlement, and still less perhaps by making believe that they have not done so. A more profitable subject for consideration is the question: Will the German settlement last? Prince Bülow tells us, in the new edition of his book,[1] that he once heard Bismarck discuss the re-establishment of Poland as the result of a European war. 'And what should we do when we had defeated Russia?' said the old Chancellor. 'Re-establish Poland by any chance? Why, then, in another twenty years we might make another alliance among the three Empires for a Fourth, and Last, Partition.' Lord Salisbury wrote, at the close of the last Polish Insurrection,[2] that the defects of the Polish national character rendered it impossible for a revived Poland, if once it were set up, to maintain itself. It was an argument of the present writer, a year ago,[3] that the conditions had been changed since Lord Salisbury wrote by the far-reaching Co-operative movement in Poznania, too little known in Western Europe, which has disciplined the Prussian Pole and taught him the elements of self-government. But Poznania is not to form part of the new kingdom; and among the Russian Poles, who will preponderate in the new kingdom, the Poznanian economic movement has had no equivalent counterpart.[4] The political evolution of the Russian

[1] *Imperial Germany*, by Prince von Bülow (English Translation), p. 252.

[2] *Essays on Foreign Politics*, by the Marquess of Salisbury (London, 1905), p. 58. It is not the least curious of the ironies of the present war that Lord Salisbury's son as Under Secretary in the British Foreign Office has just recognised a new Polish 'Emigration.'

[3] See Chapter IV.

[4] There has been considerable co-operative activity in Russian Poland, especially in the decade before the War: but co-operation has never played the same political role in Russian Poland as in Poznania. It has indeed been fostered, and very largely financed, by the Russian Government. An interesting volume has recently appeared in English on this subject (Bubnoff, *The Co-operative Movement in Russia*, published by Co-operative Printing Society, Ltd., Manchester, 1917). On their own initiative the Russian Poles have organised Agricultural Societies, affiliated to a Central Society in Warsaw on the model of the Poznanian Peasant Unions (see p. 88). There was also founded four years before the War a Central Co-operative Bank on the model of the Bank Związku Spółek Zarobkowych (see p. 92).

Pole has not advanced far beyond the stage of conspiracy—a state of affairs for which it is convenient, but perhaps not altogether honest, to lay all the blame upon the late Russian Government. Liberals believe that the capacity for self-government is inherent in every people. Reactionaries hold that some peoples are not fitted to rule themselves. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere between the two theses. However that may be, before the unhappy Poles can be quoted in illustration of either, the world must await the results of the experiment which is now being conducted at Warsaw.

To appreciate the elements of the situation in Warsaw, it is, unfortunately, necessary to embark on the uncharted sea of Polish party politics. It is a forbidding waste of waters! The multiplicity of parties, the kaleidoscopic transformations, the monotonous flow of undifferentiated rhetoric from all parts of the compass, are troublesome to master; and when they are mastered, the way is not always clear to sound judgment of the situation. Nevertheless, it is possible to disentangle and mark for future guidance the main currents beneath the surface ebb and flow. In the following pages it is proposed to make the attempt; and, by way of

It cannot as yet, however, be said to have passed the stage of initial difficulties. The co-operative societies held in 1914 just under 50 per cent. of the share capital of the Bank, a proportion insufficient to give them the control which at such an early stage of the Bank's activities the example of Poznania shows to be essential. In the year before the War the Bank suffered considerable losses owing to the collapse of branches; and, when the War broke out, it seemed on the point of being wound up. The writer has no information with regard to it later than December 1914: Bubnoff (*op. cit.*) seems to imply that it ceased operations after the occupation of Warsaw by the Germans.

It may fairly be urged, however, that the Poznanian Związek passed through very similar troubles in the 'seventies and 'eighties of the last century (see p. 89); and the Bank Związku too had its moments of difficulty, notably in and about the year 1900. The tendency to regard the Prussian Poles as dull and unimaginative, 'irretrievably bourgeois' (as a Russian Pole once said to the writer), is undoubtedly on the wane. In the economic life of Russian Poland co-operation seems likely in the future to play an increasingly important role.

introduction to the subject, the reader is presented with the following brief *roman de mœurs nationales.*

There were once three Polish tailor's assistants in New York, whose names were Casimir, Stanislas, and Timko. One Saturday night they met by chance in Rabbinowitch's Restaurant at the corner of East Fourth Street. ' Bracie mój ! ' ' Kochany bracie ! ' They fell into conversation. Before the evening was out, they had combined to form the Young Polish Party of Union and Freedom, and arranged to hold a Pan-Polish National Congress on the following day. On Sunday morning Timko came round to Casimir's bedroom, and found him mending the leg of the bed. ' This bed,' he explained with a gesture of great nobility, ' will receive the Delegates. I shall myself, as President, occupy the chair.' Timko went on to pick up Stanislas. Stanislas, too, was making preparations to receive the Congress. ' But Casimir expects us at his place,' said Timko. ' Is the Congress then to be held here ? ' ' How otherwise ? ' said Stanislas with curling lip. The deadlock seemed insoluble ; but after much negotiation, in which Timko acted as intermediary, Casimir and Stanislas remaining in their several rooms until a compromise was reached, it was arranged to leave undecided the point of principle, and to hold an Inaugural Meeting of Conveners of the Congress at Casimir's and the Congress itself at Stanislas'. The Congress was highly successful, all resolutions being carried unanimously. It proclaimed the restoration of the ancient Kingdom of Poland, and the eternal and inalienable right of all tailor's assistants to time and a-half after 6 o'clock in the cutting-room and no out-work on Saints' Days of the Catholic Church. On the following Wednesday Stanislas and Timko each received a note from Casimir, announcing his secession from the Party, and the formation of the National and International Polish Progressive League. But by the following Saturday Casimir and Stanislas had combined again in the Group of Polish Statehood and Political Work, Stanislas having in the interval discovered that Timko's mother

was a Ruthene, and both being firmly resolved to keep Timko in his place.

The truth which underlies this unassuming allegory is that politics in Poland are not primarily political but personal. The same feature may be remarked in the political life of the Magyars, a people with whom the Poles have far closer affinities than with any of their Slav brethren. The explanation is to be sought in the social structure of the two countries. In Poland, as in Hungary, one of the fundamental political factors is an aristocracy with an instinct for leadership and a thousand-year-old tradition of rule. When Poland was a nation, the aristocracy was Poland ; the rest of the population were either aliens or serfs. The privileges of the aristocracy vanished under the yoke of the ' Oppressor ' ; but their tradition lingered, and still permeates the national life to a degree which is a constant surprise to the foreigner. Their political influence is continually receiving annihilating blows, and continually reasserting itself under new forms. An aristocracy seems to be a political necessity to the Poles, in which respect alone they are differentiated from every other Slavonic people. As the English love a ' gentleman,' as the Americans admire their millionaires, so the Poles admire, and admiring abuse, their *szlachta*. The upper middle class has personal ties and business connections with the *szlachta*. The lower middle class has similar links with the upper middle class. Both are subject to the aristocratic influence. But below the lower middle class there exist two distinct worlds of Polendom, both severed by a gulf from the rest of the nation. One, by far the larger, is the world of the peasants. The other is that of the workers in the towns ; and of this latter section alone it can be affirmed that its life and thought are independent of aristocratic influence and tradition. The worker is a new phenomenon in Polish history. Fifty years ago Poland could still be described as a land of nobles, priests, and peasants. But in the last half-century there has come into being in Warsaw and Lodz, to some extent in Lemberg and Posen,

and, above all, beyond the borders of the Motherland *super flumina Babylonis* in Westphalia and Silesia, an industrial proletariate of the familiar Western type. Its growth raised problems, for the solution of which the Polish aristocratic tradition afforded no precedents. The governing classes of Russian Poland made little or no attempt to face them. The peasant they knew; he was generally willing to vote as directed; if he did not vote for the bourgeois parties, he did not vote at all; he made no serious effort to organise independently. The worker was less tractable; he was class-conscious; he had his own organisations; he was occupied with social and economic questions, to which the old political rhetoric provided no answer. On the other hand, he was not strong enough, numerically, to threaten the bourgeois supremacy; the bourgeoisie could afford to ignore him, and did so; and the worker was left to the political ministrations of International Social Democracy.

When the Revolution broke out in Russia in 1905, and the iron grip of the Tsar's Government was relaxed in Poland, two Polish parties sprang forward and struggled for the helm. The first of these was the P.P.S., or Polish Socialist Party, one of several Social Democratic groups in which the workers were organised. The P.P.S. threw in its lot with the Russian and Jewish revolutionaries, while at the same time asserting the national claim to independence. It proclaimed a general strike of the workers, and made efforts to draw the peasantry into the movement. But the strike funds were soon exhausted, and the workers drifted back to the factories; the peasants showed little inclination to collaborate, and the rival party soon held the field. The rival party were known as National Democrats. A bourgeois party with able leaders and ample financial backing, they succeeded in rallying to their standard the land-owning aristocracy, the powerful higher clergy, the big industrialists, the bulk of the bourgeoisie, the anti-Semite section of the *intelligentsia*, and a large voting block of peasants. Their activities before the Revolution had been limited

to the output of clandestine rhetoric and the fomenting of petty conflicts in the villages with the Russian authorities. Now with the paralysis of the Russian Government they had a free field; and great 'demonstrations' took place under their auspices at Warsaw, which put the abortive general strike of the Socialists completely in the shade. The following quotation from the pen of their most active organiser[1] describes the scenes in Warsaw at this date, and will serve better than any description of the writer to illumine the personality and work of a typical, influential, aristocratic, Polish politician:

. . . Une foule immense de près de 200,000 hommes s'avança dans un ordre parfait avec des drapeaux ornés d'aigles blancs polonais, dans un recueillement et un calme qu'interrompait de temps en temps l'hymne national chanté par toutes les voix. . . Plusieurs semaines plus tard il se tint à Varsovie un Congrès de paysans. Bien qu'organisé secrètement et à l'insu des autorités il réunit les représentants de presque toutes les communes du pays au nombre de 1,200 environ. Après des délibérations imposantes par le calme qui y présidait et par la haute valeur intellectuelle de ceux qui y prirent part, ce Congrès vota d'importantes déclarations: il constata l'attachement du peuple aux traditions historiques polonaises, il demanda l'autonomie du Royaume de Pologne: enfin il engagea vivement tous les paysans à veiller à l'organisation solide de leurs communes, et à sauvegarder l'ordre social dans ces temps de trouble universel.

At the elections to the First Duma the National Democrats swept the board, not a single Socialist obtaining a seat. Shortly afterwards, with the restoration of order in Poland, the country became too hot to hold the Socialist leaders. They took refuge in Galicia, and behind the shelter of the black-and-yellow frontier-posts began to organise in secret the armed bands which at the outset of the present war were to form the nucleus of the famous Polish Legions. The Socialists indeed asserted that the

[1] Roman Dmowski, *La Question Polonaise* (Paris, 1909), p. 226. The student of Polish politics should make early acquaintance with the personality of M. Roman Dmowski. M. Dmowski is the Erzberger of Polish politics.

National Democrats had made an offer to the Russians to suppress the Revolution in Poland if they were given a free hand: but the Socialists had fought the National Democrats, and been beaten. What is certain is that from this time the National Democrats began a policy of collaboration with the Russian Government, for which they are now the object of bitter reproaches from their opponents—reproaches which, in the opinion of the writer, are not altogether justified. At any rate, at the time the party could command for its policy the support of the majority of the voters; and with no more than the normal (Polish) complement of secessions and vicissitudes, they maintained their ascendancy down to the outbreak of the War. And then, with the first movement of the Russian mobilisation, their platform was swept from beneath their feet, and the whole fabric of their organisation suddenly crumbled.

Polish politics are nothing if not dramatic. The War, which reduced to its nadir the fortunes of the National Democrats, marked also the zenith of the Socialists. '*Deposuit potentes de sede!*' a Cracovian Socialist organ exclaimed in exultation; '*et exaltavit—nosmetipsos,*' the writer concluded with a touch of that humour which is one of the saving graces of Polish politics. The Socialists had prepared for the contingency of a war with Russia, and the National Democrats had not. The Legions, with their Napoleonic memories, made an irresistible appeal to every Pole. Not that the Pole loved the Niemiec so much, though many do, as that he hated the Moskal more. The writer has heard a striking story of a sermon which was preached in a certain Polish church in those early days of August 1914. The priest took for his text the words, 'A hundred years in Thy sight are but as yesterday,'[1] and repeated it over and over again with meditations on the virtue

[1] The writer ventured to point out to the member of the congregation who brought him the story, that the quotation (Ps. xc. 4) really runs: 'A thousand years in Thy sight. . . .' 'Pfe! Pedant!' replied the Pole, with ineffable scorn.

of Hope, the power of God, and the ultimate triumph of the righteous, the political bearing of which was lost on none of his hearers:

'A hundred years! A hundred years!' so the preacher cried. 'Behold! They are nearly expired; and the cup of the vengeance of God for all the iniquity that was done therein is filled to the brim, ready to run over, ready to run over!'

A thrill ran through the church as the priest slowly repeated the last words. A hundred years! 1815–1914! And now by the Divine Mercy the hundred years were but as yesterday, and a Polish Army was marching to do battle with the Oppressor. A Polish Army! What a chord was struck there in the ears of a people whose whole history is one long record of military glory and political aggression! Small wonder that the Russophil National Democrats were overwhelmed and swept aside, while their last effort, the Manifesto of the Tsar's uncle, was rejected with scorn. 'Whoever conceived and drew up the famous Grand Ducal Manifesto,' a Polish Socialist has recently observed in a bitter retrospect which appeared in an English journal,[1] 'deserves high praise from all well-wishers of war.'

The Socialist exiles in Galicia formed a *bloc* with almost the whole body of the Austrian Poles; and great numbers of the National Democrats in Russia supported their cause—at first secretly, and after the German occupation of Poland openly. Though this impressive national unity did not last, though feuds and fissures at once made their appearance—in a word, though Polish politics soon resumed under the new conditions their old aspect—yet it may be said that all these sections, constituting the great majority of the nation, remained at one in accepting—some more, some less, reluctantly—the Austro-German settlement, and in rejecting any settlement under the auspices of Russia.

The National Democrats, though crushed by the events of 1914–1915, did not cease to exist. Great

[1] *The New Europe*, June 28, 1917.

names like Lubomirski and Wielopolski will always command adherents in Poland. The present heads of those houses had been prominent in National Democrat councils, and were understood to carry great weight in the ' Spheres,' as the *entourages* of the Tsar and Tsaritsa used to be called. They now had a difficult part to play. Their policy was to keep a foot in both camps. They were bitterly anti-German, and built their hopes on an Allied victory; for that reason alone, since the Tsar was with the Allies, they could not break with the Tsar's Government. At the same time, what Pole could remain indifferent to the sight of a Polish Government in being? They maintained therefore a close *liaison* with the politicians in Warsaw; and eschewing the delicate words ' Russophobe ' and ' Russophil,' described themselves as ' Passivist ' or neutral. When the Council of State was formed under the Act of November the Fifth, the German authorities offered them seven out of the twenty-five seats. After some hesitation, they declined the offer; but some of their leaders rallied unobtrusively to the Council. The Party Caucus, however, did not remain in Warsaw; but, in accordance with historic Polish precedent, transferred their headquarters to London, to Paris, to Lausanne.

Meanwhile, the Poles in Warsaw had been tasting once again—it is true in somewhat diluted measure—the heady wine of self-government. When the Polish emissaries were received by Baron Burian in Vienna a week before the Manifesto of November the Fifth, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister offered the following observation:

> The future Kingdom of Poland will, of course, not be able to begin its full existence as a State until after the conclusion of Peace, and it will find the guarantees of its existence in a close union, political as well as military, with the two Central Powers.

It was tolerably clear that, from the moment when the Poles welcomed the Austro-German Occupation, this

appreciation of the position was inevitable. But the Poles were not quick to grasp it. The German Governor, General von Beseler, was an enlightened and agreeable personality with many Polish sympathies; and the mailed hand of the Occupation was for long hidden in a velvet glove. The Council of State began its work with a number of 'demonstrations.' An obelisk in the Plac Zielony, which recorded the loyalty of a section of the Poles to Russia during the Rising of 1831, was solemnly demolished; another monument, which commemorated the period of Prussian rule in Warsaw before the Third Partition, was also destroyed; a proposal to pull down the Orthodox Cathedral was vetoed by the German authorities. The Council was scrupulous of its dignity; one of the first acts recorded in the reports of its proceedings runs as follows:—

> The Executive Committee of the Council of State have taken cognisance of the statement made by Landrat von Conrad [an official in the German Civil Administration], to the effect that the sole reason why the Ordinance dated January 20th, 1917, with reference to the currency, was issued without previous consultation of the Council, was that the said Ordinance had been completed before the inauguration of the Council, and, further, had been drafted in agreement with representatives of the Polish community. [*From Fourth Sitting of the Council of State, January 30th*, 1917.]

The powers of the Council were fairly extensive, perhaps as extensive as they could be in a country under military occupation. Education and Justice were handed over to them practically without reserve; and for the first time for many years the native tongue was again heard in the schools and in the courts of law. Local representative bodies were called into being in the towns and in the country; and in Warsaw the municipality received control of all the public services, including police, prisons, posts (municipal), public sanitation, and hygiene. In certain towns the German military authorities reserved to themselves the control of this last department, on the ground that the conditions found on their entry

were prejudicial to the health of the troops Lodz in former days probably the filthiest town in Europe, has now been equipped with an array of sanitary delights, to which it was previously a complete stranger; and saddled with novel regulations for the disposal of refuse on the best German model, to which (if the writer's information is correct) the large Jewish population has strenuously objected 'in the name of Liberty.' Of the purely civil branches of the administration, only the railways and the posts remained wholly in the hands of the Occupying Powers. A member of the Council of State was deputed to act as Finance Minister; but the Germans in handing over the finances made the reservation, to which they have given an elastic significance, 'except in so far as the costs of the Occupation are concerned.' Similarly, a Minister of Political Affairs was appointed, but he was permitted to hold official relations only with the Central Powers.

Apart from the drafting of a Constitution for the new Kingdom, which was referred to a committee, the chief question which has occupied the Council since its formation has been the question of the Army. At the time when the two Emperors issued their Manifesto, casualties had reduced the Legions to little over 30,000 men. Subscriptions were falling off and recruits were not coming in. The horrors of the War, of which Poland has had a larger share probably than any other country that the Central Powers have overrun, had chilled the initial enthusiasm. The men were dissatisfied; and a large section of the officers, headed by the Socialist leader Pilsudski, were disposed to turn their attention from military duties to politics. It was clear that, if the Legions were to be transformed into a National Army, on which to base the foundations of a Polish National State, as the Council of State had hastened to proclaim, drastic reorganisation would be necessary, and in particular the introduction of universal military service. The numbers obtainable on this basis have been estimated in the Polish Press at slightly over

1,000,000; and it was clear that, with a force of this magnitude behind it, the Council of State would be in a much stronger position to enforce its desires, alike in negotiation with the Occupying Powers at the moment and in the future at the peace. At the same time, it should have been obvious that the Germans would never permit the formation of such a force without guarantees that it would be at their disposal, at the very least during the continuance of the War. In other words, the Poles were called upon to pay the same price that they had paid once before to Napoleon in return for the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. The precedent was not a comforting one; and it soon became clear that it would not be repeated. Whether the Germans themselves ever seriously expected to raise for their own ends a Polish national army now seems doubtful. It is certain this expectation was not, as was commonly believed in Western Europe, the motive behind the manifesto of November the Fifth. The Germans have taken no step, beyond the issue of an appeal for recruits at the same time as the Manifesto, to encourage the raising of a Polish Army; and its chief advocate has been the most Germanophobe of all the Councillors of State, the Socialist General Pilsudski. But Pilsudski wanted the Army without paying the price of placing it in German hands; and his policy, in its nature one of supreme difficulty, and requiring qualities of tact and self-restraint which the Socialist leader does not command, lost all prospects of success when early in February 1917 the Council of State decided against conscription. The outbreak of the Russian Revolution a month later still further weakened the chances of a Polish Army. The advent to power of their old comrades in Russia could not fail to strengthen the pacifist elements among the Polish Socialists; while, in the eyes of the bourgeois parties, the Polish Manifesto issued by the Cadet Government seemed to remove from the struggle the last vestiges of a Holy War.

The subsequent collapse of the Russian armies

signified the end of the common menace which had held the parties in Warsaw together. Party differences on the Council of State became steadily more pronounced. The fundamental antipathy of the Socialists and the bourgeois parties was more and more apparent, to the not unintelligible *Schadenfreude* of the Occupying Powers. In their attacks on the bourgeois majority of the Council of State the Socialists found support from their old enemies, the National Democrats, who were beginning to raise their heads again, and cherished hopes of turning to their own advantage the disintegration of the *Bloc*. The general public attributed all their misfortunes to the Government; the burden of the Occupation did not become less galling with the protraction of the War; the Germans believe with Napoleon that war should pay for itself; and their exorbitant exactions in Poland, following close on the devastation wrought by the Russian armies during the retreat of 1915, have hit the country hard. The very real economic discontent threw into relief the sterility of the Council's discussions. The Council itself, conscious of its weakness in its own house, became more and more violent (as persons not certain of their position commonly do) in its language towards the Occupying Powers. The tension culminated in an ultimatum, drafted by the Socialists, from the Council of State to the Austrian and German Governments, calling upon them 'definitely to surrender into Polish hands the administration of the country.' The Austrian and German Governments replied with a request for detailed proposals. The settlement ultimately reached (on September 12, 1917) did not materially alter the position. Though it provided the Poles with a Premier and Cabinet in due Western form, and three Regents in place of the 'future king,' the administrative control of the Occupying Powers was strengthened, and the legislative rights of the Council were restricted. Before this settlement was reached, however, the friction between the Germans and the Germanophobe elements had led to open conflict. Some of the Socialist legionaries refused

to take a new oath of allegiance.[1] Various arrests were made by the German authorities, among the arrested being Pilsudski. And the Council of State had the mortification of knowing that the oath, to which the arrested legionaries had refused to swear, was one which they had themselves drawn up and sanctioned after rejecting two other formularies proposed by the Central Powers !

The National Democrats now hope to overturn the Council of State, and step into their inheritance at Warsaw. The stormy petrel of Polish politics, M. Roman Dmowski, has recently been back in Russia, and under his auspices a National Congress took place in Moscow, which secured a notoriety it might not otherwise have commanded, owing to a decision of the British Foreign Office, followed later by Italy and France, to recognise it as representative of the Polish Nation. This *démarche* of the Foreign Office has naturally been advertised far and wide in M. Dmowski's newspapers as a triumph for M. Dmowski, the fruits of his exceptional personal relations with English aristocratic circles. So far the outside world has only M. Dmowski's account of the transaction. The Moscow Congress was attended by an imposing array of parties ; but the names of the parties were unfamiliar, and it was remarked that the same delegates who presented the credentials of the Association of Polish Independence and Reunion, the Ukraine Land-owners' League, and various other organisations hitherto unknown to the world, reappeared a few moments later as representatives of the National Democrat Party. That multicellular organism, in fact, had split and multiplied, and reproduced itself an hundredfold ; but, despite what even in a Polish political party must be described as a quite phenomenal exercise of the reproductive powers, the ' National Congress ' was only Casimir and Stanislas and Timko after all !

[1] [The remains of the Legions were disbanded by the Central Powers after the Peace of Brest in May 1918 : they offered some resistance, and endeavoured to go over to Russia.]

It is now possible to make some answer to the question, Will the German settlement last? The three Partitioning Powers are once more in congress assembled to redraw the map of Eastern Europe. It would be rash to prophesy in what constitutional form their deliberations will eventuate. The immediate policy of the Central Powers is no doubt to maintain for as long as possible the fabric of Polish self-government. But the possibility of that fabric collapsing from its own weakness can, unhappily, not be altogether excluded. Three years of upheaval have brought no leaders to the surface of Polish Nationalism. A year's trial of self-government has hardly augured well for the ability of the Warsaw politicians to make the advance from political rhetoric to political work. They have shrunk from the great sacrifice, which constituted the one faint hope of creating a genuinely independent Poland, the introduction of compulsory military service. The anarchic drift in the national character has been at least as evident as it was in 1831 and in 1863. Poland seems still unable to stand alone; and, whether the union be close or loose, it seems, under present circumstances, certain that her future is bound up with the destinies of Central Europe. That is a presumption with which the speculation, and the policy, of her friends in Western Europe should now reckon.

CHAPTER VI

POLAND 1919

[*This survey of the position in Poland was written immediately after the conclusion of the Armistice and the outbreak of the Revolution in Germany at the close of* 1918.]

FOR four years the Poles have been living at a degree of political tension such as it is probable no other nation, neutral or belligerent, has experienced during the War. The movement of events has been so rapid, the *dénouements* so dramatic, that even the most imaginative race in Europe, to whom political excitement is as breath in the nostrils, has been left baffled and gasping. The two winds of War and Revolution have torn their way through the fabric of Polish national life, searing, cleansing, destroying. Accepted orientations, established traditions, one after another have yielded to the storm; while the grouping and re-grouping of parties and politicians has been like the shifting of the colours in a kaleidoscope.

In this welter one politician only, M. Roman Dmowski, the National Democrat leader, has preserved a consistent and unvarying attitude. His followers now hope to reap the fruits of his consistency. Two political passions are ingrained in M. Dmowski, hatred of the German and hatred of the Jew. On all else M. Dmowski is a party leader, the most adroit in Poland, ready to take a programme as he finds it and seek a friendship where he can. But on these two points his convictions transcend the limits of political tactics. They are temperamental. Under no circumstances, either for Teuton or for Israelite, has he compromise or concession of any kind. Convictions such as these are rare in politics, whether in Poland or elsewhere. They are

M. Dmowski's strength. In the early days of the War, when all Poland stood for a short space united in passionate uprising against the Tsar, his enemies execrated Dmowski as a 'Pro-Russian.' To-day he mocks them with the taunt 'Pro-German,' and the laugh is on his side. In truth, there is not much to choose in the vocabulary of Polish abuse between 'Pro-Russian' and 'Pro-German.' But neither taunt is justified. Alike M. Dmowski and his opponents are Polish patriots, neither Pro-Russian, nor Pro-German, nor Pro-English, nor Pro-French, except in so far as they conceive the interests of their country are thereby served. It is true that in the decade which preceded the War M. Dmowski's policy as leader of the Poles in the Duma was 'Pro-Russian' in a marked degree. But there was an earlier period (which his opponents did not allow the world to forget) when from the cover of an Austrian newspaper office he thundered with the best of them against Muscovite tyranny, inert Byzantinism and the rest. There are Poles—there are not many, but there are some—who by long residence in Russia have acquired Russian sympathies and Russian habits of thought, and may truthfully be described as 'Pro-Russians.' Alexander Lednicki, whom the British Foreign Office seems at one time to have conceived as a possible rival to Dmowski,[1] is a distinguished example of a Pole of this type. But Dmowski was never of this type. His policy is and always has been opportunist in the choice of means. But Anti-Germanism and Anti-Semitism do not come for him within the category of means. He conceives them as ends, the two main ends respectively of his country's external and internal policy.

When the *Zweikaisermanifest* of November 5 (1916) established a Polish Government at Warsaw, and posed

[1] See the Secret Document published by the Bolshevists in Petrograd, October 31, 1917, and in the *Manchester Guardian*, December 7, 1917, in which the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in London says the British Government supports the policy of Dmowski, but would consider the policy of Lednicki, if reliable information could be obtained about him.

the future of Poland definitively as an international question, Dmowski was an exile, knocking vainly at the doors of the French and English Foreign Offices,[1] his Party fissured, his policy in ruins. An almost united Poland acclaimed the Warsaw Government. The outside world waited to see what it would do. The National Movements of the nineteenth century illustrate the many different roads by which a country may attain to unity and freedom. Germany attained her unity by her own unaided efforts against a foreign enemy. The circumstances of the present struggle made such a course impossible for Poland. Italy took a different road. The Italian Nationalists attained their goal, in 1859 and again in 1866, by calling in a powerful Ally and profiting by the difficulties of their adversary. That course was open to Poland from the moment of the Two Emperors' Manifesto onwards. Yet a third course was illustrated in the history of countries like Belgium, which owed their freedom, neither to their own efforts nor to the support of an Ally, but to international intervention. This course, too, was open to Poland. It is the course for which she has eventually pronounced, or (to speak more accurately) into which she has drifted. At first it seemed that she had taken the Italian road. That was in the days when the Legions were forming, and the Socialist leader Pilsudski had marched his Riflemen into Russia and 'redeemed' a Polish town. Nations that have been under oppression have long memories. His countrymen will never forget that first fine flush of Pilsudski's Crusade. Poland, like France, is a woman, and responds at the psychological moment to a certain touch of masterful violence. In the hour of Pilsudski's 'Invasion of Russia' Poland gave him her heart, and he has not yet lost it. M. Dmowski's recent levies of American Poles

[1] The Allied policy at the time was sufficiently divined in Poland, but only became known to the Allied public with the Bolshevist publication of the Secret Document of March 11, 1917 (in *Manchester Guardian*, December 12, 1917), by which France recognised Russia's 'complete liberty in establishing her Western frontiers.'

have never quite caught the glamour of Pilsudski's Legions in the first twelvemonth of the War.[1]

When the first Polish Government was set up at Warsaw (Nov. 1916), Pilsudski was clearly indicated as the only possible Minister of War. The obvious prerequisite for any building of the new State was the transformation of the Legions into a National Army. Pilsudski was a warm advocate of this policy. To outside observers it seemed equally obvious that, if the freedom of Poland was to be won with German aid, the Poles would be compelled to pay the price. Lombardy was won, not only on the fields of Magenta and Solferino, but also in the snows of Crimea. It might indeed be possible by adroit statesmanship to avoid the despatch of Polish troops to fight for Germany in France. But at least it would be necessary generously to relieve the German Eastern Front. These considerations do not seem to have occurred to Pilsudski, or to the other politicians at Warsaw. Almost at the outset the Council of State rejected the principle of compulsory military service (Feb. 1917), the National Army was never formed, and the different Parties on the Council gave themselves up to internecine feuds, culminating in German interference, the disbanding of the Legions, and the internment of Pilsudski in a German fortress. There remained, and remains, to Poland only the Belgian road to freedom —the international appeal.

It may be said, of course, and it is not easy to find

[1] The record of the Dmowskian troops, when there has been any fighting to be done, has been not less distinguished: but it must be admitted, their career has been somewhat chequered. The I Corps, composed of Polish conscripts from the old Russian Army, under Gen. Dowbor-Musnicki, went over to the Germans after the Bolshevik Revolution, with the idea of keeping Bolshevism out of Poland. Later, having quarrelled with the Germans, they were surrounded by the latter and interned. The same fate befell the II Corps under Gen. Michaelis. A small remnant under Col. (now Gen.) Haller seems to have made its way through the Ukraine into East Russia, and joined the Czecho-Slovaks. At the end of 1918 M. Dmowski was in Vladivostok, collecting yet another force to co-operate in the Allied invasion of Siberia. A further force was organised in France in return for the Allied recognition of M. Dmowski.

an answer, that the course of events has demonstrated beyond all cavil the futility of ' the Pro-German course ' It is not for an outsider, perhaps, at such a moment to express an opinion. There are those who think that Poland gained more by her fidelity in 1812 to the shaken cause of Napoleonic militarism than all that she lost. There are others who hold that Poland has suffered enough from the *beaux gestes*, which are so frequent in her history, and that the new Poland must be built on more material and less dangerous foundations. One thing is now certain. The new Poland will come into being, not by its own efforts, but by an international decision. It will be based on memories, not of united struggle against a common oppressor, but of the triumph of one Polish Party over another, and the ability of an ' Emigration ' to manipulate the interests of foreign powers. In such foundations there is no cementing force. A solid base for the new structure in Poland has still to be laid.

A strong Poland is an essential of development, not only in Poland itself, but in Eastern Europe as a whole. But the League of Nations cannot make a strong Poland. It is true, they can draw the map as they please. If M. Dmowski has his way—and how far the French and British Governments have committed themselves to M. Dmowski is one of those points on which the public have never been informed—vast areas in Lithuania, the Ukraine, and White Russia will be placed under Polish rule. But a ' Great Poland ' will not be a strong Poland. The elements of disunion, which it will contain, will be elements, not of strength, but of weakness. It will be a new Austria, an Austria without the Hapsburgs and the Hapsburg tradition of rule. A League of Nations sought to create a ' Great Netherlands ' in 1815. It was to be a bulwark of defence against Gallic Imperialism, a natural intermediary between Teuton and Latin, and the rest of it. But they could not give it strength. The component nationalities resented the rule of the dominant race, and after fifteen unquiet years the ' Great Netherlands ' dissolved into its several parts. The strength

of nations is a product, not of diplomatic machinery, but of biological growth. Only the Poles themselves can make a strong Poland : and for the sources of such strength they can only look, not to external, but to internal policy.

The internal problems in Russian Poland are more complex than those which await solution in the other States of Eastern Europe. The Baltic Provinces, Lithuania, the Ukraine, Austrian Poland, and in the main even Prussian Poland, are predominantly agricultural countries. In Russian Poland, on the other hand, nearly half the population before the War was engaged in industry ; and the proportion was rapidly increasing. With this growing industrialisation of what fifty years ago was still a land of ' nobles, peasants, priests ' the Jewish question is closely connected. The problem of the Jew in countries like Russia and Poland cannot be stated in terms of Western Europe. It is conditioned, not primarily by religious feeling, but by economic conditions. One of the principal factors in the acuteness which the problem has assumed in Eastern Europe is undoubtedly the restrictions which England and America have imposed in recent years on alien immigration. Mr. Steed, writing of Austria, acutely observes [1] :

> Anti-Jewish feeling can almost invariably be expressed in terms of the percentage of Jews to non-Jews intermingled with the other elements of a community. When the percentage rises above a certain point—a point determined in each case by the character of the non-Jewish population—Anti-Semitism makes its appearance.

The danger-point in a profoundly Catholic country like Poland may possibly be lower than elsewhere. It has in any case for some years past patently been exceeded. The restrictions in Old Russia on Jewish ownership of land confined the Polish Jew to the towns. The official Russian policy in recent years of concentrating the Jews in the Western provinces led to a large influx of Russian Jews into Poland (generally called ' Lithuanian

[1] H. Wickham Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, London, 1914.

Jews,' though they do not for the most part come from Lithuania), who compete with the original Polish Jews, and have markedly lowered the standard of living. Before the War there were some 2,000,000 Jews in Russian Poland out of a total population of 9,000,000 : and there were towns—Brest is an example—where they amounted to so much as 80 per cent. of the population. They held, and hold, four-fifths of the trade of the country in their hands, and control a large proportion—how large it is not easy from the available statistics to determine—of the capital invested in Polish industry. With the exception of a very small number of wealthy individuals, who would like Judaism to be treated as it is treated in Western Europe, as an affair, not of nationality, but of religion, the Jews in Poland speak a different language, wear a different dress, eat different food, are educated in different schools, and organised in different political Parties, from their Christian neighbours. Movements like Zionism, which in West European eyes seem to have a purely visionary appeal, assume an intensely practical significance in the politics of Eastern Europe. The Jewish Question in this part of the world is not one which can be left to solve itself.

The question of the land is as acute in Russian Poland as anywhere in Eastern Europe : but the conditions of the land tenure may be said to be more advanced than in any other East European country, with the exception of Prussian Poland. The solution of the agrarian problem in all these countries is the creation of a land-owning peasantry. In Russian Poland such a peasantry already exists. It holds 57·6 per cent. of the land.[1] The large

[1] This figure is given on the authority of the most recent Polish publication, *Vie économique du Royaume de Pologne* (forming Vol. I. Fasc. III. of *Encyclopédie Polonaise*, Freiburg and Lausanne, 1917), which though issued for propagandist purposes—by M. Dmowski's Party—is objective in character, and takes rank as a scientific study of high value and for the Western, unacquainted with Polish or Russian, of great convenience. Mr. Geoffrey Drage accepts this figure (' Pre-War Statistics of Poland and Lithuania,' in *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, March, 1918). Other estimates are 54·6 (Cleinow), 68 (Sering), 51·9 (Gothein).

estates represent 34·8 per cent., the Crown Lands only 5·8. This peasant proprietary owes its origin to the Russian Government. After the Polish Rising of 1863 the Government adopted a policy of rigorous repression of the upper and middle classes, who were responsible for the rebellion. The complement of this policy, with which the name of Milutin is associated, was to be conciliation of the peasants, who had taken little part in the rebellion, by a generous programme of land reforms. The Tsar Alexander II had just abolished serfage. The peasants in Poland were now declared owners of the land, of which they were in occupation ; and were given in addition certain rights over the landlords' forest and pasture, which in the primitive system of peasant agriculture prevailing are of vital importance. At the same time large tracts of land were made available for peasant settlement. The Government had confiscated the estates of land-owners implicated in the rebellion. They had also at their disposal Church lands belonging to the recently dissolved monasteries. By utilising this land in the course of the 'sixties of the last century some 917,000 peasant-holdings were formed, and peasants settled on them. The policy was largely conceived, and in the first few years of its application was undoubtedly productive of almost unmixed advantage to the country. Had the population remained stationary, it might have gone far to solve all the economic problems of Russian Poland, and would doubtless have affected powerfully Polish political development. But the population has not remained stationary. It is calculated that in the hundred years of Russian rule from 1816 to 1917 the population increased by 481 per cent. Russian Poland is now by far the most densely populated region of Eastern Europe. Whereas in Prussian Poland the number of inhabitants per square kilometre is about 72, in Russian Poland it is 110, a figure only short by five of that for the whole of Prussia. In the first generation after the Russian agrarian reforms the peasant holdings had been divided up to the extreme minimum

limit (8¼ acres) allowed by the law: and there had come into existence a body of landless labourers, who at the beginning of the present century already amounted to nearly 1,500,000, or approximately one half of the entire agricultural population. The sequel to this development has been on the one hand an emigration which averaged annually as much as 3 per cent. of the total population, and on the other hand a steady flow of the rural population into the towns.

Further subdivision of the large estates and Crown lands, though it undoubtedly ought to be undertaken and at once, cannot do much more than ease the acuteness of the agrarian trouble. The only remedy which can touch the root of the disease is an improvement in the methods of cultivation. Some of the large estates are managed on modern lines: but in the judgment of every expert who has made a study of it, the peasant cultivation is, as compared with the peasant cultivation of Prussian Poland, backward and wasteful. Holdings which under the present system are too small to support a family can be made to do so with intensive cultivation. But the moment one speaks of improved agricultural methods in Poland, one finds oneself confronted by the two great obstacles to Polish progress, each of them a legacy of Russian misrule: in the first place defective education, in the second place inadequate communications. The number of illiterates in Russian Poland, according to the last census taken before the War, was 62 per cent. of the population. In Warsaw and Lodz, the two chief cities and the centres of Polish industry, the figures were 41·7 and 55 respectively. These are staggering figures. The economic conditions which they indicate must for long act as a dead-weight retarding Polish progress. Nothing is so significant of the economic gulf between the Prussian and the Russian Pole as a comparison of the illiteracy statistics. There are no sane illiterates in Prussian Poland!

One might expect the problem of communications to prove easier of solution than that of the schools. But

probably it is the educational problem which will make most appeal to the Polish governing class. The Polish governing class has a noble record in the matter of education. Their first act when the Russian rule was relaxed in the Revolution of 1905 was to found an Association to provide schools by private subscription. This Association was suppressed by the Russian authorities under the Reaction; but with the capture of Warsaw by the Germans a new network of schools almost at once made its appearance, and in 1916 the Germans re-established the Polish University of Warsaw. In the matter of roads, on the other hand, the average Pole is satisfied with what in France, Germany, or England would be considered very little. There is a fatalistic standpoint in Eastern Europe with regard to a road. 'Shout to the horses, and if God will we shall get through,' is the prevailing attitude. Road-building is, however, an obvious form of relief work at a time of unemployment and distress: and there is nowhere where it will be more remunerative than in Russian Poland. It was by a large programme of road-building that the Prussians began in the first half of the last century the process of building up the economic life of Prussian Poland.[1] As regards railways, the Russian Government after the Japanese War began to double-track a number of the lines in Poland; and the work was nearly completed in 1914. For military reasons, however, no new lines were built, the Russian General Staff having decided in 1911 to withdraw the line of concentration of the Russian armies in the event of war with Germany to the east of the Polish provinces. The waterways of Poland, if they were developed as waterways are developed in Central Europe, might play a part in the future of the country at least as important as the railways. The most obvious need is the canalisation of the Vistula, without which the gift of Danzig—if indeed M. Dmowski has secured that town from the Allies—will be a

[1] Drage, *op. cit.*

very imperfect acquisition. At the present time only the German section of the river (Danzig-Nieszawa, 95 miles) can take modern traffic. On the remaining 572 miles of its course (of which 436 miles in Russian Poland, 136 miles in Austrian Poland) no boats above 100 tons can reach Warsaw, while above Warsaw the only traffic is timber-rafts. The standard barge on the adjoining waterways of Germany is 400 tons. Connection with the German system has long existed, and the last link in it, the canal which leads through Bromberg to the Oder, has been deepened by the Germans during the War to take the 400-ton boats. The Germans have further completed during the War an alternative mouth to Danzig (opened September 1917) by the canalised Nogat, which flows past Marienwerder into the Frisches Haff, the long lagoon at the head of which is Königsberg. The connection with the Russian rivers is far less satisfactory. The Dnieper and the Vistula are connected, but long stretches of the connecting waterways are incapable of taking modern traffic. With the Dniester there is no connection at all.

Schools, roads, railways, and canals, will clearly benefit industry no less than agriculture. The industrialisation of Poland will undoubtedly continue. It is indeed in the interests of agriculture that it should continue: for there can be no doubt that otherwise the agrarian problem cannot be solved without increase of emigration or decrease of the birth-rate. The textile industry of Poland, to which the other industries are to a considerable extent subsidiary—the metal industry, for example, is largely occupied with the production of textile machinery—has been built up on the cheap Russian market: and the policy of any future Polish Government will inevitably be to retain that market by a low tariff wall on the Eastern frontier and a high one on the West. It will not be an easy policy to carry through. But the tariff is not the only problem which Polish industry will have to solve. Social legislation under the Russian Government was both defective and undeveloped. The

Lodz industries before the War were carried on under conditions in not a few respects recalling the horrors of Lancashire in the first half of the last century. Low wages, cruel hours, child labour, and laws which treat a strike as a punishable offence, are not willingly abandoned by mill-owners, in Lancashire or in Lodz: and the Polish capitalists are not less powerful, and are scarcely less eloquent, in the political life of their country than Bright and his generation in England. Here again the temptation to any Government will be to neglect the internal problem of social reform for the external problem of the tariff. But the demand for the removal of the great evils prevailing will become increasingly insistent with the spread of education amongst the operatives; and Governments will neglect it at their peril. At the present time Bolshevism appears to have surprisingly little hold in Poland. The seceded Left of the Polish Socialist Party (Pilsudski's Party) and the quite separate organisation known as the Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania are Bolshevist in the wider sense of the world: that is to say, they place the Social Revolution above all National claims. At the moment the indications seem to be that they are losing rather than gaining influence: and for a variety of reasons, of which the strength of the Catholic Church is the chief, Poland is not naturally a favourable soil for Bolshevism. But, where industrial abuses exist, the Social Revolution, whatever may be thought of its crimes and excesses in Russia, will always appeal as a great ideal and a great hope to millions, to whom neither Nationalism nor Democracy offers any prospect of relief. 'Bolshevism' has a long course yet to run in Europe: and international repression seems no more likely to succeed in crushing it than it succeeded in crushing the Political Revolution of the nineteenth century.

CHAPTER VII

THE UKRANIAN MOVEMENT

'It will be the end of Russia, not indeed by any means as a Great Power but as a European danger, if the Ukraine ever secedes from the Empire. . . . It matters comparatively little to Russia, if she loses Poland, or even Finland. But without the Ukraine, Russia becomes an Asiatic Power.'—'Bedwin Sands,' *The Ukraine*, London, 1914.

'FINLANDIA! Baltika! Litva! Polsha! Ukraina!—Mother Russia is bleeding from five wounds!' a Cadet paper wrote just before the Bolshevist Revolution of November 1917. The attempt has now been made to probe four of these wounds, and the hemorrhage has been found to consist mostly of *tchinovnik* blood. The last of the five is more serious. The separation of the Ukraine was a blow to a vital part of Russia, and provoked her instant collapse. Not only do the Ukranian provinces cover an area nearly equal to that of France, Italy, and England combined: not only do they contain the best part of the Black Earth Zone, the granary of Eastern Europe, most of the coal and iron, nearly all of the oil, all of the salt, 80 per cent. of the beet, 70 per cent. of the tobacco, one-third of the live-stock of all Russia: but they are bone of her bone and flesh of her flesh. They are pure Slav, pure Orthodox: until a very few years ago no one would have hesitated to add, pure Russian. Gogol and Tchaikovsky were Ukranians: it would have astonished either of them to be told they were not Russians. And even Shevtchenko, the eponymous hero of the Nationalist Movement, or Drahomanov, its Mazzini, never advocated separation.

The Ukranians did not, like the Poles or the Finns, cherish the recollection of an independence recently enjoyed. For more than two and a half centuries they

had been ruled by the Tsar; and before that they had been under the Polish yoke. Those measures of Russification which, imposed at the beginning of the twentieth century, were so bitterly resented in Finland, had been introduced without protest in Ukraine at the end of the eighteenth century. When under the influence of nineteenth-century Nationalism a Ukranian Movement first made its appearance, it had been immediately suppressed by the Russian Government. Count Valuyev, Russian Minister of the Interior in 1863, declared in one of those aphorisms which Russian bureaucrats affect, 'There never has existed, there does not exist, and there never can exist, a Little Russian language and nationality.'[1] It was one of those unfortunate remarks, like Metternich's 'Geographical expression,' which are doomed to perpetual quotation. From 1876 to 1905 (not without mitigations from time to time in practice) and again from 1914 to 1917 it was forbidden to publish a book, or to import a book, or to produce a play, or to deliver a lecture, or to preach a sermon, in the Ukranian language. All education from the village school to the University was in Russian. A large part, perhaps the majority, of the educated classes rarely spoke a word of Ukranian except to servants or peasants. The higher strata of society, the functionaries, the military, the nobility, the superior clergy, were almost entirely denationalised. So to a great extent were the lower strata in the towns. And even in the villages, where the Ukranian language was universal, the so-called 'village aristocracy,' time-expired non-commissioned officers, village officials and former town-workers come back to their communes, constituted a more or less Russianised element. The majority of peasants understood a Russian speaker—when they wished to—well enough: for though many never went to school, and more forgot what they learnt in the two years of schooling which was all that most peasants

[1] Order of the Minister of the Interior to the Minister of Public Instruction, No. 394, June 8/21, 1863.

got,[1] yet most learnt again what they had forgotten during their service in the Army.

On the vexed question whether Ukranian is a dialect of Russian or a separate Slavonic language, the writer is not competent to form an opinion. It may be premised that the Slav languages resemble one another much more closely than do the Teutonic, or even the Latin, languages. But the question has in any case passed beyond the sphere of pure philology. If Ukranian was a dialect in 1914, it is a separate language now: for, whatever may be the ultimate destiny of the two great divisions of the Russian people, the events of 1917–1918 have carved lines which are beyond effacement in the ethnical development of the Ukranian race. As written by the Nationalists, Ukranian differs considerably in appearance from Russian; it discards six of the Russian letters, and uses three which Russian has not got. The Nationalists have purposely made the orthography as different from the Russian as possible. They have created a neo-Ukranian literary language, from which they have excluded as far as possible all Great Russian technical terms. But though a considerable literature now exists in this language, Ukranian may be said to be still in a fluid state. The Russophils in Galicia employ a peculiar mixture of Russian, Ukranian, and Church Slavonic, with a semi-Glagolitic script; and are to all seeming as much, or as little, understood by their peasant audiences as the Nationalists with their neo-Ukranian diction. The peasants themselves understand one another without difficulty, though their dialects vary much from one another, shading off at places into Polish, at places into Slovak, at places into Russian. A gramophone record of a folk-tale, taken in the region of the Kuban Cossacks on the shores of the Black Sea, is said to be perfectly intelligible in the vicinity of

[1] The Ukranian Nationalist Prof. Rudnycky of Lemberg in his Geography of the Ukraine (*Ukraina*, Vienna, 1916) estimates the illiteracy in the Ukranian provinces of Russia at so much as 80·5 per cent. of the population. The Census of 1897 gave the figure 83·6.

Przemysl.[1] But, though the peasants know that their language is different from Great Russian, and though a Great Russian is treated as a stranger in their villages, it may be doubted whether their political consciousness has gone much beyond this point. When questioned as to their nationality, they are apt, unless they have been otherwise instructed by the *intelligentsia*, to reply incontinently, 'Orthodox.'

Perhaps the most striking evidence of the immaturity of the Ukranian Movement in Russia is the fact that in the year 1905, when all the non-Russian nations were in clamorous revolt, scarcely a voice was raised in the Ukraine in favour of separation. The chief news that reached the world from the Ukraine was of *pogroms* organised by ultra-Russian patriots in the Ukranian towns of Kiev, Kishinev, and Odessa. There was a Ukranian Club of some forty members in the First and Second Dumas.[2] But from the Third and Fourth Dumas under Stolypin's manipulation of the franchise they had all disappeared: and at the outbreak of the War the Ukranian Nationalists had not a single representative either in the Duma or in any one of the Ukranian *zemstva*. So effectually, it seemed, had the Pan-Slav influences which dominated Russian policy in the decade before the War succeeded in the crushing of the Ukranian Movement.

Perhaps they would have succeeded altogether—for the factors in their favour, as has been indicated, were many—but for the fragment of the Ukranian race, three millions only out of thirty millions, who live on Austrian soil. Here they are called Ruthenes: they inhabit the

[1] Rudnycky, *op. cit.*

[2] Their programme was, autonomy for the Ukranian Church, Ukranian as the language of instruction in the village schools, and equality of the two languages in the administration. The Club was composed of various Parties; but at this period Ukranian Parties were rather groups and tendencies than political organisations. One wing acted generally with the Cadets; another with the Peasants' Union. The Club was contemplating transformation into an independent Ukranian Party, when the Second Duma was dissolved.

eastern parts of Galicia, of which province they constitute slightly less than half the population, and are under the yoke of the Polish majority, to whose mercies Vienna handed them over, when she made her peace with the Poles after the disasters of 1866. It may be said at once that there is no group, or fraction of a group, of Ruthenes, which does not cherish for the Poles a hatred so fierce that by the side of it the bitterest protest of the Russian Ukranians against Russian rule appears tame and insignificant. At a word from Vienna the peasants would be any day ready to bring in cartloads of the heads of the Polish landlords, as they did in the Galician Rising of 1846 ; and the *intelligentsia* would organise pilgrimages to the houses of the murderers, as they did when Miroslav Siczynsky murdered the Polish Governor of Galicia in 1908. But neither peasants nor *intelligentsia* get the opportunity ; for no one has ever charged the Poles with weakness in their rule of subject races.

Nevertheless, though held in bondage themselves in Galicia, the Ruthenes have provided a kind of 'intellectual Piedmont' for the Ukranian Movement. The books which were not allowed to be published in Russia were published in Lemberg and Czernowitz and smuggled across the border : exiles from Russian Ukraine found a home in Galicia : and the history of the Ukranian Movement down to 1914 is to all intents and purposes the history of the Ruthenes. Yet the Ruthenes are cut off from the Russian Ukranians, not only by the political barrier, but by one of those barriers which in this part of Eastern Europe count for more than political boundaries, a difference of faith. The Russian Ukranians are Orthodox, members of the Russian Church. The Ruthenes are Uniates, Catholics in communion with Rome but retaining the Greek Rite and the married clergy. The Ruthene peasant is passionately attached to his Rite, and very much more afraid of Latinisation on the part of the Poles than of proselytising efforts on the part of Orthodox Russia. 'Purifying the Greek Rite' (by which is meant the elimination of organs

vernacular hymns, and the more modern Catholic devotions, such as the Sacred Heart or even the Immaculate Conception) has always been a good political cry in East Galicia, especially among the Russophil elements: and in the hands of agitators from Russia has more than once been the prelude to whole villages going over to Orthodoxy.

The Russophils must be distinguished from the Russian emissaries, whose lead they have sometimes been willing to accept. The Russophil clergy for example, of whom there are a fair number, though they may be said to be Orthodox at heart, are not for the most part anxious for absorption in the Russian Church. Their inclination is rather—their Bishops will not permit them to express it openly—to form an autocephalous Orthodox Church, like that of Bulgaria. There are two Slavonic words meaning 'Orthodox,' *Pravoslavnye* and *Pravoviernye*. The Uniate clergy in general use the word *Pravoviernye* to describe themselves, leaving *Pravoslavnye* as the designation of the Russian Orthodox. Some of the Russophil clergy, however, affect the expression *Pravoslavnye Katoliki*, or in Latin *Orthodoxi Ecclesiae Catholicae cultores*, and they do not linger over the *Katoliki*, which is in any case a word uncongenial to the Ruthene ear, carrying with it suggestions of the thin end of the Polish wedge. The fear of Latinisation is not altogether groundless. There is within the Uniate Church a distinct Latinising—it is true, it is not a Polonising—tendency, led by the present Bishop of Stanislau. This prelate, who is more distinguished for tenacity than tact, has broken away both from the Nationalists, whom the Metropolitan and the bulk of the clergy support, and also from the Russophils, and has endeavoured to form a Christian Socialist Party. His policy is to bring the Ruthene Church into closer touch with the Catholic Church in Austria, and in particular with the ecclesiastical authorities in Vienna. He has not had much success, and has been bitterly attacked by his fellow-countrymen. The principal ground of quarrel has been

the Bishop's attitude on the question of the marriage of the clergy. It is the rule for seminarists in East Galicia to marry at the close of their five-year course at the seminary and before ordination : and in some seminaries it is, or was, the custom for the seminarists to marry before the conclusion of their course. The Bishop of Stanislau enforces rigid celibacy at his diocesan seminary throughout the course, and uses all his influence to induce the young priests to elect for celibacy at their ordination. If they once elect for it, they may not change their mind afterwards. The Bishop's motives are not unintelligible. The deplorable poverty of the Ruthene clergy, who have to support a family on a stipend smaller than that which most of the celibate Polish clergy receive, renders them very susceptible to the solicitations of the rouble, with which it is said the overtures of Russian Orthodoxy are invariably gilded. On the other hand, in villages where the population is mixed, and there is a Polish Catholic as well as a Ruthene Uniate Church, the danger of Polonisation occasionally arises : for the married Ruthene priest can rarely compare in devotion with the celibate Pole. The problem might be eased, if the Ruthene Church had large numbers of Regular clergy : but there is only one Order of Regulars of any size, the Reformed Basilian Fathers, whereas the Poles have a wealth of religious of both sexes. These considerations, however, do not appeal to the bulk of the Ruthenes. There is a strong anti-clerical current in the *intelligentsia*, and they consider that the introduction of celibacy would greatly strengthen clerical influence in the country. The *popovitchi*, moreover, or sons of the clergy, have until lately been the principal, almost the only, source from which the *intelligentsia* were recruited ; while the seminaries were one of the most fruitful fields of Nationalist propaganda. Indeed, the seminary at Stanislau enjoyed a reputation as much for political excesses as for moral defects, before the present Bishop put a stop to both. Nor do the peasants relish the prospect of exchanging the easy-going methods of their married clergy for the

more exacting standards which they see prevailing in the parishes of the celibate Polish priests. Their attachment to their Church is often more national than religious, and is combined with a curious vein, not exactly of anti-clericalism such as the *intelligentsia* profess, but of anti-sacerdotalism. There is said to be a current proverb in East Galicia, expressing the Ruthene conception of the Perfect Day: 'A Jew for breakfast, a Lord [i.e. a Pole] for dinner, and a pope [married priest] for supper.'

The question became acute two or three years before the War; and the views of the laity prevailed. The Metropolitan, Msgr. Szeptycki,[1] would no doubt, if he followed his own inclinations, take the same line as his brother of Stanislau. But he is a statesman before everything. His policy is to hold together the Nationalist clergy and the Nationalist laity, in order to present a united front to the Pole. To this policy he is prepared to sacrifice a good deal: and in the case of the Married Clergy Question he saw that it was impossible for the Church to go ahead of public opinion. He accordingly urged prudence on the authorities in the seminaries, and reassured the *intelligentsia*. In the summer of 1911 he was presented with an address by Dr. Lewicky, Head of the Ukraine Club in the Austrian Reichsrat. The Address—the parenthetic glosses are the writer's—ran:

> When in recent times certain traitor voices [i.e. the Christian Socialist Bishop and Party] made themselves heard, which sought to separate the clergy from their people, and create out of them a separate caste [i.e. by introducing celibacy], you, Prince of our National Church, showed it the national way—namely, that the shepherd must march side by side with the people [i.e. with the Nationalist *intelligentsia*], with the people and for the people.

But in the end the Metropolitan generally has his way. He is one of the outstanding personalities of Eastern Europe. He is a Pole by birth; or rather he is a member of one of those aristocratic families which bear Ruthene

[1] Pronounced 'Sheptitsky.'

names, but which were all Polonised centuries ago. A Szeptycki was Archbishop of Lemberg at the end of the eighteenth century; but the present Metropolitan, Count Andrew Szeptycki, is the first of his name, and indeed the first of his caste, to acknowledge Ruthene nationality. He occupies a unique position in the National Movement, and his place, when he dies, will be difficult to fill. Physically he is something of a Hercules, well over six feet high, with a big fair beard, and with a certain air of command, in which the Polish aristocrat and the Prince of the Church are curiously commingled. He dominates almost without question an anything but docile *intelligentsia*. The Poles, of course, will have none of him; but at Vienna he has considerable influence, and can reach quarters which the Ruthene deputies in the Reichsrat are not in a position to approach. His relations with Rome have varied. Polish influence at Rome is always strong; and there have been other difficulties. There was a time when a Pontiff[1] wrote to the Ruthenes, '*O mei Rutheni, spero per vos Orientem converti ad fidem Catholicam*': and perhaps there have been moments when Msgr. Szeptycki has had this exhortation too prominently in mind to make relations with Russia easy for the Vatican. He has had a difficult task in the management of his flock. The conflict over the celibacy question was only one of many. Again and again the clergy have chafed under anti-clerical diatribes of the Nationalist newspapers; and the diplomacy of the Archbishop has had to be put in motion behind the scenes. But by one means or another he has succeeded in shepherding into one fold the bulk of the clergy on the one hand and the principal groups of the *intelligentsia*, the so-called 'Consolidation,' on the other. This union has powerfully promoted the progress of the Nationalist Movement. In the 'nineties the Nationalists managed to exclude the Russophils altogether both from the Austrian Reichsrat (Elections of 1891) and from the Galician Diet (Elections of 1895). In recent years the

[1] Urban VIII.

Russophils, supported by the Poles, regained a little ground; and at the outset of the War they held two seats in the Reichsrat to the Nationalists' twenty-three.

Between them the two, Nationalists and Russophils, poll all the Ruthene votes: for in the almost complete absence of a Ruthene urban proletariate Socialism is weak in Eastern Galicia, and does not play a prominent role.[1] It might seem from the scant success which the Russophils have had at the polls that the Russophil Party is equally insignificant. But such is hardly the case. With fluctuating fortunes Russophilism has contrived to maintain itself in East Galicia ever since the first stirrings of Ukranian Nationalism in the early part of the last century. The idea which it represents is more powerful than is apparent from its political history. In the United States, where the special circumstances of the Polish menace do not exist, the Russophil and the Nationalist factions amongst the Ruthene immigrants are said to be almost evenly divided. There was a time when the Russophils—then known as Old Ruthenes—were supported by the Austrian Government as a useful Conservative body, well adapted to form a counterpoise to the Poles. Russophilism in those days was more literary than political, and Russian agents from Russia played little part in it. It decayed with the rise of Nationalism, and Vienna transferred its favours to the Nationalists. In the twentieth century Pan-Slavism, then at the flood in Russia, began to cast its foam across the Austrian border; and a vigorous politico-ecclesiastical propaganda under a Russian Pan-Slavist, Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, was set on foot. To this propaganda the Russophils, or a good part of them, rallied. The propaganda was avowedly irredentist in character: the Mission of Sovereign Russia (*Gosudarstvennaya Rusj*) to Russia in Bondage (*Podyaremnaya Rusj*) was openly preached; and conversion to Orthodoxy was to be the first step. The Orthodox seminaries of Volhynia and Podolia opened their doors to the sons of the Ruthene

[1] Before the War they had one seat in the Reichsrat.

clergy: and pilgrimages were organised on a large scale to Poczayevo, a well-known Orthodox convent just across the Russian border, which has a miracle-working Saint, and has for long served as a convenient centre of Orthodox propaganda. For more sophisticated souls newspapers were founded, and, above all, educational facilities to enable young Ruthenes to make their studies in Russia. The Metropolitan would not allow his clergy to join the Russophil organisation founded by Count Bobrinsky, the Galician-Russian Society: but it was known that a certain number of priests were in sympathy with it. A Polish estimate at the time [1] computed that some 500 out of a total of 2500 Secular clergy in Uniate Galicia were more or less Russophil: but many of these certainly were out of sympathy with the new tendencies which Bobrinsky introduced. The rich and beneficent Institute of the Crucifixion (*Stavropihia*) in Lemberg, for example, has always been reckoned Russophil; but its Russophilism does not extend to the political sphere, and in the ecclesiastical sphere does not stretch to the point of contemplating rupture with Rome. In the University of Lemberg the Russophils held two out of the eight Ruthene chairs [2]: but only one of the two

[1] A. von Rädlitz, *Unter uns - ohne Maske*, Vienna, 1912 (published by the Author). An irresponsible book by a Ruthenophobe enthusiast, interesting as putting forward the extreme Polish view in a language other than Polish, but somewhat esoteric for the general reader.

[2] Of the two Universities in Galicia, Cracow and Lemberg, both are Polish: but the Ruthenes have eight chairs (divided at present between the faculties Geography, History, Law, and Theology) at Lemberg. The Ruthenes want these to be separated, and others added to them to form a separate Ruthene University. Until just before the War the Poles consistently refused this demand, though the Ruthenes amount to 42 per cent. of the population. The Ruthene students at one time emigrated *en masse* to other Austrian Universities; and there has been constant bad blood, and even bloodshed, over the question between the two races. Before the War, however, out of 1683 Ruthene students studying in Austrian Universities, 1287 were back at Lemberg (figures from *Shliakhi*, organ of the Ruthene students at Lemberg, Nos. 8–9, November 1913, quoted in *La Revue Ukranienne*, Lausanne, December 1915). In January 1914, the Poles withdrew their opposition to a Ruthene University, partly under pressure from Vienna, partly in return for certain concessions made by the Ruthenes in connection with the redistribution of constituencies for the Galician Diet.

occupants was in sympathy with Bobrinksy's New Course.

The Poles, who had long been alarmed at the growth of the Nationalist Movement, now decided to join hands with the New Russophilism. The new movement was particularly welcome as a means of combating Ruthene aspirations at this time: for the domination of the Poles in Galicia was to some extent threatened by the introduction of Universal Suffrage in Austria: and a prominent Polish magnate opined that 'a little schism in East Galicia would do no harm.' The Russian leaders of the Russophils were approached accordingly through one of the leaders of the Polish Club in the Duma, M. Roman Dmowski, whose name has already made its appearance more than once in the Polish chapters of this book. M. Dmowski had no difficulty in getting into touch with Count Bobrinsky, and an arrangement was made between the two. In return for a free hand to the Russophils in East Galicia Bobrinsky was to use his influence at Petrograd to secure certain concessions to the Poles in Russian Poland. One feature of the agreement was an arrangement by which the Polish land-lords, who under the iniquitous system of Church patronage prevailing hold many of the Uniate livings in East Galicia, should be induced only to appoint Russophil incumbents. The Dmowski-Bobrinsky understanding lasted down to the War.

The Young Czech leader, Dr. Kramař, is said to have acted as an intermediary in the first instance between the two: and a Neo-Slav Congress—such was the name given to this latest manifestation of Russian Pan-Slavism—was arranged to take place at Prague in 1908. Dmowski, Bobrinsky, and the lesser Russophils from Galicia all took part in the Congress, appeared on the same platform, and exchanged the compliments customary on such occasions. When the Congress was concluded, Bobrinsky and the Russophil delegates made a 'Progress' through Galicia. In Lemberg they were welcomed at a banquet by a number of prominent Poles.

After the banquet the company made an excursion into the country to a neighbouring village, of which one of the Russophil Deputies in the Galician Diet was priest. They were received at the Railway Station by the entire village, headed by the priest in his canonicals, and offered bread and salt after the Russian fashion. Further refreshment was then partaken of at the inn; and at the conclusion of the festivities it was announced amid cheers that the village had decided to open its heart to the true light of Orthodoxy. The East European propagandist can at any rate claim to show visible results for his money.

In the early part of 1914 certain Russophil journalists were put on their trial by the Austrian Government at Lemberg on a charge of High Treason. A Polish jury acquitted them, and they were laden with flowers on leaving the Court. A similar trial took place at the same time in connection with propaganda in one of the two or three Ruthene districts in Hungary. At the Hungarian trial a good deal of peasant evidence was taken. It is interesting reading; for there is nothing so difficult as to discover what the peasants really think of those who speak in their name. The great feature of the Russian propaganda in this case, it appeared, was a wonderful magnifying-glass, through which a certain Father Kabalyuk, a missionary of Orthodoxy, showed the peasants pictures of Saints. Other witnesses gave as their reason for following Father Kabalyuk's teaching that 'he prayed in such a beautiful voice.' There was no evidence to show that the peasants had any inkling of political drift in the priest's propaganda; and very little evidence against the priest himself, though he was convicted and sentenced to four and a half years' imprisonment. Two months later, after the assassination of the Archduke, a number of the Russophil leaders withdrew to Russia. It was in these circumstances that the War broke out. The Russian 'Liberators' poured into Galicia; and the Grand Duke Nicholas in a Manifesto hailed the Ruthenes as brothers who

had 'languished for centuries under a foreign yoke,' and urged them to 'raise the banner of United Russia.'

The first Russian Governor of Galicia was a member of the well-known Russian family of Sheremetiev. His policy was to secure the support of the Poles for the military occupation, and to leave the internal affairs of the province alone. This was by no means the Pan-Slavists' programme, and they set to work at Petrograd to attack him. After a few weeks he was superseded (September 1914), and Count George Bobrinsky, a cousin of Count Vladimir, was appointed in his place.[1] Count George received his cousin and a deputation of Russophils on the day after his arrival in Galicia, and asked for their co-operation. A drastic Russifying programme was immediately announced: and as a first step the Metropolitan was deported to Russia, where he remained in exile until the Revolution. There was to be no 'Mercier mess' in Lemberg. Of the other two Uniate Bishops one, the Bishop of Stanislau, left with the retreating Austrians; the other, the Bishop of Przemysl, was seriously ill, and died shortly after. The flock was therefore left without pastoral guidance. It was not the first time a Ruthene Archbishop had been imprisoned by the enemy of Austria. A hundred years before the Russians had arrested one of Szeptycki's predecessors; and there is, or was till recently, a curious inscription on the wall of one of the rooms in the Archbishop's Palace.[2] It ran as follows:

The enemy of Austria cannot sojourn in this Palace. He is tormented there night and day. The imprisonment of the Metropolitan is the guarantee of the victory of our troops, and of the revival of Austria. *Castigans castigavit me Dominus sed morti non tradidit.*

[1] To be distinguished from yet another member of this Reactionary family, Count A. A. Bobrinsky, leader of the Extreme Right in the Senate and Vice-Minister of the Interior at the time of the Revolution.

[2] The above account of this curious inscription is taken from *La Revue Ukranienne*, Lausanne, September 1915.

Having deported the Archbishop, the Occupying authorities struck hard at the Nationalists. At last it was possible to 'deal with the Ukranian Question as a whole,' and to stamp out once and for all 'the unwholesome growth of sterile Mazeppism.'[1] Every newspaper in Ukranian was suppressed: every Ukranian library was closed: the Nationalist educational societies (*Prosvita*) were wound up: and a penalty of three months' imprisonment or 3000 roubles fine was imposed for selling, or procuring from a library or from another person, any Ukranian book published beyond the boundaries of Russia (*Order of the Governor-General, September* 30, 1914). Similar rules were applied in the Bukovina, when the Russians occupied Czernowitz (*Order of January* 21, 1915). A large influx of Russian Pan-Slavists had taken place immediately after Bobrinsky's appointment: and several of the Russian Ministries had sent agents to report on the Occupied Territory. The most notable of these visitors was the Russian Bishop Eulogius of Volhynia, who has long been an ardent supporter of the Orthodox propaganda, and has won a name as a specialist in bringing over Uniates in Chelm and in Podlachia. He was strongly backed by the Holy Synod. At the very outset of the Occupation the Bishops of the Ukranian dioceses of Russia, Kiev, Kharkov, Podolia, Pultava, Kishinev and Kherson, were instructed to make arrangements to place at his disposal as many Ukranian-speaking popes as he should ask for to undertake missionary work in Galicia. It was further announced in the Russian Press that the Holy Synod had set aside a capital sum sufficient to maintain 100 parish popes at 1300 roubles per annum, and 100 chanters at 300 roubles—rates considerably higher than the Uniate Church can afford. All parishes

[1] Mazeppa, the hero of Byron's poem, was a Hetman of the Ukranian Cossacks at the beginning of the eighteenth century. He rebelled against Russian rule, joined hands with Sweden, and was defeated with the Swedes at the Battle of Pultava. Ever since he has been coupled with Arius and other heresiarchs, against whom the Russian Church annually pronounces a solemn anathema.

in which there were no Uniate priests—and many had left with the retreating Austrians—were filled with these popes without further formalities. In others, 'when a parish expressed a desire to go over to Orthodoxy,' a vote by ballot was taken (*Count Bobrinsky, interviewed by the 'Secolo,' April* 29, 1915). A three-quarters majority was required in these cases; and Church property was preserved to the Uniate Church, unless the three-quarters majority included the priest. In all during the Occupation rather over 100 parishes were provided with Orthodox popes, and 15 Uniate priests went over to Orthodoxy. The (Russophil) Institute of the Crucifixion resisted all attempts at conversion.

The schools were placed under the Russian Pan-Slavist Tchikhatchev, a well-known member of the Duma, who was acquainted with the Uniate question, having served as Reporter to the Law for the separation of Chelm from Poland in 1912. Under Tchikhatchev at the Education Office a place was found for Bendasyuk, one of the Russophils who had stood his trial for High Treason in the same city six months before. The educational programme, as announced in the Press, provided for Russian schools in all Ruthene villages, and 'Polish schools with Russian as the language of instruction' in all Polish villages: private Polish schools with Polish as the language of instruction were to be allowed in the towns. In fact, however, very little of this programme appears to have been carried out. The existing Ruthene schools were all closed at the outset: but after a short interval most of them were reopened. The Government seems to have founded only ten Russian schools in all, five in the villages and five in the towns. The popes sent by the Holy Synod are said to have been more active, and to have opened over fifty village schools. A number of Russian courses for teachers were conducted at various centres in the province, and were well attended. They had just been completed before the Russian Retreat began. Before this the Government had quarrelled with the extrava-

gances of the Pan-Slavists. Their exorbitant demands for subsidies for propaganda were cut down: one of their papers (*Prikarpatskaya Rusj*) was suppressed: some Russophil officials were dismissed: and a sermon of Bishop Eulogius was censored.

When the Russian Retreat began, the Government gave orders to evacuate the civil population, and the Russophils told the peasants that land would be found for them in Russia. The country was to be laid waste, and all barns and agricultural implements destroyed, according to the usual Russian programme.[1] It seems that the programme was not carried out in Galicia with the terrible efficiency which it assumed elsewhere. Nor possibly did the number of peasants actually evacuated amount to more than a few thousands. Accounts from Russian sources of the Retreat say that they completely blocked the roads, and were reduced to great privations by the requisitioning of their cattle on the way to feed the retreating troops. There was, of course, no land ready for them in Russia. The Socialist Parties in the Duma interpellated the Government on these proceedings and on Ukranian policy in general (August 28/September 10, 1915), and were supported by the whole of the Liberal *bloc*. Tchikhatchev replied. He said that no schools had been shut, or newspapers suppressed, in Galicia, so far as he knew: if they had, it had not been his doing: the population had received the Russians well, and were sorry to see them go. Count Bobrinsky preferred to remain silent. One of the Liberal papers of Petrograd published next day the following malicious comment on the debate:

When we were in occupation of Galicia, there was a swoop of Pan-Slavists looking for jobs in the good work of

[1] Various official Russian instructions to this effect have been published by the Ukranian propagandists: see for instance *La Revue Ukranienne*, Lausanne, November 1915, for an Order of Bobrinsky to the local Authorities to co-operate with the military, and detailed instructions issued by the General Officer Commanding XVII Army Corps. [The authority of this publication is dubious; but the facts are unfortunately established, and the documents are therefore probably genuine.]

Russification. 'Here I am!' said Ivan. 'Here I am!' shouted Paul. Now, when it is a question of who was responsible for the thousands of unfortunate refugees, enticed into Russia by false promises of land, they are all crying sadly: 'It was not I,' 'It was not I.' Ivan says it was Paul. Paul says it was Ivan. As for Eulogius, he is inclined to think he was not given a free enough hand.

Meanwhile in Russian Ukraine the Nationalist papers, which had sprung up in Kiev, Kharkov, and elsewhere since 1905, had all been suppressed on the day after the outbreak of the War: and the reversion to the *status quo ante* 1905 in regard to the Ukranian Movement was complete. Certain Nationalists were sent to Siberia, amongst them the *doyen* of Nationalism, the historian, Prof. Hrushevsky. Others made their way to Vienna, where with the support of the Austrian General Staff they founded a body called the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine,[1] and helped to organise Ukranian Legions.[2]

[1] The League advocated complete independence for the Russian Ukraine and self-determination for East Galicia.

Some of the members of the League were used by the Austrian General Staff for Secret Service work in Constantinople, Bucharest, and especially in Sofia (where there is a traditional interest in Ukranian politics, dating from the days when Drahomanov, the father of Ukranian Radicalism, after being exiled from Russia found a home as Professor of History at Sofia University). These proceedings, which had nothing to do with Ukranian patriotism, did not enhance the reputation of the League. Its relations with the Ukraine Club in the Reichsrat were cool; and no Austrian Ukranians joined the Managing Committee. Eventually the Austrian General Staff seems to have dropped it: and the German General Staff took it up, and used it to organise propaganda amongst Ukranian prisoners and in Russia (see a communication of the Russian Ministry of War to the Russian Press in September 1917, translated in *The New Europe*, September 27, 1917).

The Rada, after its formation in May 1917, disowned the League; and from this time, though it seems to be still in existence, the League has ceased to play a prominent part in the Ukranian Movement.

[2] The Ukranian Legions did not play such a prominent part as the Polish Legions; but they appear to have furnished, and for some time maintained from their own depots, one complete Brigade, with some separate detachments from the Bukovina and from Ruthene Hungary. They were organised on the basis of the gymnastic societies, which play so large a part in the national movements of the Slavonic peoples: 75 per cent. of the rank and file belonged to the *intelligentsia*: and

But in the Ukraine itself from the outbreak of the War to the outbreak of the Revolution silence reigned. Attempts to revive the Ukranian newspapers were suppressed one after the other, in Kiev, in Kharkov, in Odessa, at different times in 1915 and 1916. The Cadets at one time took up the Ukranian Nationalists in connection with their campaign against the Government: but even the very cautious, general terms in which, after their manner—there was no Party in Russia which the subject nationalities so deeply distrusted—they declared for 'cultural autonomy' for the Ukraine produced a split in the Party, and the well-known Deputy Struve resigned from the Central Committee (1915). On this silence in Little Russia fell the crash of Revolution.

At the outset the Nationalist *intelligentsia* took control. Early in April 1917 they collected a Ukranian National Congress at Kiev, which pronounced for autonomy within the Russian Republic. Separatist tendencies were not strong at this Congress. The Congress further elected a Council or Rada, so named after the ancient Assembly of the Ukranian Cossacks; and Prof. Hrushevsky was acclaimed its President. The Rada demanded recognition by the Provisional Government of Ukranian autonomy, immediate and complete local control, and the formation of a separate Ukranian Army. The Cadet attitude in reply to these demands was to refer the question to the Russian Constituent Assembly, in which (as both parties very well knew) the Ukranians would be completely outnumbered. In studying the record of their brief spell of power in this

the nominal commander was a secondary school headmaster from Rohatyn. They were, of course, trained by Austrian instructors, but were allowed the word of command in Ukranian—rather a striking concession, when the part which the word of command has played in Austro-Magyar conflicts in the past is recollected—and the flag of the old Zaporovian Cossacks. They were in action as early as September 1914, and are said to have fought well; but it was found impossible to brigade them with the Polish Legions! There was the usual boy hero of fifteen, who liberated 100 Austrians single-handed; and various women volunteers dressed as men, without which no modern Slav formation appears to be complete.

year it is astonishing to observe with what light-heartedness the Russian Liberals down to the very last treated the national movements of the subject nations. Their attitude constitutes the strongest proof of the deep roots which Pan-Slavism had struck in Russian political mentality. Failing to obtain any satisfaction of their demands, the Rada set up an independent Government. The conflict was still in progress, and the Rada was drifting towards a complete rupture, when the Bolshevists precipitated matters by their *coup d'état* of November 1917.

The Bolshevist Revolution stripped the outer shell of intellectual Parliamentarism, and laid bare to the daylight the explosive forces which were stored within the frame-work of the new State. The Rada was 'Kerenskist' in character; it was dominated by the Social Revolutionary Party (Kerensky's Party) with a more or less complacent phalanx of bourgeoisie in the background. It had secured the support of the peasants and soldiers, or at least had met with no opposition from either of these classes—for neither was consulted—partly by appeals to the always latent antipathy which exists between Little Russian and Great Russian, partly owing to a confused idea on the part of the masses that a new Government, 'our own Government,' would surely end the War. But, as has been explained, the population in the towns, whether Ukranian, Russian or Jew, had always been far more susceptible to Russian than to Ukranian Nationalist influences: it read the Russian papers, and belonged to the Russian political parties. When after the Bolshevist Revolution Soviets began to be formed in the towns, some were Bolshevist and some were not; but none were Ukranian Nationalist. Doubtless there were Nationalists amongst their members; but at such a time the trumpet-call of the Social Revolution dominated all other cries. The Soviets declared a General Strike for two days, and allowed no bourgeois papers to appear. The episode opened the eyes of the *intelligentsia* to their own weakness. For the first time the Social Revolutionaries in the Rada were up against the realities of

government. To do them justice, they attempted to grapple with them according to their lights. They saw clearly that, if they were to fight the Soviets, they must base their government on the support of the peasantry. To what other class could they appeal? The nobility, the bureaucracy, the Church, the proletariate in the towns, all were more or less hostile. Except for themselves—and they were not under the delusion (which to the last obsessed the Russian Liberals) that Governments can be based upon an *intelligentsia*—only the peasantry were Nationalists, or could be made into Nationalists. To the peasantry, therefore, they proceeded to appeal.

Everyone knew what the peasants wanted. Every Party had long included it as a plank in their programme; and the Social Revolutionaries themselves had made it a special feature. The peasants wanted more land. Accordingly on November 20, 1917, the Rada Government issued a *Universale* or Decree—it was the old word used of the Hetman's Decrees in the sixteenth century—abolishing all private ownership in large estates, Crown and Church lands, and the Imperial Appanages, without compensation. Land Committees were to be set up to carry the Decree into effect. The *Universale* further proclaimed various measures, such as State control of production, an eight hours day in factories, and the abolition of the death penalty, with which it was hoped to take the Soviets' water and do something for the prestige of the Rada in the towns. The Land Committees assembled and got to work. The history of the next six months is well known. The Rada made its separate peace. The Soviets, with the aid of Russian Bolshevists, overturned the Rada and took Kiev. The troops of the Central Powers retook Kiev, and re-established the Rada in ignominious tutelage. They had hardly done so when 'a body of peasants' marched on Kiev, dissolved the Rada, and invested a large land-owner, an ex-Russian General, with dictatorial powers and the title of Hetman. The Hetman immediately proclaimed the

restoration of the rights of private property, 'the foundation of culture and civilisation,' and treated as null and void the Rada Government Decrees.

This bewildering political record is not intelligible without its social and economic background. It is no bad principle for the Westerner in studying the politics of Eastern Europe always to lay his ear to the ground. Nine times out of ten it is on the soil that the real changes are in progress, of which the political developments are but the symptom. When the German telegrams announced that the Rada was dissolved, it was assumed in Western Europe that the dissolution was the work of the Occupying authorities, and that the 'body of peasants,' who were said to have been responsible for it, were either ruffians suborned for the job, or more probably a figment of German propaganda. They cannot be so lightly dismissed. That the *coup d'état* was allowed by the German authorities is, of course, obvious: for no such move could have been carried through without their permission. It is possible that the Germans promoted it from the beginning; if so, in the writer's judgment, their policy was a singularly long-sighted one. But that the peasants, who carried out the *coup d'état*, were German dupes or hirelings, or alternatively that they existed only in German propagandist brains, is not only not borne out by the accounts of eye-witnesses, but is in itself improbable for reasons which it is now proposed to discuss.

The *Universale*, which confiscated the large estates, did not transfer the land into the possession of the individual peasants, but to district and communal committees. The theory of land-tenure which the Social Revolutionaries responsible for the *Universale* affected was that every peasant should have as much land as he could cultivate without hired labour, but in usufruct only and not in possession: he was not to be able to sell or bequeath it: the land was to belong to the community. This was substantially the system on which the greater part of the peasant-land in Great Russia, and some of

the peasant-land in Little Russia, was held before the Revolution. It was the system stereotyped by the Tsar Alexander II, when he abolished serfage in 1861. With the confiscation of the large estates it would now be possible to apply the system on an infinitely more generous scale. In the Black Earth Zone, in which most of the agricultural Ukraine lies, the peasants at the Abolition of Serfage received allotments ranging from $8\frac{3}{4}$ to $3\frac{3}{4}$ acres. It is calculated that in this region $16\frac{1}{4}$ acres is the minimum on which a peasant family can support itself without seeking outside work. It might seem, therefore, that all that was needed was to increase the peasants' allotments to $16\frac{1}{4}$ acres apiece out of the new confiscated land of the large proprietors. So the Social Revolutionaries thought: and up to this point the peasants cordially agreed with them.

But there was a fundamental difference between the peasant standpoint and that of the Social Revolutionary *intelligentsia*. The *intelligentsia* did not believe in the institution of property. The peasants believed that someone else was in possession of their property. Manifestly the two could co-operate up to a certain point, but no further. When the Land Committees were formed, and the distribution of the land began, difficulties at once arose. The legislation of 1861–1863, which abolished serfage in Russia, assumed (with certain qualifications) the existing communal cultivation of the land: but it distinguished between communal ownership and private ownership by the members of the commune. A Russian commune is a kind of large farm. For technical reasons, such as the necessity of providing every year a definite amount of pasture, it cannot be left to the individual cultivator to do what he pleases with his land. He has to leave a certain proportion to pasture, observe the established rotation, and the like. This is what is meant by communal cultivation; and prevails alike under private or communal ownership. The chief practical difference for the individual peasant between private and communal ownership is in the matter of

redistribution of the land. Communally owned land is redistributed at certain intervals between the members of the commune : and one of the chief economic arguments against the commune is the tendency which the system of redistribution has to discourage individual effort. What advantage is it to Ivan Ivan'itch to keep his land clean or manure it, if at the end of ten or fifteen years he may be obliged by the commune to hand it over, and to take in exchange the land of Nikolai Nikolayevitch, who is a drunkard and does not even take the trouble to plough ? In communes, on the other hand, where the land is privately owned, there is no redistribution. At the time of the Abolition the system of communal ownership was adopted for the great majority of communes in Great Russia, while the system of private ownership was adopted for the great majority of communes in Little Russia.[1] When the *Universale* was issued, therefore, the principle of communal ownership was by tradition alien to all but a minority of the Ukranian peasants.

Provision had been made in the Abolition Law of 1861 to enable freed serfs to purchase their allotments by paying off the redemption capital, and to take them out of the commune. These facilities were greatly increased by the foundation of the State Land Bank in 1883. And recent agrarian legislation has been directed avowedly to the abolition, not merely of communal ownership, but of the whole system of communal cultivation. The far-reaching Stolypin Reforms of 1906–1908 [2] declared the legal abolition of communal cultivation in all com-

[1] Communal ownership in the Ukraine was confined in the main to State Peasants (former serfs of Crown lands). But the majority of the Ukranian peasants were Estate Peasants (former serfs of private proprietors).

[2] Supplemented by Laws of 1910 and 1911. The best account in a language other than Russian of the new situation created by the Stolypin Reforms is W. D. Preyer's *Die russische Agrarreform*, Jena, 1914. The same author gives a short summary, which does not however contain any more recent material, in a chapter contributed to Sering's *Westrussland in seiner Bedeutung für die Entwicklung Mitteleuropas*, Leipzig and Berlin, 1917.

munes with private ownership; that is to say, in the majority of the communes of the Ukraine. This meant that thenceforward the Ukranian peasant was the legal owner of his allotment, in almost the same sense that a French or German peasant is the owner of his land. Specially appointed bodies were entrusted with the work of constituting self-contained, self-supporting farms, and breaking up the village system. To provide additional land to carry out these reforms, certain Crown lands were made over to the State Land Bank; and the Bank acquired in addition a number of private estates. In the six years after the passing of the Stolypin Laws 738,980 peasants were settled in self-contained farms; and 585,571 peasants were settled in groups smaller than the communes, according to a prepared scheme specially designed to form a transition stage between communal and individual cultivation. The Bank in the same six years transferred to peasants some 18,000,000 acres. As in the previous twenty-three years of its existence, from its foundation in 1883 down to the Stolypin Reforms, it had dealt only with 22,000,000 acres, it will be clear that the Reforms had notably quickened the process of transition to private ownership, even though no more than the fringe of the problem had been touched.[1]

In communes with communal ownership the Stolypin Laws made it optional for the communes to go over to private ownership. The majority of the Ukranian communes having communal ownership availed themselves of these facilities: but the majority of the Great Russian communes having communal ownership made no change. The truth is, the commune is an institution very well suited to the Great Russian temperament,

[1] It has already been shown that the land allotments at the Abolition were too small. Since the Abolition the population (in spite of a very large emigration) has increased by 43 per cent., whereas it is estimated that the additional land made available for the peasants, whether by purchase or leasehold, represents an increase of only 20 per cent.

There were altogether 795,000,000 acres of land in pre-war European Russia, of which 305,000,000 acres were peasant-land, 255,000,000 land-owners' land, and 235,000,000 Crown land.

and very ill suited to the Ukranian temperament. The commune appeals to that fundamental belief, which is ingrained in the Great Russian, in the majesty of the whole and the insignificance of the unit. Many of those who know Russia feel that that belief is amongst the noblest manifestations of the Russian character. However that may be, it forms no part of the Ukranian character. The first thought of the Great Russian peasant is for the general well-being. The first thought of the Ukranian peasant is for his own. He is profoundly individualist. He admires success, as the English or Americans admire it: he may envy and abuse it, but the sight of it excites his emulation. It is not so with the Great Russian peasant. There have always, of course, been individual peasants in the Great Russian communes who have grown richer than their neighbours, and acquired their own land in private possession. But their example has rarely been infectious: they have been more disliked than admired by their fellow peasants, and their success has been attributed rather to the will of God than to the efforts of the successful individual.[1] This psychological difference between the two peoples

[1] The following passage from the classic pages of Mackenzie Wallace puts the point more clearly than the writer can do: ' . . In Russia the way of looking at these matters is very different from ours. We should naturally feel inclined to applaud, encourage, and assist the peasants who show energy and initiative, and who try to rise above their fellows. To the Russian this seems at once inexpedient and immoral. The success of the few, he explains, is always obtained at the expense of the many, and generally by means which the severe moralist cannot approve of. The rich peasants, for example, have gained their fortune and influence by demoralising and exploiting their weaker brethren, by committing all manner of illegalities, and by bribing the local authorities. Hence they are styled *Miroyédy* (commune-devourers) or *Kulaki* (fists) or something equally uncomplimentary. Once this view is adopted, it follows logically that the communal institutions, in so far as they form a barrier to the activity of such persons, ought to be carefully preserved. This idea underlies nearly all the arguments in favour of the commune, and explains why they are so popular. Russians of all classes have, in fact, a leaning towards socialistic notions, and very little sympathy with our belief in individual initiative and unrestricted competition ' (*Russia*, London, 1905, vol. i. p. 185).

has undoubtedly tended to retard in the case of Great Russia, and to promote in the case of Ukraine, the formation of a class of land-owning peasants. But there was another factor, a historical factor, tending to differentiate the economic development of the two peoples.

Three and four centuries ago, when the Ukraine formed part of the dominions of the Polish Crown, large numbers of peasants, to escape the cruelties of Polish rule, fled to the steppe and organised themselves in communities of brigands or Cossacks. There were several of these communities : but the largest was that of the Zaporoguian or Zaporovian Cossacks, whose country was the region (now cultivated, but then virgin prairie) to the north of the Black Sea, *za porohi*, ' beyond the rapids ' of the Lower Dnieper. After the Ukraine passed from Polish into Russian hands, these Cossack communities were gradually dissolved. A section of the Zaporovians, unwilling to settle to a purely agricultural life, migrated to the Kuban region north of the Caucasus, and form to-day the Kuban *voisko* of the Cossacks. They still speak Ukranian. All the rest were given grants of land, and settled as free peasants in what are now the Governments of Pultava, Tchernigov, and Kharkov. Their descendants, though they have no military organisation and have nothing to do with the true Cossacks of the Don, the Caucasus, and Siberia, are commonly called ' Cossacks ' to this day. These Cossacks or free peasants, who have never known serfage and have owned their own land for four or five generations, have formed in Ukraine a nucleus, round which all those more enterprising elements among the peasantry, who through the Land Bank or otherwise have acquired their own land, tend politically to group. For years past the Ukranian peasant has had the standing object-lesson of a whole class of successful land-owning cultivators existing on the same soil and under the same natural conditions side by side with a whole class of unsuccessful communal cultivators. The object-lesson

has not been without its effect: and now that the land, as by miracle, has become available with which to make experiments, it has suddenly acquired acute practical significance.

It is worth examining what the object-lesson looks like on the spot. The German economist, Prof. Schulze-Gävernitz, in his Russian studies [1] describes a number of vacation tours, which he undertook in the Ukraine some seven or eight years before the passing of the Stolypin Reforms, in order to study the economic conditions in the Black Earth Zone. That one which it is now proposed to summarise was to two districts (Constantinograd and Kobelyaki) in the Government of Pultava, both of which are in the same region of the Black Earth Zone, and enjoy equal advantages of soil and climate. In the Constantinograd district Estate peasants with communal cultivation constitute 52·3 per cent. of the population. The land belongs to various large proprietors, mostly Great Russians or Poles. Often the peasant villages are surrounded in such a way that the peasants are bound to apply to the large estates for the pasture, which is indispensable for communal cultivation, and which, owing to the land-shortage, they cannot provide out of their own allotments. This pasture is commonly let by the large estates to the peasants, not in return for money payments, but for labour. The peasant undertakes to harvest so much of the proprietor's land, and in return is allowed to graze his cattle with the proprietor's cattle. Frequently the communes make an agreement of this sort for common pasture for the village. The peasants often rent arable land in addition from the proprietors. So great is the shortage of peasant-land.

The estate with which Schulze-Gävernitz was principally concerned in this district was a large one of 135,000 acres belonging to the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg, and called (as large estates often are in

[1] *Volkswirtschaftliche Studien aus Russland*, Leipzig, 1899.

this part of Ukraine) after the Christian name of the owner, Karlovka. Only 27,000 of its 135,000 acres were under the plough: lack of labour prevented the ploughing up of the rest. Twenty neighbouring villages provided the labour with which this land was harvested. In return for the 27,000 acres harvested the peasants received 8,000 to 11,000 acres of arable and 16,000 acres of pasture. The agreements were on the basis of $2\frac{3}{4}$ to $2\frac{7}{8}$ acres harvesting in return for $2\frac{3}{4}$ acres of arable: for the same area of pasture the peasant had to harvest 2 acres and carry the sheaves to the threshing-machine. The rest of the agricultural work on this estate (other work, that is, than harvesting) was done by the peasants for a money wage. The only permanent labourers kept were those who looked after the cattle. Ploughing, sowing, threshing, and taking the sheep out to pasture were carried out by labourers engaged for the summer, or from day to day. This work was only undertaken by the poorest peasants; that is to say, those shortest of land. Permanent labourers, at the time Schulze-Gävernitz visited the estate, were paid rather over *7d.* per day; summer labourers rather over *8d.*; and day-to-day labourers rather over $9\frac{1}{2}d.$ But cash wages in Eastern Europe can never be compared with cash wages in England or France without taking into consideration a great number of attendant circumstances.

The particulars here given apply to a big estate, capably administered, with no lack of capital, and with certain industrial by-products yielding profit. On many of the middle-sized estates[1] very often no money passes between the proprietor and the peasant who works for him. In such a case it is clear that the direct compulsion to work, which existed in the time of serfage, has merely been exchanged for indirect compulsion: and the worst economic feature of serfage—the fact that the peasant's interest is to do as little as he can—is retained.

[1] It is the medium-sized estates in the Ukraine which have been principally affected by the Stolypin Reforms.

The peasant-land under this system is steadily becoming less fertile. Before the Abolition the system of tillage was to keep a field under cultivation year in year out, till the soil was visibly getting impoverished, and then leave it under pasture for twice the same number of years. The original steppe cultivation was five years arable followed by fifteen years pasture. It was reckoned that during this fallow period the pasture was at its best from the fourth to the eighth year, and that by the end of the fifteenth year the land was virgin steppe once more. But this system implied that only one-fifth of the land was kept under cultivation. That is no longer possible even on the large estates. On the exiguous peasant allotments it is wholly impracticable. The result has been that the pasture-land has been steadily diminished, and the dependence of the peasants on the large estates proportionately increased. The peasants will now plough a field for six years on end, and then leave it to pasture for three years only. Many communes have no communal pasture at all; and the soil is continuously ploughed with some such rotation as rye, spring wheat, rye, barley, and (when the soil has been quite exhausted) buckwheat. With the diminution of pasture goes the weakening of the cattle. Then the peasant gives up the plough, which, primitive as it is, at any rate penetrates 3 inches into the earth. But it requires a good yoke of oxen to draw it. In place of it the peasant uses the *sokha*, which requires only one strong ox or a weak yoke, but penetrates only 1½ inches. If his cattle weaken still more, the peasant gives up ploughing, sows his winter corn on the stubble of the spring corn, and contents himself with scratching over the soil with an instrument like a large rake, made of wood with three to six iron teeth at intervals of about 5 inches. The end is emigration. In the last year before the War, for which statistics are available, of all the peasants from European Russia emigrating to Central Asia, 62 per cent. came from the Ukranian provinces; that is to say, from the richest corn-lands in all Eastern Europe!

It is not surprising that under these conditions the produce of the proprietors' land completely outclasses that of the peasants. Schulze-Gävernitz was given the following comparative figures for the Karlovka estate and for twenty neighbouring villages :

Harvest per *dessiatine* in *poods* on	Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's land	Adjoining peasant land
Winter wheat	156	none sown
Rye	169	45
Spring wheat	88	35

The difference was attributed partly to the use of fertiliser on the Grand Duke's land, partly to the quantity of weeds in the peasants' corn. As a further result of the weeds in the peasants' corn, the prices obtained in the same year at Rostov were per *pood* :

Grand Duke of Mecklenburg's wheat 45 kopecks
Peasants' wheat . . . 30–35 kopecks

From Karlovka Schulze-Gävernitz went to Kobelyaki. The Kobelyaki district is mainly inhabited by Cossacks. A few are Great Russian, but the majority are Ukranian. They have a peculiar status, midway between the peasantry and the *petite noblesse* : the peasants sometimes call the richer ones *polupanki* (half-lords). Their standard of living, however, is in no way different from that of the peasants ; and since, on the one hand, they have never had the burden of the redemption dues, and, on the other hand, they have never felt the need of French novels to read or English governesses for their children, they have been steadily growing richer, whereas both the *petite noblesse* and the peasants have been steadily growing poorer. A large number of these Cossacks, having holdings large enough to be self-supporting, have lived on them, taking no employment from anyone else.[1] Richer Cossacks rent land extensively from the large and medium estates, paying for it almost

[1] As stated above, 16½ acres is estimated to be the minimum on which a family can be self-supporting. Forty acres is reckoned the maximum which a single family can work, or with the use of labour-saving machinery anything up to 80 acres.

always in cash and not in labour. They rent it, moreover, as a rule for periods of several years at a time, instead of from year to year, as is the almost universal custom elsewhere in Eastern Europe. When Schulze-Gävernitz visited Kobelyaki, over two-thirds of all the large and medium estates in the district were held by the Cossacks on lease. In addition to renting land, they frequently purchase land, sometimes even dispensing with the aid of the Land Bank. In many districts, where they are settled, they are slowly breaking up the large estates. Some own many hundreds of acres. One very rich Cossack, whom Schulze-Gävernitz visited in Kobelyaki, owned nearly 3000 acres. He had just purchased an estate with the chateau of the former owner thrown in; and Schulze-Gävernitz found he had converted the parquet of the drawing-room into a threshing-floor!

The Cossack imports agricultural machines; he uses fertilisers, and has no regular fallow. He grows vegetables for sale, which the peasants rarely do. He has made good use of the Co-operative Movement, and grows corn largely for export. Though owing to his want of education his agriculture cannot be called scientific, he is keenly alive to make it profitable, whereas the majority of the peasants have hitherto aspired only to be self-supporting. There is no doubt that the Cossacks have led the opposition to the introduction or restoration of communal ownership, which culminated in the *coup d'état* of May 1918. That the bulk of the peasants relish their lead is, however, far from probable: for the Cossacks have not a reputation as philanthropists.

'We know you Cossacks,' the poorer peasants say; 'you are all fist. You grow richer, while your neighbours grow poorer. Why did all the souls of Petrovka village, save three, emigrate last year to Siberia? Because the Cossacks had bought up their allotments. We grow bread for our children to eat; but the Cossacks sell corn to the Jews in Odessa. . . .'

And so on. Such things were, no doubt, said a hundred times over on the Land Committees formed under

the short-lived *Universale.* But this time the Cossacks could reply :

' There is land enough for all now, Brother ; why not take it, and do the same ? '

This *argumentum ad hominem* seems to have been effective, though doubtless its success would not have been so dramatic or immediate, but for the German desire to materialise some of the fruits of the famous Bread Peace. But, with or without the German Occupation, and whether the *latifundia* are appropriated *en bloc* or broken up gradually, it seems certain that the Cossack party—that is to say, the Cossacks themselves and all the richer peasants—hold the economic future in Ukraine. They represent the process of transition from primitive to modern agriculture. The process began long ago, and was inevitable with the growth of the population and the passing of the steppe. It was immensely accelerated by the Stolypin Reforms. Even a strong Government, such as the Rada was not, could do little to arrest or deflect it. Great Russia is perhaps capable of sacrificing economic progress to a social ideal ; for the Great Russians are of those peoples who have faith, and with them all things are possible. But the Ukraine is not Great Russia : and no speculations as to the future can be of value which do not take this fundamental consideration into account.

INDEX

[*Figures indicate pages of the book.*]

ACTIVISTS, Polish, meaning of word, 78; under German Occupation, 78; on Council of State, 82–3, 113–17, 122; policy in light of events, 123
Agricultural Man, if reasonably treated, honest, 39
Agriculture, peasant, in Balticum, 39; in Courland, 39; in Lithuania, 67; in Russian Poland, 127; in Poznania, 88, 127; in Ukraine, 158, 160–1
—, large estates, in Balticum, 39; in Lithuania, 67; in Poland, 127; in Ukraine, 158–9; *and see* Karlovka
Ames, *The Revolution in the Baltic Provinces of Russia*, 43
Anti-Semitism. *See* Jews
'Austrian Solution,' in Poland, meaning of, 78; attitude of Galician Poles, 78; of Socialists, 79; of Central Powers, 79; fluctuations, 70

BALKANS, compared with Eastern Europe, 3, 4
Baltic Diets, particulars of, 32; after Russification, 32; painless expiry, 32–3
Baltic Law, 23, 24, 48
Balts, meaning of word, 21; numbers, 22, 41; '*Verlettung*,' 23; in Russian public services, 27; lack of working class, 30; of peasantry, 50; Colonisation Movement, 51–4; Young Balt Movement, 35, 50
—, national character, 29, 49; *Deutschrussen*, 27, 49; Pan-German ideas till recently unknown, 27; 'spiritual home,' 28; 'Super-Junkers,' 29; compared with English squirearchy, 24; with Irish landlords, 50; with Anglo-India, 30; with the good Etonian, 29; with Magyars, 30; with Prussian Junkers, 29; with Mecklenburg, 23; contrasted with Walloons, 29; with Russian *tchinovniks*, 24
Bank Ludowy, 102; *and see* Co-operation (in Poznania)
Bank Związku Spółek Zarobkowych (Bank of the Association of Co-operative Societies), in Poznania, 92, 93, 94, 97, 98–9; *and see* Co-operation (in Poznania)
Basilians, Uniate Order of monks, 137
Bendasyuk, Russophil Ruthene, tried by Austrians for treason 1914, 146; acquitted by Polish jury, 143; employed by Russian Occupation, 1914–1915, 146
Bernhard, Ludwig Prof., *Das polnische Gemeinwesen im preussischen Staat, die Polenfrage*, estimated, 85; quoted, 86, 92; second edition, 92, 101
Beseler, General von, Governor of Poland under Austro-German Occupation, personality, 113
Bismarck, and Poznania, 90; on a Fourth Partition, 104
Bobrikov, Governor of Finland, 12, 15
Bobrinsky, Count A. A., leader of Extreme Right in Russian Senate before Revolution of 1917, 144
—, Count George, Governor of Galicia under Russian Occupation, 144; Orders quoted, 145; interviewed in *Secolo*, 146
—, Count Vladimir, Russian Pan-Slav propagandist in Galicia, 140; methods, 140–1, 143; Galician-Russian Society, 141; understanding with M. Roman Dmowski, 142; Neo-Slav Congress of Prague 1908, 142; a 'Progress' through Galicia, 142–3; silence in Duma debate September 1915, 147

Bolshevism, appeal of, 130; compared with Nationalism, 130; with Democracy, 130; with French Revolution, 130; international repression, 130
— in Russia, 3; in Finland, 19; in Esthonia, 33; in Lettish Balticum, 47; in Poland, 130; in Ukraine, 150–2; *and see* Russian Revolution of 1917
Brödrich, Silvio, pioneer of Balt Colonisation in Balticum, 51; personality, 51–53; *Das neue Ostland*, 51
Bubnoff, *The Co-operative Movement in Russia*, 104
Bülow, Prince von, 86; *Imperial Germany*, 104
Burian, Baron, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, on Manifesto of November the Fifth, 112

CADETS. *See* Russian Liberals
Cambridge Magazine, Weekly Survey of the Foreign Press, 48
Caprivi, Count, and Poznania, 95
Catholic Church, sympathetic to Nationalism (in Lithuania) 59, (in Poznania) 92, (in Poland) 111, (in Ruthene Galicia) 139; barrier against Bolshevism, 130; for peasant against noble, 35; in medieval Balticum, 35; in Lithuania, 59, 60, 62, 64; in Poznania, 87; in Co-operative Movement, 92–4, 99 (*and see* Wawrzyniak); Russian Concordat, 65; Greek rite. *See* Uniates
Cecil, Lord Robert, British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs during War, 73; compared with his father, 104
—, Lord Robert, *Essays on Foreign Politics*. *See* Salisbury
Chelm, separated from Poland 1912, 146
Colonisation Movement, Balt, 51–4
Communications, lack of, in Russian Poland, economic consequences, 217; *and see* Roads, Railways, Waterways
'Consolidation,' group of Ukranian Nationalist Parties in Galicia, 139
Co-operation, in Lithuania, 67; in White Russia, 67; in Russian Poland, 104–5; in Ukraine, 162; in Poznania, 89; compared with Co-operation in Russian Poland, 104–5; in England, 89; in France, 98; in Denmark, 98; in Ireland, 98; Schulze-Delitzsch, 89; methods, 93; principles, 93, 94; central control, 90, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97; characteristic vicissitudes, 89–90; classes catered for, statistics, 89, 102; legal position, 95; financial position, 94, 97; political aspect, 96, 101; attacks by Government, 95–7; struggle for the Land, 98–100; elimination of usury, 94; clerical influence, 92–4, 99; *and see* Wawrzyniak, Związek Spółek Zarobkowych Polskich, Bank Związku Spółek Zarobkowych
Cossacks, so-called in Ukraine, origins, 157; distribution, 157; social status, 161; 'half-lords,' 161; drawing-room parquet as threshing-floor, 162; economic significance, 157, 162; political attitude, 162; relations with poorer peasants, 162
Council of State, Polish, as constituted Nov. 5, 1916, 82–3; as reconstituted Sept. 12, 1917, 116; powers, 113; activities, 113–17, 122; rejects conscription Feb. 1917, 101, 115; attitude to Austro-German Occupation, 113, 114, 116–17; internal friction, 116, 122
Czecho-Slovaks, General Haller and, 122; M. Dmowski and, 142; Neo-Slav Congress of Prague 1908, 142; Dr. Kramař, 142; Czech revival compared with Fennoman Movement, 9; German Tradition in Bohemia compared with Swedish tradition in Finland, 10; 'Undermost is now Uppermost,' 10

DANZIG, question of cession to Poland, 128; alternative mouth to Vistula opened by Germans in 1917, 129
Deutscher Verein in Kurland, 33–4; in Livland, 33–4; in Esthland, 33–4
Dillon, Dr., v

Divide et impera, Austrian genius for, 46; Russian unsuccess with, in Balticum, 46; in Lithuania, 61
Dmowski, Roman, Polish National Democrat leader, *La Question Polonaise*, quoted, 69, 109; personality, 109, 117, 119–120; stormy petrel of Poland, 117; compared with Pilsudski, 121; with Alexander Lednicki, 120; with Herr Erzberger, 109; anti-Semitism, 119–120; anti-Germanism, 120; the charge of pro-Russianism, 78, 110, 120; an anti-Russian period, 120; relations with Russian Pan-Slavists, 142; with Count Vladimir Bobrinsky, 142: with Czecho-Slovaks, 142; with Dr. Kramař, 142; Neo-Slav Congress of Prague 1908, 142; relations with Allies, 104, 117, 123; a Secret Agreement (?), 123, 128; question of Danzig, 128
Dorpat University, Russified in 1895, 26, 27; numbers before and after, 27; re-named Juriev, 26; 'when a man steals a shirt, he hastens to cut the name-mark out,' 26; academic atmosphere, 30; Professoriate, 31; the Dorpat duel, 30; corps not exclusively aristocratic, 31; compared with Heidelberg, 30; with Trinity College, Dublin, 30; Prof. Harnack on, 26, 31; 'an *Ersatz* for Dorpat,' 35
Doumergue, E., *Les Lettons*, 36
Dowbor-Musnicki, General, Polish military leader, 122
Drage, Geoffrey, 'Pre-War Statistics of Poland and Lithuania,' 1, 125, 128
Drahomanov, Mazzini of Ukranian Nationalism, 131; exiled from Russia, 148; a Professor at Sofia University, 148
Duma, Polish Club in 77, 109; attitude towards Finland (Third and Fourth Duma), 15, 16; Ukranian Club in (First and Second Duma), 134; eliminated (Third and Fourth Duma), 134

EDUCATION, in Finland, academic languages at Helsingfors University, 9; Socialist Compulsory Education Bill, 15
Education, in Balticum, educational system, 25; Russification of schools, 25; of Dorpat University, 26–7, 30–1; effect on illiteracy statistics, 27; concessions after 1905, 34; German Unions, 33; Congress of Lett School Teachers in 1905, 43; schools under German Occupation, 48
— in Lithuania, Russification, 57–9; concessions after 1905, 61; policy of Clergy, 59–60; Polish schools in Vilna under German Occupation, 65; Lithuanian schools in Prussia, 58
— in Russian Poland, under Russian rule, 128; under German Occupation, 128
— in Ukraine, Russification, 132; educational facilities for Ruthenes in Russia, 141; Ruthene University Question, 141
Emigration, statistics, in Lithuania, 67; in Poland, 127; in Ukraine, 160
'Emigration,' name for group of Polish aristocrats in Paris in first half of nineteenth century, 73; applied to M. Dmowski's National Council in Paris in 1917, 104, 123
Emigré Governments, recognised by Allies: Letts, 33; Esths, 33; Polish National Council in Paris, 104, 117
Encyclopédie Polonaise, quoted, 102, 125; *and see Petite Encyclopédie Polonaise*
Estate Peasants, in Russia, 154
Esths, ethnological, 21; distribution, 21; Nationalist Movement, 36; attitude towards Russia, 33, 46; rift between bourgeois and Socialist, 33; bourgeois *Emigré* Government recognised by Allies, 33; *and see* Maanôukogu
Eulogius, Russian Bishop of Volhynia, propagandist of Orthodoxy amongst Uniates, in Chelm, 145; in Podlachia, 145; in Galicia under Russian Occupation, 145; quarrel with Occupation authorities, 147

Russian Liberal Press comment on, 148

FENNOMANS, meaning of word, 10; history of Movement, 9, 10; linguistic side merged in political and economic side, 11
Finnish Diet, unreformed, 12; reformed, 14; after Russian Revolution of 1917, 18, 19; parties, 11, 18, 19
Finnish Senate, executive and second chamber combined, 12; unaffected by Reform of Diet in 1905, 15; made responsible to Diet in 1917, 18
'Flirtation Period,' between Prussian Poles and Government, 1890–1894, 95
Forest-land, agricultural settlement of, in Balticum, 52, 53; in Lithuania, 67
Four Hundred *strzelecki*, The. *See* Pilsudski

GALICIA (Austrian Poland), relations with Austrian Government, 79; support of 'Austrian solution,' 78; 'the Good Boys' (*die Musterknaben*), 79; *Mitteleuropa*, 79
—, East, Poles and Ruthenes, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143; Rising of 1846, 135; *and see* Ruthenes
Galician-Russian Society, Russian propagandist Society in Galicia, 141
Gauthiot, A., *Rapport sur une mission scientifique en lituanie russe*, 57
German Occupation, in Balticum, 47–9; in Lithuania, 62, 65; in Poland, 71, 78, 112–17, 122; in Ukraine, 151, 152, 163
'Good Boys, The' (*Die Musterknaben*), meaning of, 79; on Council of State, 82–3
Grand Duke Nicholas, manifesto to Poles, 111; to Ruthenes, 143–4

HALLER, General, Polish military leader, 122
Herzen, Alexander, quoted, 7
Hetman, of Ukraine, 151
Hrushevsky, Prof., historian, Russian and Ukranian spelling of name, v; *doyen* of Ukranian Nationalism, 148; exiled, 148; President of Rada, 149
Humour, sense of, of a Balt, 29; of Lett peasantry, 48; of the Poles, 110
Hyndman, Mrs. H. M., 'Letters from Finland,' quoted, 10, 16

ILLITERACY, in Balticum, 27; in Russian Poland, 127; in Warsaw, 127; in Lodz, 127; in Poznania, 127; in Ukraine, 133
Industrialisation, of Finland, 17; of Balticum, 36, 41, 55; of Poland, 107, 124, 129–30
Intelligentsia, in Finland, 10, 11; in Lettish Balticum, 36, 41, 45, 48, 55; in Lithuania, 58, 62, 63, 66; in Poland, 76, 108; in Russian Ukraine, 134, 148, 149–51, 153; in Ruthene Galicia, 137–40; conditions precedent to growth of, 59; effect of disproportionate growth of, 55; relations with peasantry, 134, 143; on the Land Question, 153
Ireland, compared with Finland: Gaelic League and Fennoman Movement, 9; 'twenty years of resolute government' in Finland, 18, 20; Finnish attitude to Russian conscription, 12; bilingual street-names, 9
— with Balticum: Land Purchase facilities, 37–9, 50; Dorpat University and Trinity College, Dublin, 30; Germans anxious to avoid 'reproduction of Irish conditions,' in Courland, 47; *and see* 50
— with Lithuania: Clergy, 59; emigration, 67; 'one son a priest,' 58; national wrongs, 61
— with Poland: the Ireland of Eastern Europe, 76; the impossible happens there, 76; Prussian attitude to Poles ('half amused, half irritated'), 85; Prussian belief in Conscription for Poles as education in loyalty, 91; absence of political agitation treated as sign of weakness, 91, 97; Poznanian humour, 97

JACKOWSKI, Maximilian, founder

and patron of Poznanian Peasant Unions, 86–8, 92
Jackowsky, Th. von, *Der Bauernbesitz in der Provinz Posen im 19ten Jahrhundert*, 99, 101
Jews, numbers, increase in Russian Poland, 125; 'Lithuanian Jews,' 125; decrease in Poznania, statistics, 94; in Lodz, 114; in Brest, 125; language, in Balticum German, 21; in Poland and Russia Yiddish, 21, 125; political attitude, in Balticum, 21; Revolutionaries, 12, 42, 60, 76; attempted assassination of Governor of Vilna, 60; Ghettoism versus 'Assimilation,' 125; Zionism, 125; usurers of Eastern Europe, 94; economic dominance in Lithuania, 58; in Poznania, threatened by Co-operative Movement, 94; in Balticum, threatened by Letts, 42; 'Manorial Jews,' 38
—, Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe, 124–5; in Poland, 76, 108, 124; pogroms in Ukraine in 1905, 134; H. Wickham Steed quoted, 124

Kalewala, pronunciation, 9; compared with *Divine Comedy*, 9
Karevicz, Bishop of Kovno, 62
Karlovka, large estate in Ukraine described, 158–61
Kessler, Otto, *Die Baltenländer und Litauen*, 53, 54
Kramař, Dr., Young Czech leader, 142
Kurländischer Kreditverein, and Lett savings, 41; and Balt Colonisation Movement, 52

Land Committees, in Ukraine, 151, 153, 162
— distribution, in Balticum, 38, 54; in Poznania, 99; in Russian Poland, 125–6; in Russia, 155
Landless labourers, in Balticum (*Knechte*), 39; attitude to land-owning peasants, 39; to Balts, 44; specimen contract with a Balt landlord, 40; wages, 40; savings, 41; compared with English labourers, 39; emigration to towns, 23, 41, 55; 'cut bread does not rejoin the loaf,' 42; sack of 200 country-houses in 1905–1906, 44
Landless labourers, in Lithuania, 66, 67
— — in Poznania, 99; contrasted with English labourers, 99
— — in Russian Poland, 127; emigration statistics, 127
Land-owning peasantry, in Eastern Europe compared with Balkan States, 4; with France 4
— — in Balticum (*Wirte*), 38; attitude to Balts, 39; to landless labourers, 39, 40; to bourgeoisie in towns, 45; to Socialists, 39, 45; 'Grey Barons,' 39
— — in Poznania, 99
— — in Russian Poland, 125; origins, 126; Russian policy, 126; increase of population, economic effects, 126
— — in Ukraine, origins, 157; described, 161–3; *and see* Cossacks
— — size of holdings, in Black Earth Zone, self-supporting minimum 16¼ acres, 153; average size at Abolition of Serfage, 8¾–3¾ acres, 153; maximum manageable by one family 40 acres, or with labour-saving machinery 80 acres, 161; in Poznania, 99
Land Purchase, in Finland, Socialist Bill, 15; in Balticum, 37; in Poznania, 98–100; in Ukraine, 162
Land Settlement, Prussian, in Poznania, Law of 1886, 90; Bismarck, 90–1; Amendment Law of 1904, 98; Expropriation Law of 1908, 98–9; Parcelling Banks, 98–100; compared with Russian Land Settlement in Balticum, 52; Polish resistance compared with Balt colonisation in Balticum, 52
League for the liberation of the Ukraine (*Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraine*), formation 1914, 148; programme, 148; relations with Austrian General Staff, 148; with German General Staff, 148; with Ukranian Club in Reichsrat, 148; with Rada, 148

Lednicki, Alexander, a pro-Russian Pole, 120; British Foreign Office on, 120
Lemberg University, Polono-Ruthene conflicts, 141; Ruthene Chairs, 141; demand for separate Ruthene University, 141; *Shliakhi*, organ of Ruthene students, quoted, 141
Lett Battalions, 46–7
Letts, ethnological, 21; distribution, 21; antipathy to Lithuanians, 60; attitude towards, Russia, 24, 46; towards Esths, 36; compared with Armenians, 55; rift between bourgeois and Socialist, 36, 40, 42, 46; bourgeoisie, origins, 41; attitude to Nationalist Movement, 42; under German Occupation, 48; *Emigré* elements, 33, 50; bourgeois *Emigré* government recognised by Allies, 33; proletariate, origins, 41; attitude to Nationalist Movement, 42; extremist tendency, 42, 45, 47, *and see* Russian Revolution of 1905; 'Tottenham Outrage,' 45; folk-song quoted, 37; Musical Societies, 45
Lewicky, President of Ukranian Club in Austrian Reichsrat, 138
Liberty, invocation of the preliminary to every Polish crime, 90; invoked by population of Lodz, 114
'Literaten,' Balt Upper Middle Class, 29, 30
Lithuanian Jews (*Litwaki*), 124
— printed books in Cyrillic, 57
Lithuanians, ethnological, 21; antipathy to Letts, 60; relations with Poland, 63–7; case of Norway and Sweden compared, 64; desire for Vilna compared with Italian desire for Triest, 64; National Movement, 59; clerical leadership, 59; *intelligentsia* in America, 59, 62, 67
Lodz, orthography and pronunciation, v; proletariate in, 107; German sanitary reforms, 114; textile industry, 130
Lönnrot, Editor of *Kalewala*, 8

Maanõukogu, Esth Assembly, 33; overturned by Esth soviets, 33; recognised by France and Great Britain, 33
Manchester Guardian, quoted, 120, 121
Mazeppa, 145
Mechelin, Dr., Svecoman leader, 14
Milutin, Polish policy of, 126
Moscalophilism. *See* Russophilism
Moskal, Polish for 'Muscovite' (i.e. Russian), 110
'*Musterknaben, Die*,' *See* 'Good Boys, The'

Napoleonic militarism, compared with German militarism, in Lithuania, 61; in respect of exactions, 116; Poles and, 101, 110, 115, 123
National Democrats, Polish, elements, 76, 108; programme, 76; activities, 84, 109; anti-Semitism, 76, 108, 119; struggle with Socialists in Russian Revolution of 1905, 77, 108–10; Polish Club in Duma, 77, 109–10; the charge of Russophilism, 78, 110, 120; at outbreak of War, 110–11; Manifesto of Grand Duke Nicholas to Poles, 111; after German Occupation, 78, 79; a new 'Emigration' in Paris, 104, 112, 121, 123; attitude to Council of State, 82–3, 112, 116–17; Congress at Moscow, 117; recognised by Allies, 104, 117, 123
Nationalism, interaction with Socialism, 2; pathos of infant Nationalism, 60; Nationalisms in conflict, 4
— in Finland, *see* Fennomans; in Balticum, 36, 55; in Lithuania, 59–67; in Poland, *see* National Democrats, Pilsudski, Poland (Imperialism); in Ukraine, 132–51, *and see* Ruthenes, Ukraine, Uniates
New Europe, The, and Slavonic names, vi; quoted, 6, 111, 148
Niemiec, Polish for 'German,' 110
November the Fifth, German proclamation of Polish Independence 1916 (*Zweikaisermanifest*), 71, 81, 103, 115; Baron Burian on, 112; internationalised Polish Question, 121

Obolensky, Prince, Governor of Finland, 14
Old Finns, origin, 11; strength in Diet, 11; record, 16; compared with Polish National Democrats, 11
Orthodox Church, nationality and religion, 134
— Russian, proselytism in White Russia, 65; in Chelm, 145; in Podlachia, 145; in Ruthene Galicia, 137; 'solicitations of the rouble,' 137, 143, 145; pilgrimages to Poczayevo, 141; educational facilities at Volhynian and Podolian seminaries for Ruthene *popovitchi*, 140; conversion of Ruthene village described, 143; Father Kabalyuk's wonderful magnifying-glass, 143; Holy Synod and Russian Occupation of Galicia, 145; popes sent to Uniate Churches, statistics, 146; conversions, statistics, 146; *and see* Eulogius, Russian Occupation of Galicia

Pan-Slavism, origins, 22; reaction to European culture, 21; Mackenzie Wallace on, 22; Russification of non-Russian nations, 22; attitude of Russian public opinion, 22; of Russian Liberals, 18–19, 149, 150; of Duma, 15–16; crimes, 31; suppression of Universities, *see* Universities; Pan-Slav touch, illustrated from Dorpat, 24; from re-naming of countries and places, 26; characteristic blindness, illustrated from Finland, 13; from Balticum, 42; from Lithuania, 67; attitude to Ukranian Movement, 134; irredentism, 140; 'Sovereign Russia to Russia in Bonds,' 140; alliance with Poles, 142; Neo-Slav Congress of Prague 1908, 142; activities described, 143; Russian Occupation of Galicia, 144–8; friction with Occupying authorities, 147; recriminations, 148; Duma debate Sept. 1915, 147; *and see* Russian Occupation of Galicia, Orthodox Church, Bobrinsky (Count Vladimir), Eulogius, Tchikhatchev
Parcelling Banks, in Poznania, 98–100
Passivists, in Poland, meaning of word, 78; under German Occupation, 75; attitude to Council of State, 82–3, 116–17, 122
Peasants, shy of politics, in Balticum, 45; in Lithuania, 57; in Poznania, 87; vote as told, in Russian Poland, 108; in Poznania, 86; confuse national with social issues, in Lithuania, 64; in Galicia, 138; with religious issues, in White Russia, 65; in Ukraine, 134; 'a Jew for breakfast, a Lord for dinner, and a pope for supper,' 138; keep accounts in their heads, 93; will not make clean breast of their debts, 94; attitude to Nationalism, in Poznania, 87; in Ukraine, 151; to Prussian rule in Poznania, 87; to Russian rule in Russian Poland, 126; to German Occupation, in Balticum, 48; in Lithuania, 61; to Russian Occupation in Galicia, 147; to Clergy, in Poznania, 87, 93; in Galicia, 138; to *intelligentsia*, 134, (on Land Question) 153; village aristocracy, 132; Old Poland, 86, 101, 107; State and Estate peasants in Russia, 154
Peasant Unions, in Poznania, 86–8; in Russian Poland, 104
Petite Encyclopédie Polonaise, 1; English translation, 1; *and see Encyclopédie Polonaise*
Petition of Subject Nations to President Wilson, 51, 62
Phillips, Prof. Alison, *Poland*, 1
Piip, Dr. Antonius, 32
Pilsudski, Polish Socialist leader, personality, 76, 115, 121; *petit nom* Ziuk, 82; before Russian Revolution of 1905, 76; after Revolution of 1905 in Galicia, 77; *strzelecki* (Riflemen), 77; invasion of Russia with the Four Hundred *strzelecki*, 77, 111; effect on national mind, 77, 110, 121; the Legions, 77; appointed Brigadier-General in Austro-Hungarian Army, 76; rallies to Supreme National Committee, 77; after German

Occupation, 78, 82, 83; Chairman of Army Committee of Council of State, 82, 122; Central National Committee, 77, 80–82; withdraws Brigade on Stochod, 76, 80; resignation and official censure, 80; opposes recruiting for Legions, 81; effect in America, 80–1; negotiates for Germans with Passivists, 82–3; friction with bourgeois Activists, 79–80, 116; politics in the Legions, 114; imprisonment in Germany, 117, 122
Poczayevo, a centre of Pan-Slav propaganda, 141; pilgrimages, 141
Poland, national character, 5; Lord Salisbury on, 74, 104; 'Slav enthusiasm without Teutonic power of work,' 90; dramatic sense, 70, 111; a notable sermon, 110; 'Pfe! Pedant!', 110; *beaux gestes*, 123; demonstrations and proclamations, 74, 109, 113; sense of humour, 110; the personal factor, 75, 107; compared with Anglo-India, 75; with Magyars, 107; Casimir, Stanislas, and Timko, *roman de mœurs nationales*, 106; only 'big' nation in Eastern Europe, 5; Imperialism, 5, 111, 123; in White Russia, 65–6; '*cuius religio eius regio*,' 66; 'Pole,' 'Latin' and 'Catholic,' three identical terms, 65, 135; compared with Prussian Imperialism in Poznania, 100; attitude to subject races, 135; parties, 75; feuds and fissures, 111; independent Conservative landowners, never any lack of, 83; aristocracy. See *szlachta*; social conditions, 130
—, Polish Question, Bismarck on, 104; Lord Salisbury on, 74, 104; factors discussed, 5, 71–5, 123–4; compared with German Unity movement, 121; with Italian Unity movement, 121–2; with Belgian Question, 121, 122; with United Netherlands of 1815–1830, 123
—, Prussian Poland, *see* Poznania; Austrian Poland, *see* Galicia; Army Question, *see* Polish Legions; N.K.N., *see* Supreme National Committee; P.P.S., *see* Socialism (in Poland); *see also* Activists, Austrian Solution, Dmowski, National Democrats, Passivists, Pilsudski, Regency Council
Polish Legions, origin, 77; Napoleonic memories, 110, 111; compared with Italian *Risorgimento*, 122, 123; numbers, 102, 114; Austrian Government transfers Galician conscripts, 77; withdrawal on Stochod, 80; under Occupation, 114; politics in corps of officers, 114; oath of allegiance, 117; dissolution, 117, 122; proposed formation of national army, 114–15, 122; conscription rejected by Council of State, February 1917, 101, 118, 122; compared with troops raised by M. Dmowski, 122
Political ethics, crimes of nations, 61; story of Dorpat, 31; Balt Special Constabulary in 1905, 45; conflict of cultures, Russian and Balt, 23–35; Russian and Scandinavian, 20; Balt and Lett, 36–55; German and Polish, 83–100; Polish and Lithuanian, 64, 66; Polish and Ukranian, 135–143; self-government, Liberal and Reactionary attitude to, 105; moral basis of Nationalism, 50; of Imperialism, 100; national self-help, 121–4; mustard-seed of nations, 59, 60
Population, statistics, in Balticum, 22; in Lithuania, 64; in White Russia, 65; in Poland, 72, 126–7; in Poznania, 100; in Ukraine, 134, 155
Posen. *See* Poznania.
Poznania (Posen), Prussian Poland, kernel of new Poland, 6, 72; '*via prima salutis, quod minime reris, Graia pandetur ab urbe*,' 72; a State within a State, 84; 'irretrievably bourgeois,' 105; contrasted with Russian and Austrian Polands, 103–4, 127; state of communications compared, 128; illiteracy statistics compared, 127. *See also* Co-operation (in Poznania)

Preyer, W. D., *Die russische Agrarreform*, 154
Prikarpatskaya Rusj, Russian propagandist newspaper in Galicia, 147
Prosvita, Ukranian educational organisation, 145
Protestantism, in N.E. Europe, 36; compared with Catholic Church, 36; de-nationalising influence, illustrated from Lithuanians in E. Prussia, 61; Lutheran Clergy in Balticum, 26; virtues and deficiencies, 35; attitude in Russian Revolution of 1905, 44; relations with Letts and Esths, 36, 43
Proverbs, 42, 138

RADA, ancient name for Assembly of Ukranian Cossacks, 149; formation after Russian Revolution of 1917, 149; Parties, 150–1; relations with Russian Government, 149–51; with Bolshevists, 151; with Central Powers, 151; collapse, 151, 163
Rädlitz, A. von, *Unter uns—ohne Maske*, 141
Railways, in Russian Poland, 128; policy of Russian General Staff, 128
Red Guards, in Finland, in 1906, Sveaborg Mutiny, 14; in 1917, Viborg Mutiny, 17, 18; fighting with White Guards, 19
Regency Council, Polish, 116
Rerum novarum, Encyclical of Leo XIII, and Poznanian Co-operative Movement, 93
Revue Ukranienne, La, Lausanne, 141, 144, 147
Roads, in Eastern Europe, 128; in Russian Poland, 128; in Poznania, 128
Rohrbach, Paul, *Das Baltenbuch*, 26; visit to Courland in 1915, 53; *Russisches Denkschrift*, 56
Rudnycky, Prof., Ukranian Nationalist geographer, *Ukraina*, 133, 134
Russia, national character, 3, 20, 156, 163; Mackenzie Wallace quoted, 156
Russian Commune, not an East European institution, 3, 155–6; Mackenzie Wallace quoted, 156; communal cultivation, explained, 153–5; described, 160–1; communal ownership, 153–4; in Great Russia, 154, 155; in Ukraine, 154, 155; Stolypin Reforms, 154–5; position at outbreak of War, 155
Russian devastations in retreat, in Balticum, 46, 47; in Lithuania, 62; in Poland, 116; in Galicia, 147
— Liberals, and subject nations, 131, 149, 150; and Finland in 1917, 18, 19; and Poland in 1917, 115; and Ukraine, 149–50; on Russian Occupation of Galicia, 147; delusions, 151
— Occupation of Galicia 1914–1915, Grand Duke Nicholas' Proclamation to Ruthenes, 143; Count Sheremetiev Governor August 1914, 144; Count George Bobrinsky Governor September 1914, 144; 'sterile Mazeppism,' 145; arrest of Ruthene Metropolitan, 144; 'no Mercier mess in Lemberg,' 144; suppression of newspapers, 145; of educational societies, 145; of schools, 146; conversions to Orthodoxy, 145–6; quarrel with Pan-Slavists, 147; evacuation of peasants, 147; interpellation in Duma September 1915, 147; reply of Tchikhatchev, 147; Russian Liberal Press comment, 147; *and see* Orthodox Church, Pan-Slavists
— Revolution of 1905, in Finland, 13; in Balticum, 42–5; in Lithuania, 60; in Poland, 76–7, 108–10; in Ukraine, 134; relation to Socialism in Eastern Europe, 2; to Nationalism, 56
— — of 1917, and Eastern Europe, 3; in Finland, 17–19; in Balticum, 32–3, 51; in Lithuania, 63; in Poland, 115; in Ukraine, 149–52
— State Land Bank (Peasants' Bank), in Balticum, 52; in Lithuania, 67; in Ukraine, 157, 162
Russification, in Finland, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18; in Balticum, 23–7, 35, 46; in Lithuania, 56, 57,

61, 67; in Ukraine, 132, 134, 148–9; in Galicia under Occupation, 144–8; *and see* Pan-Slavism
Russophilism, in Finland, 11, 20; in Balticum, 46; in Lithuania, 61; in Poland (Moscalophilism), 76, 78, 83, 112; in Russian Ukraine, 132, 150; in Ruthene Galicia, 138–47, *and see* Ruthenes, Ukraine, Uniates
Ruthenes, attitude to Poles, 135; to Russian Ukranians, 135; 'intellectual Piedmont,' 135; National Movement, in Reichsrat, 139; in Galician Diet, 139, 141; Clergy and *intelligentsia*, 137–40; relations with Vienna, 140; under Russian Occupation, 145; *and see* Ukraine, Uniates, Szeptycki
—, Russophils, in Reichsrat, 139; in Galician Diet, 139; in America, 140; in Lemberg University, 141; relations with Vienna, 140; with Poles, 142; with Russia, 136, 140–7; Old Ruthenes, 140; 'New Course,' 142; treason trials at Lemberg and in Hungary 1914, 143; at outbreak of War, 143; under Russian Occupation, 144–7; *see also* Bobrinsky, Pan-Slavism, Orthodox Church, Russian Occupation of Galicia, Russophilism

Salisbury, Lord, British Premier in nineteenth century, father of Lord Robert Cecil, formerly himself known as Lord Robert Cecil, *Essays on Foreign Politics*, 1, 74, 104
Scandinavian culture, 20; contrasted with Russian culture, 20; Finnish affinities, 20
Schism, 'A little schism in East Galicia would do no harm,' 142; 'schismatic dictionaries' in Lithuania, 57
Schulze-Gävernitz, Prof., *Volkswirtschaftliche Studien aus Russland*, 158–62
Schwertbrüderorden (Brothers of the Sword), ancestors of Balts, 21, 35; Dorpat Professors '*alle noch die alten Schwertbrüder*,' 31
Secret Treaties, The, documents quoted, 120, 121
Serfage, in Balticum, 35; Abolition in Russia by Tsar Alexander II 1861–1863, 153, 154, 155; in Russian Poland, 126; in Ukraine, 154
Sering, Prof. Max, quoted, 125; *Westrussland in seiner Bedeutung für die Entwicklung Mitteleuropas*, 154
Sheremetiev, Count, first Governor of Galicia during Russian occupation, 144; policy, 144; conflict with Pan-Slavists, 144; superseded September 1914, 144
Shevtchenko, Ukranian Nationalist poet, 131
Siczynsky, Miroslav, Ruthene student, assassinated Polish Governor of Galicia in 1908, 135
"Small" and "big" nations, 5, 20
Socialism, interaction with Nationalism, 2; tendencies in Eastern Europe and in Russia contrasted, 3
— in Balticum, origins, 42; foresight of leaders in 1905, 42–3; 'Tottenham outrage,' 45; in War, 47; prospects, 55
— in Finland, 11–18; compared with British Labour Party, 12; contrasted with Poles, 14; attitude in 1905, 12; Russophilism, 11, 16; moderation, 14
— in Lithuania, 60, 62
— in Poland, P.P.S., 108; struggle with National Democrats in 1905, 77, 108–10; association with Radicals, 77, 78; on outbreak of War, 110–11; a Polish Socialist on Grand Duke Nicholas' Manifesto to Poles, 111; under Austro-German Occupation, 116; friction with bourgeois, 116; Bolshevist parties (Left of P.P.S. and Social Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania), 130; *and see* Bolshevism
— in Ruthene Galicia, 140
—, Christian Socialism in Galicia, 136, 138; in Russian Poland (Christian Democrats), 75. *See also* Bolshevism
Social Revolutionary Party, in

Ukraine, 150–1, 153; agrarian programme, 152
Soviets. *See* Bolshevism
Spheres, The,' entourages of Tsar and Tsaritsa, 112
Sporting rights, in Balticum, 38; compared with English Game Laws, 38
State Peasants, in Russia, 154
Stavropihia (Institute of the Crucifixion), in Lemberg, 141, 146
Steed, H. Wickham, *The Hapsburg Monarchy*, 124; on Anti-Semitism, 124; on Kossuth, 73
Stolypin, Russian Premier, manipulation of Duma franchise, 134; land reform, Laws of 1906–1908 supplemented by Laws of 1910–1911, 154–5, 159, 163; position at outbreak of War, 155
Struve, Russian Liberal, 149
Strzelecki (Riflemen), 77; the Four Hundred, 77, 111
Supreme National Committee (N.K.N.), in Poland, formation, 77; some hurried departures from Cracow railway station, 78; relations with Russian Poles, 78, 79; friction with Central National Committee (Socialist), 80, 81
Svecomans, meaning of word, 10; political attitude, 10; propaganda in Europe before War, 1, 7, 12, 13
Szeptycki, Msgr. Count Andrew, Archbishop of Lemberg, Metropolitan of Ruthene Uniate Church in Galicia, pronunciation of name, 138; family, 139; personality, 139; compared with Lithuanian Bishop Valanczevskis, 59; policy, 139; attitude to *intelligentsia*, 139–40; to Nationalist Movement, 139; to Russophils, 136, 139, 141; relations with Poles, 139; with Vienna, 139; with Russia, 139; with Rome, 139; arrested under Russian Occupation, 144; a curious inscription, 144
Szlachta, Polish upper class, 107; compared with English 'gentlemen,' 107; with American millionaires, 107; with Magyars, 107; contrasted with other Slavonic peoples, 107; traditional connection with Paris (see 'Emigration'), 73, 85; sale of estates to Settlement Commission in Poznania, 91

TANNENBERG, Hindenburg's victory, 70; Polish associations of spot, 70
Taryba, Lithuanian National Council, 62, 63
Tchikhatchev, Russian Pan-Slavist, Reporter to Law for separation of Chelm from Poland 1912, 146; entrusted with Russification of schools in Galicia during Russian Occupation, 146; defence in Duma debate, September 1915, 147
Textile industry in Russian Poland, 130; conditions compared with Lancashire, 130
'Tongue-consciousness,' in Finland, 9; in Lithuania, 64; in Poznania, 87
'Tottenham outrage,' 45
Travers, R. *See* Hyndman, Mrs. H. M.
Two Emperors' Manifesto. *See* November the Fifth

UKRAINE, economic, 131; compared with Poles, 131; with Anglo-Saxon individualism, 156; with Finns, 131; with Great Russians, 156, 163; language or dialect, 133; Nationalist orthography, 133; Russophil orthography, 133; parties, before War, 134; in Rada, 150–1; relations with Great Russians, 134, 150; during War, 148–9; after Russian Revolution of 1917, 149–52, *and see* Rada; Land Question, *see* Russian Commune, Karlovka, Land-owning peasants, Universale
—, Austrian Ukranians in Galicia. *See* Ruthenes.
Ukranian Legions, formation, 148; numbers, 148; composition, 148; word of command, 149; boy-hero, 149; women volunteers, 149

Uniates, in Galicia, '*O mei Rutheni, spero per vos Orientem converti ad fidem Catholicam.*' 139; Polonisation, 135, 136, 137, 138, 142; Latinisation, 136–8; 'purifying the Greek Rite,' 135; celibacy question, attitude of *intelligentsia*, 137; of peasants, 138; 'a Jew for breakfast, a lord for dinner, and a pope for supper,' 138; of Bishop of Stanislau, 136, 137, 144; Ruthene seminaries, 137; *popovitchi*, 137; Basilians, 137
—, Nationalism of Clergy, 139; policy of Metropolitan, 139; friction with anti-clerical *intelligentsia*, 139
—, Russophil clergy, 136; numbers estimated, 141; number converted to Orthodoxy under Russian Occupation, 146; *Pravoslavnye Katoliki*, 136; Institute of the Crucifixion (*Stavropihia*), 141, 146; attitude of Metropolitan, 141; of Poles, 142; 'a little Schism in East Galicia would do no harm,' 142; *and see* Szeptycki, Orthodox Church
—, in White Russia, 65; converted to Orthodoxy, 65; reconverted after 1905 but to Latin Rite, 65; Latin Metropolitan at Mohilev, 65
—, in Chelm, 145, 146; in Podlachia, 145
Universale, old word for decrees of Hetman of Ukranian Cossacks, 151; used of decrees of Rada, 151; of November 20, 1917, abolishing private ownership of land, 151, 152, 154, 163
Universities, suppressed during Russification, Dorpat, 26; Vilna, 57; Warsaw, 128

VALANCZEVSKIS, Lithuanian Nationalist Bishop, 59
Valuyev, Count, Russian Minister of Interior in 1863, on Ukranian Nationalism, 132
Vistula, navigability particulars, 129; connection with Dnieper, 129: with Dniester, 129; with Prussian waterways, 129; with Frisches Haff, 129; *and see* Danzig

WAGES, in Balticum, 40; in Ukraine, 159; comparison with Western Europe, 159
Wallace, Sir Donald Mackenzie, quoted, 22, 156
Warsaw University, revived by German Occupation, 128
Waterways, in Eastern Europe, 128–9; *and see* Vistula, Danzig
Wawrzyniak, Msgr., Patron of Co-operative Societies in Poznania, 1892–1910; personality, 91–2, 97; compared with Maximilian Jackowski, 92; with Lord Cromer, 92; influence on parochial clergy, 93; attitude of ecclesiastical authorities, 93; 'Refrain from retaliation as heathenish,' 97; sequel, 97; struggle for land, 98; *and see* Co-operation (in Poznania)
Wertheimer, Fritz, *Kurland und die Dunafront*, 48; quoted from *Frankfurter Zeitung*, 48
White Guards, in Finland, in 1906, Sveaborg Mutiny, 14; in 1917, Viborg Mutiny, 17; fighting with Red Guards, 19; appeal to Germany, 19
White Russian Question, 65–6
Wirte. *See* Land-owning peasantry (in Balticum)
Wolf, *Prolegomena to Homer*, 8
Wolonczewski. *See* Valanczevskis

ZAPOROVIAN (Zaporoguian) Cossacks, origin, 157; flag revived by Ukranian Legions, 149; descendants in Ukraine, 157
Zweikaisermanifest. *See* November the Fifth
Związek Spółek Zarobkowych Polskich (Association of Polish Co-operative Societies), in Poznania, 89, 90, 93, 95, 96, 98, 101; *and see* Co-operation (in Poznania)

Printed by Spottiswoode, Ballantyne & Co. Ltd., Colchester, London and Eton.

Date Due

FE 4-52

DK46 .B98
The new eastern Europe,
Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library
1 1012 00022 3935